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THE PLURALISTIC FOUNDATIONS OF
THE RELIGION CLAUSES
Steven H. Shiffrinj
Contemporary Supreme Court interpretations suggest that the religion
clauses are primarily rooted in the value of equality. The United States Su-
preme Court has argued that in the absence of discrimination against relig-
ion (or the presence of other constitutional values), there is no violation of the
Free Exercise Clause when a statute inadvertently burdens religion. Simi-
larly, equality values have played a strong role in the Court's Establishment
Clause jurisprudence. Many distinguished commentators have pointed to
the equality focus and have argued that it gives insufficient attention to the
value of religious liberty. Professor Shiffrin argues that these commentators
are right in contending that an equality emphasis misses much of importance
in religion clause jurisprudence, but their emphasis on liberty or equal liberty
is too narrow. Instead, he suggests an understanding of the proper place of
equality in religion clause jurisprudence requires an appreciation of a wider
range of values.
Professor Shiffrin recognizes that the equality value is important, but
shows that many deviations from religious equality are deeply embedded in
the framework of government operations. For example, it will not work to
maintain that our Constitution regards religion and nonreligion as equal.
Indeed, the religion clauses are best interpreted to protect religion not just
because of values such as autonomy, equality, community, and religious
peace, but because religion is regarded as valuable. This, he suggests, is a
regrettable interpretation. It obviously is a bitter pill for religious skeptics to
swallow, and it should even be a source of regret for most religious believers.
Nevertheless, this interpretation is the best reading of our evolving Constitu-
tion. The foundational view that religion is valuable, however, does not flirt
with theocracy. Far from it. The Constitution forbids coercion and, with
exceptions, the favoring of one religion over another. Even more important,
the Constitution, with some exceptions, is best interpreted to curb government
intervention that favors religion, not because religion is a constitutional
f Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. I owe thanks to many people, most of whom
have read a draft of this paper in one form or another, including John Blume, Jesse
Choper, Christopher Eisgruber, Richard Fallon, Cynthia Farina, Martha Fineman, Sheri
Lynn Johnson, Trevor Morrison, Margaret Powers, Seana Shiffrin, Gary Simson, Father
Robert Smith, Madhavi Sunder, Lee Teitelbaum, and participants in the Conference on
Law and Religion, sponsored by the Program in Law and Public Affairs, Princeton Univer-
sity, Feb. 28, 2003, the Conference on Philosophy and Social Science, hosted by the Insti-
tute of Philosophy, Czech Academy of Sciences, May 16-20, 2003, and the Conference on
Feminism and Fundamentalisms, sponsored by the Feminism and Legal Theory Program,
Cornell University, April 11-12, 2003.
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stepchild, but because the seductions of governmental dependence are great
and because government is not to be trusted.
In applying his analysis, Professor Shiffrin explores many examples,
including (1) the ingestion of peyote; (2) animal sacrifice; (3) the govern-
ment 's use of religious symbols; (4) the government's support of monotheism,
including the Pledge of Allegiance; (5) the teaching of evolution in the public
schools; (6) the government's protection of conscientious objectors and those
who refuse to work on the Sabbath; and (7) voucher programs together with
government support for religion within the public schools. Given the plural-
istic nature of the values underlying the religion clauses and the variety of
contexts in which questions about the legal status of religion arise, he con-
cludes that equality can best be seen as one important value among many in
a rich and evolving tradition.
This tradition, he argues, is misunderstood by both the secular left and
the religious right. The secular left does not understand the importance of
religion in our constitutional tradition, and the religious right does not un-
derstand that government harms religion when it tries to help. Neither the
secular left nor the religious right understand the complex dimensions of re-
ligious equality.
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INTRODUCTION
Contemporary Supreme Court interpretations suggest that the re-
ligion clauses are primarily rooted in the value of equality.' For exam-
ple, in interpreting the Free Exercise Clause, the United States
Supreme Court has argued that in the absence of discrimination
against religion or in the presence of other constitutional values, it is
not unconstitutional for a statute to inadvertently burden religion. 2
Similarly, equality values have played a strong role in the Court's Es-
1 Without approving of the trend, Daniel Conkle has suggested that "formal neutral-
ity has become the dominant theme under both the Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses." Daniel 0. Conkle, The Path of American Religious Liberty: From the Original Theology
to Formal Neutrality and an Uncertain Future, 75 IND. L.J. 1, 10 (2000); see also Thomas C.
Berg, Slouching Toward Secularism: A Comment on Kiryas Joel School District v. Grumet, 44
EMORY L.J. 433, 446-47 (1995) (finding Court decisions "increasingly driven by the equal
treatment theme"). The emphasis on equality is closely associated with, but not identical
to, a "neutrality" approach to the Establishment Clause. See Zelman v. Harris, 536 U.S. 639,
676 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 809-10 (2000)
(Thomas, J., plurality opinion). Formal-not substantive-equality is the principal (but
not exclusive) value of that approach. Neutrality is a doctrinal approach, then; formal
equality is the primary value that it serves.
2 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990). For criticism of Smith, see
Jesse H. Choper, The Rise and Decline of the Constitutional Protection of Religious Liberty, 70 NEB.
L. REv. 651, 670-80 (1991); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith
Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1109, 1152-53 (1990) [hereinafter McConnell, Revisionism]. In
support of Smith, see William P. Marshall, In Defense ofSmith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58
U. CHI. L. REv. 308, 308-28 (1991). For debate about the original meaning of the Free
Exercise Clause, compare Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption:
An Historical Perspective, 60 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 915, 936-46 (1992), arguing that history
does not support religious exemptions from laws, with Michael W. McConnell, The Origins
and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1409, 1415, 1513-17
(1990) [hereinafter McConnell, Origins], arguing that history supports religious exemp-
tions from laws, and that these exemptions were "consonant with the popular American
understanding of the interrelation between the claims of a limited government and a sov-
ereign God." For John Locke's position, see JOHN LocKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERA-
TION 41-42 (James Tully ed., 1983). For analysis of the effect of incorporating the clause
into the Fourteenth Amendment, see Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Free Exercise
Clause: Religious Exemptions Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1106, 1149-56
(1994).
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tablishment Clause jurisprudence. 3 Many distinguished commenta-
tors have argued that the Court's focus on equality results in
insufficient attention paid to the value of religious liberty. 4 In my
view, these commentators are right in contending that an equality em-
phasis misses much of importance in religion clause jurisprudence.
But their emphasis on liberty or equal liberty5 is too narrow. Instead,
I will suggest that understanding the proper place of equality in relig-
ion clause jurisprudence requires appreciation of a broader range of
values with regard to both religion clauses, 6 and a recognition that
this appreciation is itself independently important. Discussing the
failure to recognize the full range of values underlying the Free Exer-
cise Clause is, of course, a necessary theoretical prelude to discussing
the Establishment Clause. But it is more than that. The failure to
appreciate the breadth of values underlying the Free Exercise Clause
is also pragmatically important because a better understanding of the
Clause could persuade citizens, jurists, and legislators that greater pro-
tection is appropriate in particular circumstances.7 With respect to
3 See Thomas C. Berg, Religious Liberty in America at the End of the Century, 16 J.L. &
RELIGION 187, 189 (2001) (referring to the Court's "shift in emphasis from separation to
equality"); Berg, supra note 1, at 446-47; Conkle, supra note 1, at 6-8; Noah Feldman, From
Liberty to Equality: The Transformation of the Establishment Clause, 90 CAL. L. REv. 673, 694-700
(2002).
4 See, e.g., Berg, supra note 3, at 198 (remarking that there is currently no Supreme
Court Justice consistently willing to depart from an equal treatment approach in favor of
embracing the value of liberty or substantive neutrality); Choper, supra note 2, at 680-84
(discussing the limited scope of protection offered by the Free Exercise Clause after Smith);
McConnell, Revisionism, supra note 2, at 1137-39 (supporting religious exemptions under
the Free Exercise Clause).
5 Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case Against Discretionary Ac-
commodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 555, 567-70 (1991) (arguing that the religion
clauses protect the values of liberty and equality or a regime of equal religious liberty).
6 Some scholars have somewhat broader views of the scope of religion clause values
than most others in the field. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1154-1301 (2d. ed. 1988); Timothy L. Hall, Religion and Civic Virtue: A Justification of Free
Exercise, 67 TUL. L. REv. 87, 112-17 (1992) [hereinafter Hall, Civic Virtue]; Timothy L. Hall,
Religion, Equality, and Difference, 65 TEMPLE L. REV. 1, 77-89 (1992) [hereinafter Hall, Equal-
ity]. Daniel Conkle, also displays eclectic views of Establishment Clause values. See generally
DANIEL 0. CONKLE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw: THE RELIGION CLAUSES (2003) [hereinafter CON-
KLE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw] (maintaining that multiple values underlie the religion
clauses); Daniel 0. Conkle, Toward A General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1113 (1988) [hereinafter Conkle, General Theory] (same). Although I share their com-
mitment to a broad understanding of the values underlying the religion clauses, I part
company with them concerning the character of the religion clause values, the way in
which they should be defended, and the manner in which they should be applied. Moreo-
ver, none of these commentators focus upon the complicated ways in which equality relates
to the religion clauses.
7 For example, many courts and legislatures have not yet addressed whether states
should interpret their own constitutions to provide more generous protection for religious
liberty than is afforded by the United States Supreme Court. See, e.g., Catholic Charities of
Sacramento v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 89-91 (2004) (leaving open the scope of relig-
ious liberties covered by the Free Exercise Clause of the California Constitution).
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the Establishment Clause, the failure to recognize the full range of
relevant values creates an additional difficulty. By failing to appreciate
the value of protecting religion from a government trying to be "help-
ful," the Supreme Court" and distinguished scholars9 make some Es-
tablishment Clause problems appear easier than they are. In reality,
too many values interact in too many complicated ways to hope or
expect that the clauses could be reduced to a single value such as
"equality" or even to a small set of determining values. Failure to ap-
preciate this complexity leads the Court and important commentators
to miss the extent to which the values underlying the Establishment
Clause conflict with each other.
In exploring these arguments, Part I argues that the Free Exer-
cise clause is supported by seven values: (1) it protects liberty and au-
tonomy;10 (2) it avoids the cruelty of either forcing an individual to do
what he or she is conscientiously obliged not to do or penalizing her
for responding to an obligation of conscience;1 1 (3) it preserves re-
spect for law and minimizes violence triggered by religious conflict; t 2
(4) it promotes equality and combats religious discrimination;' 3 (5) it
protects associational values;1 4 (6) it promotes political community;1 5
and (7) it protects the personal and social importance of religion.16
Part II argues that the Establishment Clause is also supported by
seven values: (1) it protects liberty and autonomy, including prevent-
ing the government from forcing taxpayers to support religious ideol-
ogies to which they are opposed; 1 7 (2) it stands for equal citizenship
without regard to religion;' 8 (3) it protects against the destabilizing
influence of having the polity divided along religious lines;19 (4) it
promotes political community;2 0 (5) it protects the autonomy of the
state to protect the public interest;2 1 (6) it protects churches from the
8 See, e.g., Berg, supra note 3, at 232-47 (describing cases involving government assis-
tance to religious institutions and activities that do not consider the risks of government
involvement).
9 See, e.g., JESSE H. CHOPER, SECURING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 174-78 (1995) (upholding
financial aid to religious institutions in some circumstances without considering the issue);
accord Douglas Laycock, The Underlying Unity of Separation and Neutrality, 46 EMORY L.J. 43,
70-71 (1997); Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 933 (1986) [hereinafter McConnell, Coercion].
10 See infra Part I.D.1.
I t See infta Part I.D.2.
H2 See infra Part I.D.3.
13 See infra Part I.D.4.
14 See infra Part I.D.5.
15 See infra Part I.D.6.
16 See infra Part I.D.7.
17 See infra Part II.B.1.
18 See infra Part I.B.2.
19 See infra Part I.B.3.
29 See infra Part ll.B.4.
21 See infra Part HI.B.5.
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corrupting influences of the state; 22 and (7) it promotes religion in
the private sphere.23
In assessing the appropriate relationship between religion and
the state, it is vital to draw upon an eclectic mix of resources. No
single source of interpretation should be regarded as dispositive. Al-
though original intent is entitled to some weight in some circum-
stances, it should not be primary for many reasons. Among other
things, it is not clear that the original intent of the Framers was for us
to follow their intent.2 4 Even if it were, the Framers themselves did
not agree upon the appropriate relationship between religion and
government. 25 And furthermore, even if they had agreed, it is not
clear that a legal theory requiring us to be bound in the twenty-first
century by the will of a group of eighteenth century white male agra-
rian slaveholders would have a lot to recommend it.26 Moreover, our
whole history of constitutional interpretation testifies that precedent
is a more important source of interpretation than original intent.2 7
Although precedent may be more important than original intent,
it also cannot be of primary importance for our inquiry. Our point
here is not to follow the law as if we were lower court judges, but
rather to extend our understanding of religion clause theory and ju-
risprudence. Therefore, precedent should not be our primary guide.
In determining the value of the religion clauses, we should consult the
best thinking on the subject and that should include the writing of
Framers, jurists, political theorists and commentators. Moreover, we
should be influenced by how relationships between church and state
have worked in practice, and there the testimony of historians, politi-
cal scientists, sociologists, and theologians is indispensable. In short,
my view is that in interpreting the religion clauses, we should act like
constitutional scavengers,2 8 appropriating the best theory and the best
22 See infra Part II.B.6.
23 See infra Part II.B.7.
24 H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REv.
885, 902-48 (1985).
25 CONKLF, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, s pra note 6, at 19. For an excellent account of the
different paths taken in analyzing the religion clauses and their historical antecedents, see
JOHN WITFE, JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT: ESSENTIAL
RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 7-36 (2000).
26 See Gordon S. Wood, Slaves in the Family, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV., DEC. 14, 2003, at 10
("Seeing Washington and Jefferson as slaveholders, men who bought, sold, and flogged
slaves, has to change our conception of them. They don't belong to us today; they belong
to the 18th century, to that coarse and brutal world that is so remote from our own.")
Although we might wish that the eighteenth century's coarseness and brutality was more
remote from our own, Wood's point about contextualizing the founders is on the mark.
27 Cf. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 97 (1993) (suggesting that an
originalist view would yield an "understanding of the Constitution [that is] dramatically
different from the understanding that prevails today").
28 Gregory S. Alexander, Interpreting Legal Constructivism, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 249, 249
(1985) (book review) ("In the deconstructed legal culture lawyers must be intellectual scav-
[Vol. 90:9
THE PLURALISTIC FOUNDATIONS
descriptions of how the world actually works in order to arrive at our
conclusions. On the other hand, the task is not to produce a "perfect"
Constitution, 29 divorced from the values, experiences, and traditions
of our nation. Our scavenging must produce insights that comforta-
bly fit within our evolving traditions. 0
In the end, there is no substitute for practical reason. Indeed,
when it comes to applying the religion clauses to concrete cases, I
press for the view that there is no pat formula, no single determining
principle that resolves them. What is true with the speech clause
3
'
holds with both the religion clauses: balancing or prudential judg-
ment concerning multiple values in a variety of concrete contexts is
unavoidable. By this I do not mean to suggest that ad hoc balancing is
always appropriate. The mix of values frequently requires the formu-
lation of rules and standards to apply in specific factual contexts.
32
That these rules or tests may differ need not signal confusion. They
may simply respect relevant differences. To have a sense of this, how-
ever, it is necessary to consider a range of situations. Accordingly, I
discuss many examples, including (1) peyote ingestion; (2) animal
sacrifice; (3) the government's use of religious symbols; (4) govern-
ment involvement with monotheism, including the Pledge of Alle-
giance; (5) the teaching of evolution in the public schools; (6)
government protection of conscientious objectors and those who re-
fuse to work on the Sabbath; and (7) government support for religion
within and without the public schools.
In both Parts of this Article, I argue that the religion clauses can-
not be explained by reference to equality. The equality value is im-
portant, but I try to show that many deviations from equality are
deeply embedded in the framework of government operations. For
example, it will not work to maintain that our Constitution regards
engers, raiding other disciplines for helpful vocabularies, using as much of the discourse as
seems helpful, and discarding the rest.").
29 Although I do not share Henry Monaghan's views of the Due Process Clause, I
think it unassailable that there can be a gap between what is constitutional and what isjust.
See Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 353, 354-60 (1981).
30 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 176-275 (1986).
31 STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, TIHE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROtaNCE 9-45
(1990) (defending a balancing methodology); Steven Shiffrin, Defamatory Non-Media Speech
and First Amendment Methodology, 25 UCLA L. REv. 915, 942-63 (1978) (same).
32 Thomas Berg recognizes that different tests may be appropriate in different Estab-
lishment Clause contexts. Thomas C. Berg, Religious Clause Anti-Theories, 72 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 693, 696--97 (1997). I agree with this methodological perspective, but part company
with Professor Berg regarding the scope of values underlying the Establishment Clause.
For a sampling of the literature exploring when to use rules and when to use stan-
dards, see Frederick Schauer, Codifying the First Amendment: New York v. Ferber, 1982 Sup.
CT. REV. 285; Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985); Shiffrin,
supra note 31; Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV.
L. REV. 22 (1992).
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religion and nonreligion as equal. Indeed, the religion clauses are
best interpreted to protect religion not just because of values such as
autonomy, equality, and religious peace, but because religion itself is
regarded as valuable. In my view, this is a regrettable interpretation.
33
It is obviously a bitter pill for religious skeptics to swallow, and it
should be a source of regret for most religious believers. As I will
argue, however, it appears to be the best reading of our evolving Con-
stitution.34 Nonetheless, the foundational view that religion is valua-
ble does not flirt with theocracy. Far from it. The Constitution
forbids coercion and the favoring of one religion over another (ex-
cept when it doesn't-more on that later). Even more importantly,
again with some exceptions, the Constitution is best interpreted to
curb government intervention in favor of religion, not because relig-
ion is a constitutional stepchild, but because the seductions of govern-
mental dependence are great and because government is not to be
trusted.
The upshot of these values and principles is that other deviations
from religious equality are sometimes permitted. In part, these devia-
tions are influenced by a strong religious presence in American cul-
ture, the pluralistic character of American religions, and the plethora
of conflicting religious beliefs. For better or for worse, the urge on
the part of religious culture to find some expression in governmental
activities leads to government engaging in monotheistic prayers. Be-
cause of the pluralistic and conflicting character of religious beliefs,
government often participates in practices inconsistent with or forbid-
den by many established religions. On a similar note, because reli-
gions impact government interests in diverse ways, government can
sometimes remove obstacles impeding the practice of some religions,
but not others.
Deviations from religious equality are not always fatal, nor should
they be. Similarly, compliance with religious equality should not al-
ways pass muster under the religion clauses. The kind of formal
equality denying liberty to those religiously burdened by a law not
aimed at religions is unworthy of respect. Financial aid afforded to
religious and nonreligious schools alike also raises serious Establish-
ment Clause issues despite compliance with equality. The same ap-
plies to proposals to permit equal access to classrooms for religious
and secular leaders. For those who revel in simplicity these conclu-
sions will be unsettling. But there is a deeper concern. Complying
33 As will be clear, this is not because I personally regard a religious perspective to be
false or without value (though many such perspectives are); it is because I believe that
governmental attempts to aid religion too often harm religion.
34 In so arguing, I support the view that interpretation of the Constitution involves
mixed normative and descriptive judgments.
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with equality is seen by many as a proxy for fairness. If equality is not
the central meaning of the religion clauses, there is the suspicion that
everyone is not being treated fairly. That suspicion is warranted, and
improvements can be made, particularly in the direction of substan-
tive equality. I will argue, however, that religious equality cannot pos-
sibly be achieved in a diverse society. Given the pluralistic character
of the values underlying the religion clauses and the variety of con-
texts in which questions about the legal status of religion arise, equal-
ity is best seen as one important value in a rich and evolving tradition.
Both the secular left and religious right misunderstand this tex-
tured religious tradition. The secular left does not understand the
importance of religion in our constitutional tradition. The religious
right does not understand that government harms religion when it
tries to help. Neither understands the complex dimensions of relig-
ious equality.
I
THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
The Massachusetts Bay Colony tried to protect its inhabitants
from blasphemers and heretics by banishing them from the colony. If
those banished returned, the authorities engaged in whippings, cut
off ears, bored tongues with hot irons, and resorted to executions.
35
For minority religions, freedom of religion was the right to keep quiet,
the right to be punished, or the right to leave Massachusetts. 3 6 To stay
in Massachusetts was to accept and live by the terms of the Puritan
deal.17
The fighting legal issue regarding free exercise today is not
whether persons are free to hold opinions different from the majority
35 TIMOTHv L. HALL, SEPARATING CHURCH AND STATE: ROGER WILLIAMS AND RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY 48-49 (1998);JAMEs A. MORONE, HEII FIRE NATION: THE POLITICS OF SIN IN AMERI-
CAN HISTORY 70 (2003).
36 Hall, Equality, supra note 6, at 29-30. The colonists thought they were following the
will of God. For the more influential argument that most religious persecutors misunder-
stood the will of God, see LocKE, supra note 2, at 23-26. Augustine, on the other hand,
thought that religious persecution was theologically justified. See IHLNS KONG, GREAT CHRIS-
TIAN THINKERS 81-82 (1994). And Locke's toleration did not extend to Catholics, Muslims,
and atheists. Locke, supra note 2, at 50-51. For a critical evaluation of Locke's argument
for religious liberty, see Stanley Fish, Mission Impossible: Settling the Just Bounds Between
Church and State, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 2255, 2255-69 (1997). On the Christian theory of
persecution, see generally PEREZ ZAGORIN, How THE IDEA OF RELIGIOUS TOLERATION CAME
TO THE WEST 14-45 (2003) (defining "heresy" and addressing how the church treated her-
etics from the earliest times of Christianity until the end of the Protestant Reformation);
John T. Noonan,Jr., Development in MoralDoctline, in CHANGE IN OFFICIAL CATHOLIC MORAL
TEACHINGS 287, 292 (Charles E. Curran ed,, 2003) (describing how both the church and
state "regularly and unanimously denied the religious liberty of heretics" for more than
1,200 years).
37 HALL, supra note 35, at 48-64.
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or to express those opinions in the public square, but the extent to
which government can restrict religious action.38 There is general
agreement that government may not single out religious action for
special adverse treatment.39 The question is whether a general law
that incidentally burdens religious conduct is vulnerable on the
ground that it violates the free exercise of religion. Let me begin by
giving two examples, analyzing them under the Supreme Court's cur-
rent approach, under traditional secular liberal approaches, and
under communitarian approaches, 40 before developing my own views.
(1) The state of Oregon outlaws ingesting peyote regardless of
the motivation for doing so. Four persons ingest peyote: the first as
part of a religious ceremony of a Native American church; the second
as an integral part of an artistic life, believing peyote ingestion is an
important part of the creative process; the third as an integral part of
a hedonistic life style; and the fourth who tries the drug out of
curiosity.
(2) Three persons violate a law against the torture of animals: the
first as part of a required religious ceremony; the second as a piece of
performance art; the third as a part of a sadistic life style.
A. The Court's Approach
Although the matter is not entirely free of difficulty, it seems that
the Court as currently constituted would deny the religious claims in
each of the examples mentioned above. Justice Scalia, writing for the
Court in Employment Division v. Smith,4 1 argued that a law outlawing
the ingestion of peyote could constitutionally be applied to a partici-
pant in a religious ceremony of the Native American Church.4 2 Justice
Scalia did not suggest that the importance of the state interest in the
individual case outweighed a cognizable religious claim. Instead, he
maintained that there was no cognizable religious interest in the first
38 Sometimes government can interfere with religion without interfering with relig-
ious action, for example, by desecrating sacred places. See generally David C. Williams &
Susan H. Williams, Volitionalism and Religious Liberty, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 824-31
(1991) (criticizing the view that "government action desecrating a site would present no
cognizable effect, but government action denying access to the site would, because the
religious harm would arise ... from the inability of Indians to perform ceremonies there").
39 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
40 As will become clear, some communitarian approaches are secular and some are
not.
41 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
42 The Smith case actually dealt with state denial of unemployment compensation ben-
efits to individuals who had been fired from their jobs at a private drug rehabilitation
center for ingesting peyote as a part of a Native American religious service. See id. at 874.
The Court had to determine whether the law prohibiting peyote ingestion could constitu-
tionally have been applied to the drug use at the religious ceremony to decide whether the
applicants were appropriately denied their unemployment benefits. See id. at 876.
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place.43 Any other conclusion, he suggested, would lead to a "system
in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh
the social importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious
beliefs."44 Ironically, under existing law, the artistic claimant in both
examples would have a cognizable speech claim 45 (even though it
would undoubtedly be unsuccessful). It seems that the First Amend-
ment is somewhat more solicitous of speech than it is of religion. 46 I
believe one would have to rise very early in the morning to justify this
differential treatment, and the Court has been sleeping on the subject
for some time. In any event, the Court's bottom line would ultimately
be the same for all claimants in both examples. One way or another,
their claims would be denied; equal protection under the law is not
always sweet.
B. Liberal Theory
Equality of application can be achieved in a different way, how-
ever. Followers of Immanuel Kant believe that rights may not be in-
fringed unless the exercise of those rights interferes with the rights of
others. 4 7 So, with respect to the peyote example, a Kantian might ar-
gue that the autonomous choice of the individuals involved should be
43 See id. at 878-80. Justice Scalia maintained that a successful religious claim could
be maintained only if religion were singled out for special treatment, see id. at 877-78, or
when the religious interest was accompanied by another constitutional interest, giving rise
to a "hybrid" claim. See id. at 881-82. On the fate of Smith in the lower courts, see Carol M.
Kaplan, The Devil is in the Details: Neutral, Generally Applicable Laws and Exceptions from Smith,
75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1045, 1060-73 (2000) (describing "distortions and inconsistencies" in the
lower courts' post-Smith jurisprudence).
44 Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. The sweep of the opinion led Michael McConnell to say that
the decision was "undoubtedly the most important development in the law of religious
freedom in decades." McConnell, Revisionism, supra note 2, at 1111.
45 Laws of general application with an incidental impact on freedom of speech are
required to meet what has in practice been a relatively undemanding test. The leading
case is United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) which upheld a law prohibiting
draft card burning, stating that "when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in
the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating
the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms."
See also City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000) (ban on public nudity upheld as
applied to nude dancing); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288
(1984) (ban on sleeping in the park upheld as applied to demonstration against govern-
ment policy regarding the homeless).
46 On the irony of this, see KENT GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS: INDIVIDUALS, COMMU-
NITIES, AND LIBERTIES OF SPEECH 22-24 (1995).
47 IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL EI.EMENTS OF JUSTICE 35, 43-44 (John Ladd
trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1965) (1797) (explaining that one individual does an injustice to
another when he interferes with the freedom of another); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY oFJuS-
TICE 204 (1971) ("[A] basic liberty covered by the first principle can be limited only for the
sake of liberty itself, that is, only to insure that the same liberty or a different basic liberty is
properly protected and to adjust the one system of liberties in the best way."); RONALD
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 199-200 (1977) (maintaining that except in extreme
cases, rights may be limited only when another right is abridged).
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respected because ingesting peyote does not interfere with the rights
of another.
The animal torture example is particularly difficult for the Kant-
ian. The Kantian traditionally believes that humans are distinguished
from animals in their ability to reason and make autonomous
choices. 48 According to this reasoning, animals have no rights be-
cause they are not moral creatures.4 9 Applying the principle that indi-
viduals' autonomous choices should be protected unless they interfere
with the freedom of others, a principled Kantian would have to con-
clude that in a just state, the believer, the artist, and the sadist should
each be permitted to torture animals.
Nietzsche once suggested that to have a system is to lack integ-
rity,50 and I would hope that followers of Kant would lack integrity in
this circumstance and not follow their principles. 51 Indeed, Kant him-
self did not always adhere to his principles. He himself argued that
animal cruelty could be proscribed because it brutalized human be-
ings,52 but this prefers one lifestyle over another and sidesteps the no-
tion that imposing suffering on animals is an independent wrong,
regardless of how it impacts human beings.5-
What the approaches of Scalia and Kant have in common is that
neither of them treat religious liberty differently from other forms of
liberty. Religion is not deemed to be special, and religious liberty
would have no special privilege in these examples. 54
48 See generally IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MoR-ALS (Lewis
White Beck trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1959) (1785) (explaining concepts of reason, auton-
omy, and human dignity).
49 See IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES OF VIRTUE 105 (James Ellington
trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1964) (1888).
50 FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE TWILIUH-I OF THE IDOLS OR, HOW ONE PHILOSOPHIZES
WITH A HAMMER, reprinted in THE PORTABLE NIETZSCHE 463, 470 (Walter Kaufmann ed.,
trans., 1968).
51 Even better, the Kantian tradition has evolved in ways that have modified its narrow
understanding of what makes human beings important or how much the differences be-
tween human beings and animals matter. For example, Tom Regan's articulate defense of
animal rights rejects the Kantian understanding of autonomy. TOM REGAN, THE CASE FOR
ANIMAL RIGHTS 84 (1983); see also CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, THE SOURCES OF NORMATVITY
152-53 (Onora O'Neill ed., 1996) (focusing on the extent to which an animal nature is a
part of human nature worth valuing and that both animals and humans have a "way of
being" someone that they share). I do not know if Korsgaard is suggesting that we would
have to share a way of being with animals to justify obligation. She does make it clear that
one may owe obligations to creatures whether or not they are moral agents.
52 KANT, su/pra note 49, at 106 (suggesting that cruelty to animals violates a duty to
oneself because it reduces compassion which, in turn, will harm relations with other
human beings).
53 See Steven Shiffrin, Liberalism, Radicalism, and Legal Scholarship, 30 UCLA L. REv.
1103, 1138-40 (1983).
54 Cf. RAINER FORST, CONTExTS OFJUSTICE: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY BEYOND LIBERALISM
AND COMMUNIARIANISM 69 (John M. Farrell trans., 1994) ("A person's religious conviction
is worthy of protection because it is identity-determining, and not because it is religious.").
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C. Communitarian Theory
The approach to religious freedom taken by communitarianism
depends on the particular form of communitarian theory. In general,
communitarians maintain that liberalism exalts individual liberty at
the expense of democracy and self-government, 55 autonomy at the ex-
pense of civic virtue 56 or community, and rights at the expense of du-
ties. 57 This cluster of ideas can lead to differing approaches regarding
freedom of religion. Distinguishing between participatory com-
munitarians, traditional communitarians, and substantive com-
munitarians should help illustrate this point.
A participatory communitarian would place most emphasis on
self-government 58 and the capacity of the polity to change. Rights, on
this conception, would not be discarded but would flow from the idea
of self-government and the conditions that make self-government pos-
sible. 59 On that analysis, it is easy to see how rights of freedom of
speech and press would arise. It is, however, more difficult to ground
a comprehensive right to freedom of religion.6 0 It might be possible
For the religious right, and some on the religious left, the worthiness of protection would
in part depend upon its religious character. In this respect, Justice Scalia, a religious be-
liever and a member of the right, is not a member of the religious right.
55 See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DiS-
COURSE 109-44 (1991) (discussing how the current focus on individual liberty makes it
difficult to cultivate the "values and practices that sustain our republic" through the politi-
cal process).
56 See, e.g., ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 252,
257-59 (2d ed. 1984) (preferring an Aristotelian emphasis on virtues over a liberal empha-
sis on rational rules); see also GERTRUDE HIMMELFARB, THE DE-MORALIZATION OF SOCIETY:
FROM VICTORIAN VIRTUES TO MODERN VALUES 9, 246-57 (1995) (contrasting differences in
content and observance of virtues in Victorian and contemporary times, and lauding Victo-
rian ethos requiring respect for others). Many of those associated with communitarianism,
including McIntyre, Michael Sandel, and Michael Walzer, do not accept the label for one
reason or another. DANIEL BELL, COMMUNITARIANISM AND ITS CRITICS 1 (Oxford 1993).
For the argument that liberalism also seeks to support virtues appropriate for the mainte-
nance of a regime of personal freedom, see PETER BERKOWITZ, VIRTUE AND THE MAKING OF
MODERN LIBERALISM 189-92 (1999).
57 GLENDON, supra note 55, at 76-108.
58 Self government does not refer to individual autonomy, but to democratic rule of
the polity. At best, of course, it is a metaphor. It would be hard to know who the "self' is
that rules in our "democratic" society. On the difficulties associated with the metaphor,
see Steven H. Shiffrin, Liberal Theory and the "Loyal Opposition"in Democratic Justice, 11 GOOD
SocIFTY 78, 79 (2002) (book review).
59 MICHAELJ. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHI-
LOSOPHY 321-28 (1996) (arguing that cultivating religion and morality is necessary for ap-
propriate discourse in a self-governing society). Compare SUNsTEIN, supra note 27, at
347-54 (arguing for a liberal republican defense of rights), withJOHN HART ELY, DEMOG
RACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980) (providing a liberal pluralist de-
fense of rights grounded in processes of representative democracy). For criticism of
Sunstein and Ely, see James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 TEX. L.
REV. 211, 233-39, 241-42 (1993).
60 On the problem, see ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 180-92 (1989).
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to squeeze freedom of religion into the idea of self-government by
positing that religion is necessary for the virtues that support self-gov-
ernment. Even accepting this assumption, however, it is not clear why
self-governing citizens could not be permitted to distinguish between
and discriminate against those religions that support civic virtues and
those that, for example, support intolerance toward others. Of
course, the notion of self-government assumes equality of persons, but
on the communitarian understanding, equality of persons does not
necessitate equal respect for the choices people make. 61 The par-
ticipatory branch of communitarianism, therefore, could support
some religions, but not others.
On the other hand, Cass Sunstein suggests that religious peace is
a precondition for self-government, and that religious persecution or,
more narrowly, government favoritism of religion, endangers religious
peace. 62 The necessity-for-religious-peace arguments do not afford a
sturdy basis for protecting religions that are unable or unwilling to put
up a significant fight,63 nor do they address other circumstances
where violence or instability are unlikely. Moreover, a virtuous citi-
zenry and a citizenry not embroiled in overt hostilities have value
above and beyond their support of political deliberation. Finally, the
civic virtue and religious peace values do not exhaust the range of
values supporting religious freedom.
Perhaps traditional communitarianism can provide a stronger
footing.64 Traditional communitarians conceive of traditions as the
foundation of the national community. One could certainly argue
that a substantial part of the American tradition is to protect religion.
On the other hand, communitarianism-even on that understand-
ing-justified anti-catholicism, 6 5 anti-semitism,6 6 and discrimination
against groups such as the Mormons and the Jehovah's Witnesses67
61 See MICHAELJ. PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND MORAL PERSPEC-
TIVES 59, 64-65 (1997); Michael J. Sandel, Political Liberalism, 107 HARv. L. RIEv. 1765, 1794
(1994) (book review).
62 SUNSTEIN, supra note 27, at 133-41, 307.
63 JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FoR? 48-49 (1996).
64 For a description of traditional communitarianism, see IAN SHAPIRO, THE MORAL
FOUNDATION OF POLITICS 171 (2003): "The communitarian outlook is distinctive, and dis-
tinctively at odds with the Enlightenment, in that its proponents see the good as collec-
tively given, embedded in the evolving traditions and practices of political communities."
65 See WILL HERBERG, PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC-JEW: AN ESSAY IN AMERICAN RELIGIOUS
SOCIOLOGY 231-34 (rev. ed. 1960);John C.Jeffries,Jr. &James E. Ryan, A Political Histoy of
the Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. L. REv. 279, 299-305 (2001).
66 STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, PLEASE DON'T WISH ME A MERRY CHRISTMAS: A CRITICAL HIS-
TORY OF THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (1997) (describing the history of anti-
semitism, with an emphasis on American culture).
67 On the Mormons, see Sarah Berringer Gordon, A War of Words: Revelation and Story-
telling in the Campaign Against Mormon Polygamy, 78 CHI-KENT L.REv. 739 (2003); on the
Jehovah's Wimesses, see Vincent Blasi & Seana V. Shiffrin, The Story of West Virginia State
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throughout much of our history, and it is not clear why it would not
justify discrimination against Muslims 68 and other minority religions
in contemporary culture.69 American ideals honor freedom of relig-
ion; American practice protects freedom of religion-except when it
doesn't. In interpreting American culture, do we look to the practice
or to the theory?70 If we look to the practice, we ratify violations of
religious liberty. If we look to the theoretical ideals, we risk aban-
doning the rich complications of the community for the abstract liber-
alism that communitarianism purports to denounce.
Substantive communitarians value religion as a source of moral
and civic virtue, as a way of life, and a way of truth. 7 1 Standing alone,
however, these beliefs are not necessarily tied to freedom of relig-
ion. 72 After all, the leaders of the Massachusetts Bay Colony were sub-
stantive communitarians, yet they banished heretics and
blasphemers. 73 Contemporary substantive communitarians presuma-
bly would make distinctions of quite a different sort than those of
John Winthrop, Cotton Mather, and their fellow colonists. Substan-
tive communitarians value religion as an associational activity and in-
cline against individualism.7 4 If the person who ingested peyote for
Board of Education v. Barnette: The Pledge of Allegiance and the Freedom of Thought, in CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAw STORIES 433-75 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2004).
68 RoWAN WILLIAMS, WRITING IN THE DUST: AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, at 67-68 (2002); R.
LAURENCE MOORE, TOUCHDOWN JESUS: THE MIXING OF SACRED AND SECULAR IN AMERICAN
CULTURE 111-12 (2003).
69 See WILL KYMLICKA, CON-TEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPH. AN INTRODUCTION 227
(1990) ("[T]he problem of the exclusion of historically marginalized groups is endemic to
the communitarian project.")
70 SHAPIRO, supra note 64, at 175 ("In most, if not all, communities, there is considera-
ble disagreement about how the collectively given norms and practices that have been
inherited should be interpreted and what they require in practice.").
71 "' [R]eligion was especially important to the development of a republican culture,'
with religious (including especially Christian) values and insights playing prominent and
substantial roles...." Daniel 0. Conkle, Secular Fundamentalism, Religious Fundamentalism,
and the Search for Truth in Contemporary America, 12 J.L. & RELIGION 337, 356 (1995-96)
(quoting Richard Vetterli & Gary C. Bryner, Religion, Public Virtue and the Founding of the
American Republic, in TOWARD A MORE PERFECT UNION: SIX ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION 92
(1988)); see also Lash, supra note 2, at 1118-22 (discussing the view that commitnent to a
republican culture involved the promotion of Christian values). As will become clear,
stress on cultural values does not exhaust the richness of the case for religious freedom.
72 On the perils of religious communitarianism, see FREDERICK MARE GEDIcEs, THF-
RHETORIC OF CHURCH AND STATE: A CRITICAL ANALSIS OF RELIGION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
122-25 (1995) ("Religious commnnitarian discourse is not a viable alternative to secular
individualism."); Hall, Civic Virtue, supra note 6, at 119 ("Historically, republican principles
were a poor ally for religious liberty. They could as easily justify jailing a dissenting
preacher who threatened republican solidarity as giving him free room to propagate mi-
nority religious tenets, and they were the joists over which the platform of religious estab-
lishment was most frequently laid.").
73 See supra text accompanying notes 35-37.
74 See STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW AND POLIT-
Ics TRIVikLIZE RELIGIOUS DEvOTION 17 (1993) (defining religion in terms of group
worship).
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religious reasons was associated with an institutional religion with a
history and an association of believers, the substantive communitarian
would be sympathetic. The substantive communitarian might have
less sympathy for the sincere, but individualistic, New Age pacifist be-
liever who did not belong to a religious group. Nonetheless, the sub-
stantive communitarian might be consoled by the fact that the pacifist
was following a duty to God rather than making an autonomous
choice.
D. Free Exercise Values
In my view, the approaches taken by the Court, the Kantian lib-
eral tradition, or communitarians are not sufficiently sensitive to the
special claims of religious believers. The foundations of religious free-
dom are more complicated than those approaches assume. Indeed,
the Free Exercise Clause is supported by seven different values.
1. Liberty and Autonomy
Both the religious claimants and the nonreligious claimants in
our examples maintain that they have made an autonomous choice to
lead their lives in a particular way, and the state is burdening an im-
portant aspect of their liberty. Unquestionably, autonomy is a signifi-
cant value, and it is part of the reason that the free exercise of religion
is supportable. Moreover, it should be clear that the free exercise of
religion implies the liberty right not to practice religion.75 As we have
seen, however, an emphasis on liberty or autonomy does not distin-
guish religious claims from artistic or hedonistic claims. If liberty or
autonomy is the crucial value, one can make a case for all of the claim-
ants, including those in the peyote and animal torture examples.
2. Obligation and State Cruelty
Unlike the other claimants, the religious claimant maintains that
her conduct is dictated by a moral obligation, not pursued according
to a choice or preference. 76 To be sure, the religious claimant has
75 Cf Torcaso v. 'atkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1961) (holding unconstitutional a
state requirement that a notary swear a belief in God because it invaded freedom of belief
and religion).
76 For these purposes, it should not matter whether the obligation comes from a be-
lief in God, traditional or otherwise. It is enough that the obligation is morally based. See
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 343-44 (1970) (interpreting the University Military
Training and Service Act to protect conscientious objection on "deeply held" moral
grounds without belief in God); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965) (inter-
preting the University Military Training and Service Act to protect conscientious objection
not based upon belief in a traditional God); AMY GUTMANN, IDENTITY IN DEMOCRACY 168-78
(2003) (discussing the extent to which ethical obligations should be accommodated
whether or not based on religious premises); see also William Herbrechtsmeier, Buddhism
and the Definition of Religion: One More Time, 32 J. FOR THE ScI. STUDY OF RELIGION 1, 15-17
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made the choice to accept the obligation (or may believe that he or
she has been given the grace to accept the obligation). 77 Nonetheless,
it seems particularly cruel 78 for the state to force individuals to do
what they are obliged not to do or to penalize them for responding to
obligations. 79 Moreover, to make no distinction between religious ob-
ligations (or obligations of conscience) and lifestyle preferences
seems to conflate too much. 0 Whether or not the religious claimant
(1993) (arguing that theistic definitions of religion are too narrow and cannot account for
religions such as Buddhism).
77 Resisting the free exercise claim of obligation, Professor Marshall argues that relig-
ion might be best understood as a "product of man's freedom rather than his external
obligation." Marshall, supra note 2, at 327. He suggests that his conception of religion is
more consistent with the commitment to freedom in the First Amendment than is Judge
McConnell's argument that "religion should be treated as the product of an externally
imposed obligation." Id. Marshall's conception of religion is underdeveloped, and seems
to be beside the point. Certainly it is not inconsistent with the Constitution to interpret
free exercise of religion to embrace individuals' duties to follow obligations when they are
freely accepted. To the extent obligations are deemed to be imposed without the possibil-
ity of rejection (presumably under some deterministic reasoning), the case for protection
seems even stronger. On the importance of obligation to religion and the role of subjectiv-
ity in accepting the obligation, see KAPL RAHNER, FOUNDATIONS OF CHRISTIAN FAiTH: AN
INTROnucrioN TO THE IDEA OF CHRISTIANITY 343-44 (William V. Dych trans., 1978).
78 One might argue that the problem is not cruelty, but rather that the state has no
jurisdiction to interfere in the religious sphere. See Michael W. McConnell, Religious Free-
dom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 173 (1992) (discussing the "view that the rela-
tions between God and Man are outside the authority of the state"). To be sure, the
Framers had a widespread view that some things belonged to God and others to the state,
see Hall, Equality, supra note 6, at 32-36, but it is not clear from the historical evidence that
exemptions of this type fell on God's side of the ledger. See Hamburger, supra note 2, at
932-33, 936-46. Treating state interference with religion as "jurisdictional overreaching"
is difficult to reconcile with a balancing approach that seems inevitable once exemptions
are recognized. See infra notes 104-117 and accompanying text. Moreover, the 'jurisdic-
tion" view of free exercise would afford no protection for those who acted on the basis of
moral conscience, not based on belief in God. Cf Seeger, 380 U.S. at 176 (construing "relig-
ious training and belief" to include "[a] sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in
the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by ... God"). One might still argue
that thejurisdiction view is a part of the values underlying the Free Exercise Clause. Given
the originalist pedigree for the argument, this argument makes some sense. See Hall,
Equality, supra note 6, at 32-33 (discussing conceptions of religious liberty from the colo-
nial period to the adoption of the First Amendment). Moreover, the case for a partial
religious foundation for the religion clauses is not confined to originalism. See infra notes
234-86 and accompanying text.
79 See McConnell, supra note 78, at 173 ("The Free Exercise Clause does not protect
autonomy; it protects obligation."); Geoffrey R. Stone, Constitutionally Compelled Exemptions
and the Free Exercise Clause, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 985, 993 (1986) (contending that requir-
ing conduct that is at odds with religious duty is more serious than overriding speech
preferences). As Professor McConnell observed elsewhere, an analogy to discrimination
against the handicapped appropriately illustrates the importance of accommodating relig-
ious duty. Failing to accommodate the handicapped treats them as if they are the same
when they are differently situated than other people. By contrast, racial discrimination
ordinarily treats people who are the same as it they are different. See McConnell, Revision-
isr, supra note 2, at 1140.
80 Joshua Cohen, pointing to the special nature of believers' moral and religious obli-
gations, argues that deliberative democrats should support religious liberty because re-
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should be punished for ingesting peyote, that claimant has a stronger
case than the artist who simply prefers, however strongly, to engage in
an artistic project. The point here is not that religion is more impor-
tant. The religion may be completely wrong. The point is the existen-
tial difference in the choice facing the claimants. Nor should it be
decisive whether the religious consequences facing a religious claim-
ant for violating the obligation are deemed by the claimant to impli-
cate eternal punishment, though that factor might be relevant to the
degree of burden the law places upon an individual.8 1 To force some-
one to do what he is obliged not to do is especially cruel, regardless of
the consequences he fears.8 2
3. Ineffectiveness, Respect for Law, and Mitigation of Violence
Triggered by Religious Conflict
Because the claim of the religious person flows from an obliga-
tion, a second reason supports special consideration for religious
claims. As John Locke famously argued, persecuting people in an at-
tempt to make them change beliefs might succeed in controlling ex-
ternal conduct, but it is unlikely to be effective in controlling beliefs.
83
To be sure, modern impositions upon religion are designed to control
conduct, not belief. But the existence of a law does not eliminate the
jecting it would deny the principles of equal citizenship undergirding deliberative
democracy. SeeJoshua Cohen, Democracy and Liberty, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 202-07
(Jon Elster ed., 1998). This claim accents the liberal character of liberal communitarian-
ism: liberal communitarianism derives from rights theory what is owed to citizens for them
to participate in a community, rather than focusing upon rights they have that flow from
the nature of a community. Michael Sandel argues that the unencumbered self of individu-
alism wrongly emphasizes choice and that it cannot explain freedom of religion. See
SANDEL, supra note 59, at 64-66. He suggests that observers have no choice but to follow
conscience, and that treating religion as a mere choice "may thus fail to respect persons
bound by duties derived from sources other than themselves." Id. at 67. This characteriza-
tion ignores the extent to which conscience can be cultivated or desensitized through vol-
untary action, and it further ignores what the Christian tradition would call sin, which in
many cases involves succumbing to temptation despite conscience. See also supra note 77
(discussing the relationship between freedom and obligation).
81 For the claim that free exercise claims of this stripe should be limited to those
claimants who fear extratemporal consequences, see Choper, supra note 2, at 679. For a
vigorous critique, see Gary J. Simson, Endangering Religious Liberty, 84 CAL. L. REv. 441,
446-51 (1996) (arguing that limiting protection to those who face extratemporal conse-
quences is underinclusive, ignoring religions and tenets that encourage compliance out of
reverence and love of God and duty to others). See also Hall, supra note 6, at 32-36 (com-
menting on the "core theoretical argument that centered on the perversity of subjecting
individuals to conflicting claims of sovereignty by God, on the one hand, and civil govern-
ment on the other").
82 The existence of obligation need not necessarily be a prerequisite for a Free Exer-
cise claim. See infra note 93.
83 LOCKE, supra note 2, at 27; see alsoJAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE
(1785), reprinted in THF MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF
JAMES MADIsON 12 (Marvin Meyers ed., 1973) ("Religion both existed and flourished... in
spite of every opposition from [laws].").
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perception of an obligation. Attempted enforcement of laws against
religious claimants might not even succeed in controlling external
conduct. In fact, it can frequently promote disrespect for law.84 For
example, persons drafted to serve in the military despite religious ob-
jections will often refuse to serve. The military will not get another
soldier, but the state will be forced to support another inmate whose
crime consists of following his or her perception of God's will over
that of the state. It would push this argument too far to suggest that
the absence of religious exemptions generally presents a serious risk
of violence, but the goal of religious peace is certainly a compelling
reason to ground a constitutional opposition to more general forms of
religious persecution. 5
4. Equality and Anti-discrimination
As Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager have argued in de-
tail, enhanced judicial scrutiny for religious claimants is appropriate
because of the possibility of discrimination on the basis of religion.8 6
84 See MADISON, supra note 83, at 15.
85 See LocKE, supra note 2, at 33; MADISON, supra note 83, at 14; J. JUDD OWEN, RELIG-
ION AND THE DEMISE OF LIBERAL RATIONALISM: THE FOUNDATIONAL CRISIS OF THE SEPARA
TION OF CHURCH AND STATE 168-70 (2001); Stephen Pepper, Conflicting Paradigms of
Religious Freedom: Liberty v. Equality, 1993 BYU L. Rev. 7, 17-18. For an argument that the
goal of religious peace has moral dimensions stretching beyond pragmatism, see JOHN
COURTNEY MURRAY, S.J., WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS ON THE AMERICAN
PROPOSITION 56-78 (1960). For doubts about the distinctiveness and cogency of religious
peace as a value, see Stephen D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional
Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 207-10 (1991).
86 Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The
Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 1245, 1248 (1994); see
alsoJesse H. Choper, Religion and Race under the Constitution: Similarities and Differences, 79
CORNELL L. REv. 491, 491-93 (1994) (arguing that a history of hostility and hate toward
religious beliefs and race provides a strong justification for strict scrutiny of government
discrimination based upon either); Stephen Pepper, Taking the Free Exercise Clause Seriously,
1986 BYU L. REv. 299, 307 (arguing that religion is perceived to be "subject historically to
abuse and persecution and therefore 'inherently suspect' as a basis for governmental classi-
fication"); Michael J. Perry, Freedom of Religion in the United States: Fin de Sicle Sketches, 75
IND. L.J. 295, 299 (2000) (contending that at a minimum the free exercise norm is an anti-
discrimination norm). For doubts that an anti-discrimination principle would have yielded
substantial protection in the areas where judicial scrutiny has been the most effective in
protecting religion, see Prabha Sipi Bhandari, Note, The Failure of Equal Regard to Explain the
Sherbert Quartet, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 97 (1997). For a wide-ranging and sensitive exploration
of the possibilities of the equality value regarding the religion clauses, see Hall, Equality,
supra note 6 passim.
Eisgruber and Sager deny that the value of religion entitles it to constitutional protec-
tion. Eisgruber & Sager, supra, at 1248. Their argument in part turns on objections to the
subjective character of balancing tests and views about the proper roles ofjudges and legis-
lators. Id. at 1248-59. These familiar objections, however, would seem to apply to vast
areas of constitutional adjudication-including freedom of speech-which they regard as
a model instance of constitutional value. Id. at 1250-51. They also deny that the cruelty of
burdening conscience makes religion special, arguing that it would be equally cruel to
burden the conscience of the nonreligious, or to punish or deny benefits to the disabled
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American colonists fled from and then imposed religious inequality.8 7
The Constitution was designed to put an end to such discrimination.88
In a sense, as Jack Rakove puts it, "the religion question occupied a
position similar to that of the race question in mid-twentieth-century
America." 9 Of course, adopting the Constitution did not usher in a
nation of religious equality. Discrimination against Catholics, Jews, Je-
hovah's Witnesses, Mormons, Muslims, atheists, and agnostics, among
others, stain our history.9 0 Although much of this discrimination has
been in civil society, the Court has played a role in reflecting the relig-
ious prejudices of American society.91 Nonetheless, the Court is well
prepared to stamp out clear cases of discrimination. Thus, when the
City of Hialeah outlawed animal sacrifice as part of a religious ritual
while permitting it in other circumstances, the Court unanimously
struck the ordinance down.9 2 Although the question of what counts
as discrimination and the question whether discrimination is some-
times justified can sometimes be complicated, I know of no commen-
tator and no Justice who denies that equality is an important free
exercise value.
for that which they cannot do. Id. at 1262-65. Although they are correct in this respect,
they provide no ground for denying a measure of protection to religious believers, but
instead show that those of nonreligious moral conscience and the disabled should also be
protected. To be sure, the cruelty rationale does not show that religion is itself valuable,
but it provides an additional basis for denying that equality is the exclusive rationale for
free exercise protection.
Finally, Eisgruber and Sager argue that religion can be a force for good or evil. Id. at
1265-67. They suggest that believers who violate otherwise valid laws do not likely engage
in actions that are for the good of the republic, and find government endorsement of one
(religious) view about what is valuable in life to be "indefensibly partisan." See id. at
1265-66. Even assuming a nonpartisan government on this understanding was workable
and desirable, but seeSilnIUIN, supra note 31, this, as I argue below, slides too fast over the
question whether our Constitution can best be interpreted in this way. As I argue below,
we might have a better Constitution if it did not regard religious views as superior to non-
religious views (among other things, religion would be better off), but we have a flawed
Constitution.
87 See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
88 See also MADISON, supra note 83, at 1 I (speaking of the "equal title to the free exer-
cise of Religion").
89 Jack N. Rakove, Once More into the Breach: Reflections on Jefferson, Madison, and the
Religion Problem, in MAKING GOOD CITIZENS: EDUCATION AND CIVIL SOcIETY 233, 256 (Diane
Ravitch &Joseph P. Viteritti eds., 2001).
90 See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text; see also R. LAURENCE MOORE, REI--
ious OuTSIDERS AND THE MAKING OF AMERICA (1986) (surveying the treatment by historians
of different religious groups in America).
91 SeeJohn C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment Clause,
100 MicH. L. REV. 279 passim (2001).
92 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546-47
(1993).
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5. Associational Values
Association is a significant value, independently supported by
nonreligious aspects of the First Amendment, but it is also one of the
values underlying free exercise.93 The importance of association to
freedom of speech is not often noted, 94 but it seems absolutely vital.9 5
Suppose the government outlawed the telephone book. The tele-
phone book seems crucial to interpersonal communication and asso-
ciation. Secular associations nurture friendships, beliefs,
controversies, ways of life, identities, and often impact upon the wider
social and political sphere. Religious associations do all these things
as well. Finally, the freedom of religious association warrants greater
protection than freedom of association generally not only because re-
ligious associations are more likely to be discriminated against, but
also because, as I shall subsequently argue, religion has special consti-
tutional value.
6. Promotion of Political Community
Free exercise promotes political community in many ways. First,
equal liberty with its implications for preventing violence is a neces-
sary prerequisite for the maintenance of a tenable political commu-
nity. Nations divided by the prospect or the reality of religious
persecution can hardly nurture a defensible political community.96
Second, the pluralistic character of American religion allows for
Madisonian checks and balances, thereby stabilizing the political com-
munity.97 Third, protecting free exercise has symbolic implications
that reach beyond its nonsymbolic functions. One of the defining
characteristics of the United States is its commitment to religious lib-
93 Suppose a law prohibits gender discrimination and does not provide an exemption
for the selection of religious leaders such as priests or ministers. Suppose further that the
particular religion bringing the claim does not argue that it is obliged to discriminate on
the basis of gender, but chooses to follow tradition or does so in order to avoid schism.
Presumably, applying the law to the selection of religious leaders would violate both free-
dom of association and free exercise. For powerful argumentation in support of equality
and dissenting rights within private associations, see Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112
YALE L.J. 1399 (2003) and Madhavi Sunder, Cultural Dissent, 54 STAN. L. REv. 495 (2001).
94 But see Seana Valentine Shiffrin, What's Wrong with Compelled Association, 99 Nw. U.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2005).
95 Association issues arise in a variety of contexts that will not be discussed here, but
the literature is large and growing. See, e.g., FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION (Amy Gutmann ed.,
1998) (analyzing the issue of freedom of association from various perspectives); NANCY
ROSENBLUM, MEMBERSHIP AND MORALS (1998) (arguing that associations need not reflect
public values to warrant constitutional protection).
96 Cf Conkle, General Theory, supra note 6, at 1166-69 (maintaining that religiously
inclusive policies support political community).
97 McConnell, Origins, supra note 2, at 1515-16. But see Steven D. Smith, The Rise and
Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 149, 204-07 (1991)
(questioning the pluralism rationale).
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erty. That the country has been at the forefront of offering such pro-
tection is a substantial part of the pride of being an American
citizen.9 8 There are grounds to question whether a commitment to
rights is enough to bind together a strong political community,99 but
it seems inescapable that the commitment to religious liberty is an
important ingredient in binding our political community together.10 0
Finally, as will be discussed infra, one can argue that the protection
and promotion of religious liberty supports the kind of civic virtue
necessary for the maintenance of a viable political community.10 '
7. The Value of Religion
Religion itself can be regarded as independently valuable. Like
autonomy, this consideration alone could support free exercise.
Moreover, it is possible to argue that religion is deemed to be constitu-
tionally more valuable than other forms of the good life' 0 2 (not
98 William P. Marshall, Religion as Ideas: Religion as Identity, 7 J. OF CONTEMP. LEGAL
IssuEs 385, 402 (1996) (observing that the interpretation of religion clauses has much to
do with how we identify with our country) (citing SHIFFRIN, supra note 31, at 5 (making
similar argument for the speech clause)).
99 Charles Taylor, Religion in a Free Society, in ARTICLES OF FAITH, ARTICLES OF PEACE:
THE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY CLAUSES AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 109-113 (James
Davison Hunter & Os Guinness eds., 1990).
100 Abner Greene argues that constitutional limitations on the effectiveness of relig-
ious groups in the political process justify religious exemptions. SeeAbner S. Greene, The
Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102 YALE LJ. 1611, 1643-44 (1993). Although no
legislature could base legislation upon what God's will might be on a subject, religious
groups can be enormously powerful in politics. Consider the Mormons in Utah or the
Lutherans in Minnesota. The inability to include religious terminology in the preamble to
legislation is of little political moment. Argument ultimately based on religious founda-
tions is routinely presented in public life, and-whether the issue be civil rights, the envi-
ronment, or what-have-you-it is typically easily translated in secular terms. Finally, as will
be discussed in further detail, the Establishment Clause does not generally foreclose legis-
latively created religious exemptions. See infra notes 367-81 and accompanying text. Al-
though Greene's argument is elegantly presented, to my mind it does not present a
persuasive argument for religious exemptions. On the role of religion in democratic life,
see Steven Shiffrin, Religion and Democracy, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1631, 1632-34, 1656
(1999) (arguing that neither the Establishment Clause nor democratic theory counsel
against using religious argument in democratic life).
101 See infra notes 234-70 and accompanying text.
102 To argue that it is crueler to force one to violate one's conscience than to force one
to abandon a personally vital artistic project is not to say that religion is more important
than art; it is to say that violating conscience punishes more harshly wholly apart from the
value of the religion or the value of the artistic project. On the other hand, if religion is
independently valuable from a constitutional perspective, theological arguments for free-
dom of religion might then be recognized as part of the structure underlying the religion
clauses. For example, Locke and others made theological arguments about the limited
jurisdiction of government with respect to religion and about the unchristian character of
persecution. LOCKE, supra note 2. To accept Lockean arguments necessarily is to reject
arguments based on other theologies with different conceptions of the propriety of perse-
cution or the relationship between church and state. This seems ironic on some readings
of the Establishment Clause. See Smith, supra note 97, at 149-50, 153-66. In my view, the
religion clauses are not neutral. They favor religion over nonreligion and theistic religion
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merely as a hedge against discrimination, for example) even though
the Constitution rightfully imposes severe limits on governmental at-
tempts to promote religion. I will consider these contentions in the
course of treating the underlying purposes and functions of the Estab-
lishment Clause. 10 3 For the present, however, it is enough to con-
clude that even if one assumes that religion has no special value under
the Constitution, even if the values of the Free Exercise Clause were
confined to liberty, autonomy, avoiding cruelty, stability, association,
community, and the like, religious claimants would deserve special at-
tention when the state imposed a burden on their conduct.
E. Applying the Free Exercise Clause
Special attention need not mean inevitable victory, however. 10 4 A
prudential judgment weighing the appropriate facts and circum-
stances is warranted. As Donald Giannella suggested nearly forty years
ago, the relevant factors include the importance of the secular govern-
mental interests involved, the relationship of the governmental means
to its interests, the impact that an exemption would have on the gov-
ernment interests, all balanced against the impact on religious liberty
including its importance in the particular case. 10 5 In addition, relig-
ious equality interests should be taken into account.'0 6
over nontheistic religion. If theological grounding of the religion clauses is accepted, see
id. at 160-64, theological partisanship is unavoidable. Although such theological argu-
ments have a historic pedigree and independent theological appeal-for reasons that will
become clear-I believe it best to restrict, to the greatest extent possible, the formal
grounding of the clauses to a civic perspective, recognizing however, that any governmen-
tal arrangements will in effect not follow the prescriptions of one religion or another.
103 See infra Part II.
104 Indeed, even before Smith, courts were not particularly sensitive to religious claim-
ants. See Choper, supra note 2, at 684; Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble with Accommodation, 60 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 743, 756 (1992) [hereinafter Lupu, Trouble];James E. Ryan, Note, Smith and
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 VA. L. REv. 1407 (1992)
(tracing the cases). Aside from inflating the importance of governmental interests, the
Court has exhibited a "distressing insensitivity" to what amounts to a burden on the free
exercise of religion. See Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free
Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. RFv. 933, 945, 960-66 (1989) [hereinafter Lupu, Rights].
To some extent, this narrow conception of burden stems from the Court's favoring of the
dominant American religious tradition over minority religions. See Williams & Williams,
supra note 38, at 797 (arguing that the Court had protected "nonvolitionist religious be-
liefs" like most Native American religions only from facially discriminatory regulations
while protecting volitionist religions from both facially discriminatory and facially neutral
regulations). For particularly strong claims in favor of religious liberty, see Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 195, 219 (1992), suggesting that
voluntary crucifixion should perhaps be protected. See also Stephen L. Pepper, The Case of
the Human Sacrifice, 23 ARiz. L. REv. 897 (1981) (using human sacrifice as the vehicle for an
innovative discussion of the scope of free exercise).
105 Donald A. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development:
Part L The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. Rev. 1381, 1390 (1967).
106 See supra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
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So, applying the factors isolated by Giannella to the peyote exam-
ple, in my view, the religious claimant should win. Even conceding
that the state interest in regulating peyote is significant, it would not
be sacrificed in any significant way by a compelled religious exemp-
tion. The law against peyote consumption burdens religion in a sig-
nificant way; and there are good reasons to believe that it
discriminates against a minority religion. For example, if the Protes-
tant majority ingested peyote as part of a communion service in Ore-
gon, the law against peyote ingestion would surely have exempted
religious ceremonies. 10 7 The Smith case thus reeks of insensitivity to
the plight of a religious minority.' 08 This is not to say that the Court
believes that the equality value has no role to play in free exercise
analysis, but the Court's conception leaves much to be desired. As to
the nonreligious claimants, whether or not it is good policy to outlaw
their conduct, there is surely no constitutional barrier. We do not live
in a Kantian country. To be sure, the artist might raise a free speech
claim, but even assuming his conduct fell within the scope of the First
Amendment, the artist would-and should-lose.
The animal sacrifice case, however, is more difficult. 10 9 On the
one hand, the state interest is important-animals deserve protec-
tion. 110 Surely, they deserve to be protected from the nonreligious
claimants. On the other hand, the law may seriously burden religion
if it prohibits people from fulfilling spiritual obligations. Moreover,
there are some equality concerns. Animals are treated horribly in this
society so that our meals will taste better.II1 If the state permits such
vile treatment of animals for culinary reasons, might it not be hypo-
107 Even during prohibition, mainstream religious services whose rituals required alco-
hol were exempt from prosecution. National Prohibition Act, Pub. L. No. 66-66, 41 Stat.
305, 308 (1919) ("Liquor for nonbeverage purposes and wine for sacramental purposes
may be manufactured, purchased, sold, bartered, transported, imported, exported, deliv-
ered, furnished, and possessed, but only as herein provided ....")..
108 It might be argued that ingesting peyote is more dangerous than drinking wine,
but the record in the Smith case showed that peyote ingestion in the Native American
Church led members to resist drug abuse, particularly alcoholism. Moreover, the church
forbade nonreligious use of peyote. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 913-16
(1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also McConnell, Revisionism, supra note 2, at 1135
(noting that evidence showed peyote use in the church was not dangerous and did not
lead to substance abuse). Smith's impact on minority religions ranges well beyond its facts.
See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 104, at 216 (arguing that Smith "entrenches patterns of defacto
discrimination against minority religions" (italics added)).
109 I am assuming that the state does not single out penalties for only those animal
sacrifices performed by religious groups or in the exercise of any particular religion. Any
such law would plainly be unconstitutional. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546-47 (1993).
110 On ethical issues concerning the relationships between humans and other animals,
see ANIMAL RIGHTS AND HUMAN OBLIGATIONS passim (Tom Regan & Peter Singer eds., 2d
ed. 1989); Toms REGAN, DEFENDING ANIMAL RIGHTS 1-27 (2001); PETER SINGER, ANIMAL Lisa
ERATION 1-23 (2d ed. 1990).
111 SINGFR, supra note 110, at 95-157.
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critical to outlaw similar treatment for religious purposes? Another
equality concern is exposed by asking whether there would be a simi-
lar prohibition if majority religions employed animal sacrifice as a part
of their ceremonies. The question answers itself, but too much
should not be made of the point. What if human sacrifice were an
occasional part of our majority religious ceremonies?112 Presumably,
such sacrifices would not be outlawed if that were the case. But that
counterfactual should not justify the inhumane practice of a minority
religion. 1 3 Equality is an important value, but it is not all-important.
In the end, one is forced to choose between vindicating religion
and stopping the inhumane treatment of animals in this context. If
we suppose that the religious treatment of animals is no worse than
that employed for culinary purposes or for medical research, 5 4 I
would conclude that the equality concerns should militate toward the
invalidation of a law prohibiting animal sacrifice. On the other hand,
if the religious ceremony involved treatment that is worse than that
employed for other, "legitimate" purposes, I would uphold the law.
These examples highlight two objections to invoking heightened
scrutiny of religious burdens. The first is that the process of making
such decisions is subjective. Supporting this objection is the fact that
honest and intelligent people disagree on how to resolve these cases.
Those Justices who employed heightened scrutiny in the peyote case
were divided over the resolution. 1" 5 The Constitutional Court of
South Africa was also deeply divided over the issue in a similar case." 16
That subjectivity is involved does not necessarily mean that the deci-
sions are arbitrary. If they were arbitrary, the Justices would be flip-
ping coins rather than engaging in argument about recurring
decisionmaking factors. Moreover, controversy frequently permeates
the outcome of constitutional decisions. The underlying logic of the
subjectivity objection is that if there are no obvious objective answers
to legal questions, the decisions should be in the hands of the legisla-
112 Cf Pepper, supra note 86, at 313 ("If Catholic or Jewish beliefs prohibited photos
on drivers' licenses, would they be required?").
113 To be sure, some religions may do otherwise objectionable things to animals as a
sign of spiritual respect to God. The ascription of "inhumanity" in the interest of animal
protection is taken from a civic perspective.
114 See Sidney Gendin, The Use of Animals in Science, in AMMAL SACRIFICES: RELIGIOUS
PERSPECTIVES ON THE USE OF ANIMALS IN SCIENCE 15-60 (Tom Regan ed., 1986).
115 Compare Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Smith, 494 U.S. at 891, 904-07, with
Justice Blackmun's dissent, joined by justices Brennan and Marshall, id. at 907-17.
116 See Prince v. President of the Law Soc'y of the Cape of Good Hope, Case CCT 36/
00, 2, 134-36 (2000) (freedom of religion guarantee in South African constitution did not
preclude denial of admission to the bar by applicant who previously used and continued to
use cannabis as a religious practice).
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tures. 117 To fully canvass this issue, we would need to replough the
ground unfurled in the debate over judicial review. We are not going
there.
The second and more serious objection is that judicial review of
this type violates the Establishment Clause. The idea is that the Estab-
lishment Clause forbids the favoring of religious claimants over non-
religious claimants." 8 To engage that objection, we need to
determine the underlying purposes of the Establishment Clause.
II
THE EsTABi.ISHMENT CLAUSE
A. The Court's Approach
A good starting point'1 9 for exposing the complexity of the Estab-
lishment Clause is County of Allegheny v. ACLU,120 where a Nativity
Scene was centrally placed in a public building during the Christmas
season. 121 The Court invalidated the display as a violation of the Es-
tablishment Clause, 22 but four Justices led by Justice Kennedy dis-
sented. 123 Justice Kennedy argued that as long as there was no
coercion 124 or proselytizing, 125 government should be able to recog-
117 ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE
LAw 129-32 (1990); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF IrERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAw (1997).
118 Philip B. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 5
(1961). For the claim that discrimination in favor of religious claimants violates the free-
dom of speech clause, see Marshall, supra note 98, at 393-97.
119 In a sense there is no good starting point, because it could be argued that the line
of cases involving government appropriation of religious symbols is quite different, for
example, from cases involving financial aid to religious organizations. One attempt to
unify the multifaceted factual contexts is to analyze them using the Lemon test, which scruti-
nizes government actions for a primary religious purpose or effect, or excessive govern-
mental entanglement. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Many, including a
fair number of justices, have attacked the test in ways that would weaken Establishment
Clause protection. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 319-20 (2000)
(Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting) (describing Lemon's career as "checkered" and collecting
cases questioning it). My colleague Gary Simson has argued that the test should be
strengthened in ways that so far as I can tell mark him ont along with Kathleen Sullivan as
the two strongest defenders of free exercise and separation of church and state (taken
together) among academics. GaryJ. Simson, The Establishment Clause in the Supreme Court:
Rethinking the Court's Approach, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 905, 935 (1987); Sullivan, supra note
104.
120 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
121 Id. at 578. The Justices also considered a display of a Chanukah menor-ih with a
Christmas tree and a "sign saluting liberty" in front of a city-county building, but the sim-
pler issue of the Nativity scene suffices to expose the larger issues. See id.
122 Id. at 579.
123 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Scalia joined Justice Kennedy. Id.
at 655. Although Justice White is deceased, Justice Thomas has since joined this voting
bloc.
124 Id. at 659-63.
125 Id. at 663-65.
[Vol. 90:9
THE PLURALISTIC FOUNDATIONS
nize and accommodate the role that religion plays in American soci-
ety. 12 6 Justice Kennedy thus echoed themes espoused by the religious
right. In a sense he suggested that instead of recognizing a high wall
between church and state, the government should be permitted to
build bridges. 127 Justice Kennedy pointed to many government prac-
tices recognizing the importance of religion, from the prayer opening
Supreme Court sessions 28 to Thanksgiving Proclamations by numer-
ous Presidents, 129 as well as the existence and support of legislative
chaplains 3 0 and a prayer room for members of the House and Sen-
ate. 131 To block Allegheny County from cooperating with this display,
argued Justice Kennedy, would show hostility toward religion. 1
32
Justice Kennedy and his concurring Justices clearly promote a
communitarian line.1 33 From their perspective, the state should be
able to cooperate with those forces of society that promote virtue; the
state should not alienate itself from the views of the people; indeed, in
the absence of coercion, the majority of the community ought to be
able to express themselves through local governments without rigid
constitutional intervention. Ironically, several of the Justices who
voted "for" religion in the Allegheny County case form a crucial part of
the majority of the Court in the peyote case that not only denied the
rights of the religious claimants in that case, but also would deny it in
any and all cases in which a statute incidentally impacts religion even
in a severe way, at least in the absence of some other constitutional
interest. 134 This looks like hostility to religion in the free exercise
context. It may not be pretty, but what unites the perspective of these
Justices is a communitarian perspective favoring majority religions
over minority religions because the majority is deemed entitled to ex-
press their religious views through the state. 13
5
126 Id. at 657-60.
127 William Van Alstyne, Trends in the Supreme Court: Mr. Jefferson's Crumbling Wall-A
Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 DuKE L.J. 770, 771 (referring to the shift from walls to
bridges in a similar case).
128 County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 672.
129 Id. at 671.
130 Id. at 672.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 655, 657.
133 Although the communitarian themes seem evident in Justice Kennedy's opinion
here, I do not mean to suggest that Justice Kennedy's constitutional jurisprudence rou-
tinely promotes communitarian values.
134 Here, of course, the religious right parts company with Justice Kennedy, favoring
strong free exercise interpretation and weak establishment clause interpretation.
135 An alternative view would be that these Justices are simply statist, that they are
replacing "an inordinate distrust of religion" with "an inordinate faith in government."
McConnell, supra note 78, at 116. Certainly these Justices ordinarily opt for a limited judi-
cial role with respect to the state except, for example, with respect to affirmative action,
attempts to increase Black representation, the 2000 election, and some First Amendment
cases. See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 387 (2003) (striking down the undergradu-
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The majority of the Court, however, disfavors the communitarian
approach. Instead, the prevailing Justices in County of Allegheny take
an egalitarian line. Using an approach offered by Justice O'Connor in
an earlier case, 136 Justice Blackmun inquired whether the display in-
volves an endorsement of religion. 137 An endorsement of religion is
invalid because it "sends a message to nonadherents that they are out-
siders, not full members of the political community, and an accompa-
nying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of
the political community."'138 Justice Blackmun concludes that viewers
may fairly understand that the purpose of the display is to endorse
religion, and it is therefore invalid. 1 9 Taking Smith together with
County of Allegheny---not to mention other cases-it would be easy to
conclude that equality is the central value of the religion clauses. In
Smith, religion and nonreligion are treated equally, and the law is up-
held; in County of Allegheny, religion is seemingly endorsed by the state,
and the law is invalidated. A proper reading of the Establishment
Clause cases, however, leads to the conclusion that equality is neither
a necessary condition in some cases to avoid a constitutional violation,
nor a sufficient condition in other cases.
ate admissions program at the University of Michigan); Bush v. Core, 531 U.S. 98, 111
(2000) (employing an innovative equal protection analysis in a way that effectively decided
the 2000 Presidential election); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 927 (1995) (striking down
Georgia's attempt to increase Black representation after Justice Deparunent refused to
preclear other plan); McConnell v. FEC, 124 S.Ct. 619 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., Kennedy,
Scalia, and Thomas, JJ., dissenting, vote to invalidate loophole closing sections of the Bi-
partisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 on First Amendment. grounds). Why the activity in
some spheres and not in others? My suspicion and suggestion is that these Justices' capacity
to empathize with some groups more than others plays a role in their willingness to engage
in searching judicial review of a state decision. McConnell also recognizes that the views of
the Court appear to favor mainstream over nonmainstream religions. McConnell, supra
note 78, at 139.
136 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
137 County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 592-94 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall,
Stevens, and O'Connor, 11).
1-38 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also William W. Van Alstyne,
What is "An Establishment of Religion"?, 65 N.C. L. Rev. 909, 914 (1987) (arguing that a
mingling of church and state denies equal respect owed to citizens); cf. Eisgruber & Sager,
supra note 86, at 1283 (advocating an "equal regard" analysis for free exercise issues). It is
possible to read this test as simply protecting the feelings of citizens. So understood, the
test is vulnerable to substantial objections. See William P. Marshall, The Concept of Offensive-
ness in Establishment and Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 66 IND. L.J. 351, 373 (1991) (arguing that
.the concern with offense contained in the current religion clause doctrine should be
abandoned" as inconsistent with speech clause theory and law). A better understanding of
the current endorsement approach is that the feelings of a reasonable person are a proxy
for whether the government has deviated from religious equality. The deviation, not the
reaction to it, is itself the violation. The endorsement test is vulnerable to other serious
objections, though most of them have bite only if applied to cases other than those involv-
ing the use of religious symbols by government. See McConnell, supra note 78, at 155-57
(arguing that the endorsement test should be modified to be a "favoritism" or "preference"
test even when applied in the context of government symbols).
139 County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 598-602.
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Establishment Clause analysis should take a page from the meth-
odology employed in free speech cases.' 40 That is, it should evaluate
the challenged state action against the full range of Establishment
Clause concerns, and it should proceed to determine if the state's pro-
motion of particular interests sufficiently justifies the impingement on
Establishment Clause concerns. 41 Examples in which the state pur-
sues formal equality can be especially useful because they help us draw
upon other interests implicated by the Establishment Clause. In the
next section, I explore these other interests and subsequently apply
them to specific examples.
B. Establishment Clause Values
The Establishment Clause serves multiple functions. It is a pro-
phylactic measure that (1) protects religious liberty and autonomy,
including the protection of taxpayers from being forced to support
religious ideologies to which they are opposed; (2) stands for equal
citizenship without regard to religion, as we have discussed; (3) pro-
tects against the destabilizing influence of having the polity divided
along religious lines; (4) promotes political community; (5) safe-
guards the autonomy of the state to protect the public interest; (6)
shelters churches from the corrupting influences of the state; and (7)
promotes religion in the private sphere.
1. Liberty and Autonomy
A longstanding claim about the relationship between the Free Ex-
ercise Clause and the Establishment Clause is that the Free Exercise
Clause protects liberty directly and the Establishment Clause protects
liberty indirectly.142 Thus, if the state sponsors school prayer, the
sponsorship pressures little children to participate in the prayer. In-
deed, the Court has held that a prayer at a high school graduation has
this effect. 143 From the liberty perspective, those who voted for the
140 SHIFFRIN, supra note 31, at 9-45 (explaining approaches employed by the Court
and advocated by constitutional theorists regarding content-based and conduct-based
speech restrictions).
141 Most Establishment Clause scholars do not support balancing. My colleague Gary
Simson, however, explicitly argues for a form of balancing albeit more restricted than what
I recommend. Simson, supra note 119, at 923-32 (proposing that if a law has a substantial
adverse effect on the Establishment Clause, it must serve a substantial government interest
in order to stand). The debate on whether to balance and, if so, how open-ended the
balancing should be is, of course, well developed in the free speech context. See, e.g.,
STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN &JESSE H. CHOPER, THE FiRST AmENDMENT: CASES-COMMENTS-QUES-
TIONS 149 n.b (3d ed. 2001) (citing sources).
142 The liberty aspect of the Establishment Clause is emphasized in Choper, supra note
9, and McConnell, Coercion, supra note 9, at 941. 1 rse the term liberty to include the right
to make autonomous choices about the particular character of religious exercise to follow.
143 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 598-99 (1992).
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claimants in the peyote case1 44 and against Allegheny County in the
creche case 145 were voting to protect religious liberty in both cases.
This interpretation also addresses the objection that preferring relig-
ious claimants over nonreligious claimants in the peyote case would
violate the Establishment Clause. To the contrary, if the Establish-
ment Clause is interpreted to protect religious liberty, favoring the
religious claimants in the peyote case would advance the objectives of
both clauses. 146
A particular liberty interest raised when government seeks to
fund religious institutions is the right of taxpayers not to be forced to
support religious ideologies to which they are opposed.147 It is not
clear to me that this interest is entitled to the weight attached to it by
opponents of vouchers and other subsidies of religious institutions. If
taxpayer liberty were the key issue, the appropriate remedy would be
144 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 907 (1990) (Blackmun,J.,joined by Bren-
nan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
145 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 620-21 (1989).
146 Berg, supra note 1, at 452 (suggesting religious voluntarism is at the heart of both
clauses); Donald A. Giannella, Lemon and Tilton: The Bitter and the Sweet of Church State
Entanglement, 1971 S. CT. REV. 147, 153 (explaining the "free exercise aspect of neutrality"
where religious liberty is seen as the central value of both clauses); Wilber G. Katz, Freedom
of Religion and State Neutrality, 20 U. CHI. L. REv. 426, 429-33 (1953) (maintaining that
protecting religious freedom by passing legislation that would be precluded by a rule of
complete church-state separation does not violate the Establishment Clause); cf Jesse H.
Choper, The Free Exercise Clause: A Structural Overview and an Appraisal of Recent Developments,
27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 943, 948 (1986) (suggesting that cases granting religious exemp-
tions are ordinarily constitutional because an Establishment Clause violation requires a
purpose to aid religion and significantly endangering "religious liberty in some way by
coercing, compromising, or influencing religious beliefs"); McConnell, Coercion, supra note
9, at 939-40 (suggesting that accommodating religion is unproblematic because an Estab-
lishment Clause violation requires coercion or interference with religious choice); Michael
A. Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach To Establish-
ment Clause Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 311, 313 (1986) (stating that both clauses
support religious liberty so no tension between them). On the difficulties of relying on
religious liberty alone, see CONKLE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 6, at 122. I do not
mean to suggest that promoting religious liberty can never violate the Establishment
Clause. Supporting the religious liberty of some, but not others, might do so. So might
supporting religious liberty beyond what is necessary to prevent free exercise violations in
some contexts. See infra notes 367-81 and accompanying text. If equality is respected,
however, stopping free exercise violations can never violate the Establishment Clause.
147 Madison argued that the compulsion to pay even three pence was objectionable
because it opened the door to "force him to conform to any other establishment."
MADISON, supra note 83, at 10. Isaac Backus vigorously complained of the "extortion" in-
volved when taxpayers were forced by the state to support religions. See Isaac Backus, An
Appeal to the Public for Religious Liberty, in ISAAC BACKUS ON CHURCH, STATE, AND CALVINISM
303, 325-43 (William G. McLoughlin ed., 1968). On this aspect of religious liberty, see
LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 1-26 (in colonies); 29-78 (in states) (2d ed.
1994); Douglas Laycock, The Benefits of the Establishment Clause, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 373,
376-77 (1992).
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refunds, not prohibitions. 148 Nonetheless, this concern is worthy of
some weight in an Establishment Clause balance.
2. Equality
If a state is permitted to endorse a particular religion, formally
creating insiders and outsiders on the basis of religion, there is good
reason to fear that this formal marginalization will carry over to the
social and economic spheres. t49 Discriminating on the basis of relig-
ion would be subtly encouraged. In addition, complying with formal
equality does not always address issues regarding substantive equality.
Equality of form can be accompanied by inequality of effect. Politi-
cians were not blind to the impact of state establishments at the outset
of our history. As Leonard Levy points out in his excellent history of
the establishment clause, "the American multiple establishments were
nonpreferential in law and theory but not necessarily in fact. In the
four New England states that maintained establishments, the Congre-
gationalists dominated overwhelmingly, as was expected when they
adopted the system of tax-supported nonpreferential aid." 150 This in-
equality of effect was a vital factor in the movements to eradicate the
state establishments. 1 5 1
One of the failures of the Smith case was its refusal to take ine-
quality of effect seriously enough to expose the state action to serious
constitutional scrutiny.152 As we shall discuss, a similar insensitivity ac-
companies the Court's treatment of vouchers. 153 Nonetheless, I will
argue that deviating from equality might sometimes best accommo-
148 Another possibility would be to require that those who have religious objections
give a somewhat higher amount (to assure sincerity) to charity. See Kent Greenawalt, Con-
flicts of Law and Morality-Institutions of Amelioration, 67 VA. L. REv. 177, 208 (1981).
149 See, e.g., Pierre deVos, South Africa's Constitutional Court: Starry-Eyed in the Face of His-
tory, 26 VT. L. REv. 837, 854 (2002) (suggesting that marginalization of non-Christian South
Africans could be linked to "social exclusion and political disempowerment").
150 LEw, supra note 147, at 77; see also id. at 134-37; Douglas Laycock, "Nonpreferential"
Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 875, 878 (1986)
(describing disproportionate impact as the source of "bitter religious strife"); cf Alan E.
Brownstein, Constitutional Questions About Vouchers, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. Am. L. 119, 126
(2000) ("Facial neutrality of government action does not guarantee religious
equality ....").
151 See, e.g., LEVY, supra note 147, at 139-42.
152 The law harmed a Native American religion, but had no impact on Christian reli-
gions or those of other traditions.
153 The Court's general handling of inequality of effect in constitutional law is per-
verse. For example, one of the great scandals of constitutional law is its refusal to take
seriously the inequalities associated with disproportionate racial impact while studiously
policing state regulations that have a disproportionate impact on interstate commerce.
Compare Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that disproportionate impact
on race does not ordinarily trigger elevated scrutiny), with Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397
U.S. 137 (1970) (holding that disproportionate impact on interstate commerce gives rise
to elevated scrutiny).
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date the interests at stake in particular contexts. Moreover, deviations
from formal equality may sometimes be justified in the interests of
substantive equality. 54
3. Stability
Religious wars have plagued the world for many centuries. If the
state is open for capture by religious groups, the potential for intoler-
ance, ugly confrontation, and violence is multiplied. 15 5 Nonetheless,
it goes too far to suggest that a significant purpose of the Establish-
ment Clause is to assure that the polity is not divided politically along
religious lines. The stability of our country does not depend upon
keeping religious arguments out of public life. Indeed, churches have
made many progressive contributions to the political life of the coun-
try.15 William Brennan famously wrote in New York Times v. Sullivan
that our Nation has a "profound national commitment to the princi-
ple that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open .... ,,157 It mocks that commitment to say that we believe
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open, except when it comes to religious speech. The religion clause
does not contradict the speech clause. The First Amendment is not at
war with itself.
Although the Establishment Clause should not be read to limit
the role of religion in public debate, the concern that religious divi-
sions can lead to violent conflicts is supportable. We live in a country
in which Catholics have been beaten over disputes about the role of
the Bible in the public schools;' 5 Jehovah's Witnesses have been the
perennial objects of maltreatment; 59 anti-semitism has been a persis-
tent problem; 160 Muslims have been particularly victimized since the
attacks on the World Trade Center, 16 1 and the Ku Klux Klan has
spread a reign of terror designed to produce a White "Christian"
America. The potential for violence is sufficiently serious to warrant
caution regarding governmental actions that embrace some religions
and exclude others. It may well be that the existing religious divisions
154 See infra notes 367-81 and accompanying text.
155 See supra note 85.
156 Shiffrin, supra note 100, at 1646-52 (discussing the progressive contributions of
religion to American democratic life).
157 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
158 JAY P. DoLAN, IN SEARCH OF AN AMERICAN CATHOLICISM: A HISTORY OF RELIGION AND
CULTURE IN TENSION 56-57 (2002) (referring to Nativist church burnings and Bible riots).
159 See generally Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 67 (documenting instances of discrimina-
tory treatment against Jehovah's Witnesses).
160 See FELDMAN, supra note 66.
161 Discrimination against Muslims long preceded the attacks on the World Trade
Center. Edward McGlynn Gaffney,Jr., Hostility to Religion, American Style, 42 DEPAUL L. REv.
263, 274-79 (1992).
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in our country have been substantially less violent because the Estab-
lishment Clause has precluded state capture for religious purposes.
4. Promoting Political Community
It is possible to maintain a political community with an estab-
lished religion.' 6 2 The dangers to a political community from an es-
tablished church are not as significant as those that are triggered by
religious persecution. Religious persecution predictably triggers re-
sponsive hostility, but using government symbols to mark some reli-
gions as outside or at the margins of the political community is also
risky. Symbolic affronts themselves undermine the kind of reciprocal
respect that is helpful in supporting political community. A govern-
ment that treats all citizens as insiders regardless of their religious be-
liefs helps to foster a more inclusive political community. 163
5. Protecting the Autonomy of Government
Another historical concern is that religions will use the govern-
ment to further their own sectarian ends. 164 The colonists, after all,
had fled from a situation in which they believed that religions had
used the machinery of the state to their disadvantage. Moreover, in
the pre-Vatican II age, Protestant Americans worried that if Catholics
came to power they would threaten liberties and institute the type of
religious persecutions all too prevalent in Europe.16  That these con-
cerns were exaggerated and fueled by class and ethnic prejudice does
not negate the legitimacy of a concern that religions might use gov-
ernment for their own ends. Indeed, the Protestants captured the
public school system and used it in an attempt to instill their own
religious views. 166 That they called this hegemony "nondenomina-
162 England continues to do so to this day.
163 Conkle, General Theory, supra note 6, at 1166-69.
164 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 623 (1971). See generally Marci Hamilton, The
Constitution's Pragmatic Balance of Power Between Church and State, SD02 ALI-ABA 501 (1998)
[hereinafter Hamilton, Pragmatic Balance] (exploring dangers accompanying politically
powerful religious interests); Marci A. Hamilton, Power, The Establishment Clause, and Vouch-
ers, 31 CONN. L. REv. 807, 821 (1999) [hereinafter Hamilton, Power] ("Religion is not a
passive participant in the political process but rather a potent presence with the capacity to
overreach."); Pepper, supra note 85, at 18-19 (expressing concern that a church-state alli-
ance would th reaten liberty and good government). But cf Ira C. Lupu, Threading Between
the Religion Clauses, 63 LA%%W & CONTEMP. PROBs. 439, 445-46 (2000) (suggesting that relig-
ious groups "deserve[ ] the same political liberty as other" groups).
165 STEPHEN MAcF.no, DtVRRSITY AND DISTRUST 61-63 (2000) (discussing the contribu-
tion of pre-Vatican II Catholic attitudes toward liberty and democracy to anti-Catholic hos-
tility); JOHN T. MCGREEW, CATHOLICISM AND AMERICAN FREEDOM: A HISTORY 170 (2003)
(referring to the "familiar" arguments about potential Catholic threats to religious liberty).
166 Conkle, supra note 1, at 4 ("[T]hroughout most of our country's history, there has
been an overt Christian, and primarily Protestant, dominance in American law and public
life.").
2004]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
tional" did not successfully paper over the fact that Protestants were
using government to further their own religious ends. This concern
need not mean that the Establishment Clause precludes religious par-
ticipation in political life. It does, however, exhibit concern that par-
ticular forms of legislation make government an instrumentality of
particular religions. If government adopts a civil rights law or abol-
ishes capital punishment in response to lobbying by religious believ-
ers, there is no Establishment Clause problem.' 67 If it places a Creche
in a prominent public place, it is reasonable to be concerned that
religion is using government to further its own sectarian ends.
6. Protecting Churches
In The Garden and the Wilderness, Mark Dewolfe Howe emphasizes
Roger Williams's contribution to the analysis of freedom of relig-
ion. 168 According to Howe, Williams warned that close connections
between church and state would work to the detriment of religion. If
the church is the garden and the state is the wilderness, Williams wor-
ried that the state would ruin the garden and transform it into the
wilderness. 169 In fact, Williams was even more pessimistic than Howe
let on. Williams fled England because the Church of England was
impure and was subsequently banished to Rhode Island after he criti-
cized the Puritans of Massachusetts for maintaining impure
churches. 170 He ultimately came to believe that all churches were im-
pure-even his own. 171 One need not fear that the wilderness might
corrupt the garden because there was no garden to be corrupted.1 72
167 MICHAEL J. PERRY, UNDER GOD?: RELIGIOUS FAITH AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 20-21
(2003); Shiffrin, supra note 100, at 1652-56.
168 MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND GOVERN-
MENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 5-12 (1965); see also ISAAC KRAMNICK & R.
LAURENCE MOORE, THE GODLESS CONSTITUTION: THE CASE AGAINST RELIGIOUS CORRECT-NESS
46-66 (1996) (describing Roger Williams as "ahead of his time"); PERRY MILLER, ROGER
WILLIAMS: His CONTRIBUTION TO THE AMERICAN TRADITION 254-57 (1953) (explaining Wil-
liams's significance to contemporary conceptions of religious liberty); EDMUND S. MORGAN,
ROGER WILLIAMS: THE CHURCH AND THE STATE 115-42 (1967) (describing Williams's ideas
about the state and the church). On some of the personal complications of Williams, see
HALL, supra note 35, at 17-33, 37-38; Steven D. Smith, Separation and the Fanatic, 85 VA. L.
REv. 213, 216-19 (1999) (reviewing HALL, supra note 35).
169 HowE, supra note 168, at 5-6, 12; Conkle, General Theory, supra note 6, at 1181-82
(endorsing Williams's view that government support of religions may be counterproduc-
tive); Van Alstyne, supra note 127, at 914 (arguing that state involvement with religion risks
"profaning religion").
170 See, e.g., MORGAN, supra note 168, at 24-27.
171 See HALL, supra note 35, at 27 ("Williams ultimately refused spiritual communion
with everyone, including his wife.").
172 Philip Hamburger shows that Williams's theological views were exueme, but
Hamburger apparently intends this as a way of discrediting Williams's political views and in
that respect is unsuccessful. See PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE
38-53 (2002).
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Nonetheless, Howe was right to emphasize Williams's contribu-
tion to political thought.17  Williams, like Madison 174 and Jeffer-
son, 17 5 argued that God was not so stupid as to place the fate of
religion in the hands of politicians.1 76 He argued that politicians had
historically operated in ways that did not benefit religion. 17 This
should hardly be surprising. Politicians operate with many motives.
They are probably far more motivated by a desire to further the public
interest than they are ordinarily given credit. But they are also often
corrupted by the desire for re-election, by the need for campaign
funds, and by the various foibles of human character. We have wit-
nessed numerous cases in which religious leaders have violated the
trust placed in them to advance the cause of religion. How much less
should one expect politicians to act on behalf of religion? 78 Indeed,
173 It is necessary to separate Williams's political arguments from their theological un-
derpinnings. It is not necessary to believe that the number of authentic Christians consti-
tutes a small portion of the population in order to believe that there are dangers to
religion when government seeks to promote religion, but, for Williams, this was an impor-
tant truth. KRAMNICK & MooRE, supra note 168, at 48.
174 James Madison argued that religious establishments "instead of maintaining the
purity and efficacy of Religion, have had a contrary operation." MADISON, supra note 83, at
12; Hall, Civic Virtue, supra note 6, at 121 ("The revolutionary generation was also repeat-
edly warned that government sponsorship of religion frustrated the very process of virtue
creation."). Madison cautioned that government support of religion "corrupted religion
itself, and thus corrupted religious capacity for generating true virtue." Hall, Civic Virtue,
supra note 6, at 121. For religion to flourish, and with it the possibility for citizens to
acquire the virtues necessary for self-government, "Roger Williams's wall of separation be-
tween the fruit-producing garden and the destructive encroachment of the wilderness had
to be vigorously maintained." Id.
175 AsJefferson put it, "I do not believe it is for the interest of religion to invite the civil
magistrate to direct its exercises, its discipline, or its doctrines .... " Van Alstyne, supra
note 127, at 775.,, 1905)..
176 DONALD SKAGS, ROGER WILLIAMS' DREAM FOR AMERICA 15-17 (1993).
177 According to Williams, "Whenever civil rulers had emerged as would-be protectors
or champions of religion, they had appropriated religion to profane interests-to their
own quest for profit and power." KRAMNICK & MOORE, supra note 168, at 57; accord MoR-
GAN, supra note 168, at 119-20; cf. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 320 (1952) (Black, J.,
dissenting) ("State help to religion injects political and party prejudices into a holy field
.... Government should not be allowed, under cover of the soft euphemism of 'co-opera-
tion,' to steal into the sacred area of religious choice."); McConnell, Origins, supra note 2,
at 1438 (
It is anachronistic to assume, based on modern patterns, that governmental
aid to religion and suppression of heterodoxy were opposed by the more
rationalistic and supported by the more intense religious believers of that
era. The most intense [colonial] religious sects opposed establishment on
the ground that it injured religion and subjected it to the control of civil
authorities.
); McConnell, supra note 78, at 146 ("[G] overnment is unlikely to be a valuable contributor
to our understanding of spiritual truth.").
178 See Taylor, supra note 99, at 103 (
[T]he separation of church and state did not have to mean bracketing God
or religion. It may have for some, but that is not the way most Americans
understood disestablishment. In fact, many supported the measure in the
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when politicians combine with merchants to commercialize Christ-
mas,179 when they invoke the name of God to justify unjust wars (often
God is invoked on both sides of a conflict),' 8 0 and when they suggest
that God favors one political party over another, it becomes increas-
ingly obvious that religion is being used to serve politics, not the other
way around."8 "
Even more serious, the reliance of religious organizations upon
the state for evangelical purposes tends to undermine their own integ-
rity.112 Indeed, there is considerable evidence that the Roman Catho-
lic Church, the church with the historically strongest ties to the state
in Europe and Latin America, has compromised its commitment to
social justice in its effort to maintain its privileged position in many
countries.18 3 At least prior to Vatican II, Catholic support for dictators
name of religion, to preserve its strength and integrity from the enervating
and corrupting effect of state interference.
179 See Thomas C. Berg, Church-State Reations and the Social Ethics of Reinhold Niebuhr, 73
N.C. L. REv. 1567, 1625-27 (1995).
180 STEVE BRUCE, POLITICS AND RELIGION 4 (2003) ("Everyone claims divine approval.
All states mobilize for war by first enlisting God as their recruiting sergeant."). As Bob
Dylan sang, "And that land that I live in-Has God on its side .... The Germans now too
have God on their side .... If God's on our side-He'll stop the next war." BoB DVLAN,
With God on Our Side, on THE TIMES TrEv ARE A-CHANGIN' (Sony 1964).
181 Van Alstyne, supra note 137, at 914 (
[I] t profanes religion for any secular authority to trade on its practices
for its (the state's) civil or secular ends, i.e., it is a trespass on religion by the
state; the state has no right to take things from the voluntary communities
of faith and entangle them as instruments in the conduct of civil affairs.
182 See Backus, supra note 147, at 333-34; see also T.B. MASTON, ISAAC BACKUS: PIONEER
OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 71-73 (1962) (describing Backus's distrust of evangelical uses of
state power).
183 NICHOLAS ATKINS & FR.ANK TALLETr, PRIESTS, PRELATES AND PEOPLE: A HISTORY OF
EUROPEAN CATHOLICISM SINCE 1750, at 324 (2003) (explaining that, in return for benefits
from the state, the Church preached submission to the temporal authority though it prac-
ticed extensive charitable work). The Church's commitment to social justice, however, did
not include a commitment to religious freedom. RENE REMOND, RELIGION AND SOCIETY IN
MODERN EUROPE 173-74 (Antonia Nevill trans., 1999) (discussing the Catholic Church's
resistance to religious liberty prior to 1945); J. Bryan Hehir, Catholicism and Democracy: Con-
flict, Change, and Collaboration, in CHANGE IN OFFICIAL CATHOLIC MORAL TEACHINGS 20, 22
(Charles E. Curran ed., 2003) ("Throughout the nineteenth century, Catholic teaching
resisted the idea of religious freedom in the name of standing against philosophical relativ-
ism and for the interests of the church."). Instead the Church's commitment was to sup-
port the truth, thus the burning of heretics at the stake, the Inquisition, and the like.
Although the Protestant commitment to religious freedom preceded that of the Catholic
Church, it too was not easy to come by. For example, Thomas C. Berg writes:
[As] Niebuhr pointed out, the Puritan faction in seventeenth-century En-
gland 'pled for liberty of conscience when it was itself in danger of persecu-
tion; and threatened all other denominations with suppression when it had
the authority to do so.' In America, of course, it is a familiar story that the
Puritans who came seeking their own religious freedom immediately de-
nied it to others. Even after official disestablishment... American authori-
ties put in place a range of preferences for generic Protestantism, despite
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in some countries and opposition to them in others followed a rela-
tively consistent pattern. If the dictator supported religious privileges
such as subsidies for Catholic education, the Church did not oppose
the dictator.8 4 If the dictator opposed Catholic privilege, the Church
opposed the dictator. 8 5
There were, however, exceptions on both sides. 186 For instance,
the Church was relatively quiet about Hitler despite his suppression of
the supposed Protestant commitment to 'soul liberty' and to the exemption
of religious concerns from the cognizance of government. It has always
proved difficult for religious persons to see the practices familiar to them as
anything other than 'natural' and necessary to public order.
Berg, supra note 179, at 1612 (citations omitted).
184 Speaking of the position of the Catholic Church in many European countries well
into the twentieth century, Ren6 Remond writes:
Imbued with the juridical tradition inherited from Rome, the
[C]atholic church attached great importance to an explicit recognition of
its rights, written into laws, which obviously ruled out any separation [of
church and state]. The Pope continued to reaffirm as ideal a Christian
state whose leaders made open reference to religion, made its teaching the
rule of their actions and imposed on their nationals a respect for the obliga-
tions fixed by the church.
PEMOND, supra note 183, at 160.
185 Cf ROBERT P. KRAYNAK, CHRISTIAN FAITH AND MODERN DEMOCRACY: GOD AND POLIT-
iCS IN THE FALLEN WORLD 3 (2001) (
[T]he Roman Catholic Church supported emperors and kings throughout
much of its history; and although it resisted them on many occasions to
defend the freedom of the church and the needs of the people, it did not
really accept liberal democracy until very recently, when the Second Vati-
can Council (1962-65) endorsed a qualified version of democratic human
rights.
); CHARLES R. MORRIS, AMERICAN CATHOLIC: THE SAINTS AND SINNERS WHO BUILT AMERICA'S
MOST POWERFUL CHURCH 69 (1997) (noting that Pope Gregory XVI and Pope Pius IX
maintained that it was "insanity to believe in liberty of conscience and worship or of the
press"). For the claim that the Church's move to accept liberal democracy at Vatican 11 was
preceded by other steps beginning in 1945, see RtMONO, supra note 183, at 174-77.
Remond writes that the Church regarded the Enlightenment's emphasis on rationalism
and its companion devotion to democracy as the major threat to the evangelical mission of
the Church, but the administrations of Franco, Mussolini, Hider, and Vichy France taught
the Church that there were some things worse than democracy. See id. at 167-77. Accord-
ingly, the Church simultaneously embraced liberal democracy and opposed communism.
See id. Although Rdmond's analysis is plausible when applied to the Church in France-
which was in no position to push for control after its collaboration with the Vichy regime-
the Church in Italy took the position that "Fascism's failing was not due to its authoritarian-
ism, its violence or denial of democracy, but to 'its refusal to found itself on the Church
and to profess itself Catholic.'" CAROLYN M. WARNER, CONFESSIONS OF AN INTEREST GROUP:
THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND POLITICAL PARTIES IN EUROPE 80 (2000) (quoting ANDREA Ric.-
CARDI, Governo e "profezia' nel pontificato di Pit X11 in Pic XIl 31, 42-43 (Andrea Riccardi ed.,
1985)). On the other hand, the American bishops supported freedom of speech and relig-
ion long before the Vatican. See MORRIS, supra, at 135 (discussing the tendency of the
American bishops to ignore Vatican pronouncements when they conflicted with American
conceptions of free speech and religion).
186 One exception was that the Church would often remain quiet in circumstances
where speaking out would risk persecution by the government. This pattern of church
behavior persisted in Mexico for much of the twentieth century, despite the courageous
actions of many. See VIKRAM K. CHAND, MEXICO'S POLITICAL AWAKENING 153-203 (2001).
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religious freedom because it calculated that its best interests were
nonetheless served by keeping quiet. 18 7 On the other hand, strong
Church forces criticized Latin American dictators despite support for
the Church because they felt morally obliged to do so'8 8 (though the
Vatican has since taken strong efforts to cut back on the political in-
volvement of priests and bishops)." 9 Although the current Pope has
been willing to take unpopular positions because he thinks they are
right, the Church has historically muffled its stance in favor of social
justice when it thought its evangelical interests were served by doing
so.' 9 0 Indeed, for centuries, it permitted political leaders to play a
major role in the selection of religious leaders.1 91 As Alister McGrath
187 For the suggestion that Pope Pius XII was relatively silent about Hider largely be-
cause he felt that a strong Germany was necessary as a buffer against communism, see
WILLIAM J. O'MALLEY, S.J., WHYv BE CATHOLIC 161 (2001). Compare O'MALLEY, supra, with
ALISTER E. McGRATH, THE FUTURE OF CHRISTIANITY 10 (2002) ("[The] failure of the Ger-
man churches to make a significant impact on Hider's rise to power, and his gradual move
toward reaffirmation of German imperial claims, raised serious questions concerning the
moral credentials of Christianity ...."). Fear and anti-semitism surely played a significant
role in the silence. See RIMOND, supra note 183, at 168-69.
188 MICHAEL FLEET & BRIAN H. SMITH, THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND DEMOCRACY IN
CHILE AND PERU 4 (1997) (
During the late 1960s and 1970s, the Church emerged as a critic and
antagonist of repressive military regimes in several [Latin American] coun-
tries. Catholic bishops became champions of human rights and popular
interests ....
[A decade later,] Church leaders and activists helped to persuade a
number of military governments to relinquish power to civilian successors
The Church thus played a generally progressive role in most of Latin
America during the last thirty years.
). See generallyJEFFREY KLAIBER, S.J., THE CHURCH, DICTATORSHIPS, AND DEMOCRACY IN LATIN
AMERICA (1998) (providing a comprehensive overview of the Catholic Church's role in
defending human rights and promoting democracy in Central and South America from
the 1960s to the 1980s).
189 BRIAN H. SMITH, RELIGIOUS POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA, PENTECOSTAL VS. CATHOLIC
51, 67 (1998).
190 Cf ATKINS & TALLETT, supra note 183, at 324 (suggesting the "enlightened absolu-
tism" of the eighteenth century defined a symbolic relationship between church and state
in which the church "functioned in some measure as a state bureaucracy and mouth-
piece"). The Church's "political influence has been decidedly conservative for most of its
history." FLEET & SMITH, Supra 188, at 13. The Church continues to promote its evangeli-
cal interests through ties with governments when it is able to do so even in the post Vatican
II context. See infra notes 410-14 (showing that the Church maintains privileges to teach
in many European public schools). For a nuanced discussion of the power and limits of
the Church's involvement in politics, see generally TIMOTHY A, BYRNES, TRANSNATIONAL
CATHOLICISM IN POSTCOMMUNIST EUROPE (2001); TIMOTHY A. BYRNES, CATHOLIC BISHOPS IN
AMERICA (1991).
191 The Church moved to regain control in the middle of the nineteenth century, but
it took nearly a century to complete the task. See R9MOND, supra note 183, at 180-83. In
Latin American colonies, the Church permitted political leaders to censor ecclesiastical
communications including those from the Vatican. SeeJost CASANOVA, PUBLIC RELIGIONS
IN THE MODERN WORLD 114 (1994). This practice was not eliminated in Brazil until 1890.
Id.
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observes, "[a] church which scents the powerful fragrance of power
and influence shows a worrying ability to become accommodating and
flexible on matters which some might regard as non-negotiable."'
192 If
it is desirable for religious voices to play a role in the democratic pro-
cess,1 93 providing incentives for them to remain silent is not helpful.
Ironically, conservatives, including the religious right, are ordina-
rily the first in line to decry the influence of politicians in the private
sphere, yet they are enthusiastic about government support for relig-
ious education and social welfare activities. The left, which ordinarily
is prepared to support extensive governmental involvement in the pri-
vate sphere, is quick to see the dangers when government becomes
involved with religion. The left position might be recast this way: gov-
ernment involvement in the market is full of dangers, but the failure
to intervene is even more dangerous because the market threatens to
exploit labor, ruin the environment, and the like. On the other hand,
the progressive might believe that the dangers of government involve-
ment in the religious market are not outweighed by a need for inter-
vention. It is unclear, however, why the conservative sees the dangers
of intervention in the business market to be greater than the dangers
of intervention in the religious market.
In any event, when Justice Kennedy complains that those who
seek to prevent the Nativity Scene display are hostile to religion,' 94 he
ignores not only non-Christian religious believers, but also concerns
about tight church-state relations within the Christian tradition that
stretch back for centuries. tg  Justice Kennedy's brand of name-calling
has no place in Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
192 McGRATH, supra note 187, at 12; accord MICHAEL M. WINTER, MISGUIDED MORALITY:
CATHOILIC MORAL TEACHING IN THE CONTEMPORARY CHURCH, at xiv, 38, 56-57, 83-87
(2002); Cal Thomas & Ed Dobson, Blinded by Might: The Problem with Heaven on Earth, in
WHAT'S GOD GOT TO Do WITH THE AMERICAN EXPERIMENT? 51, 52 (E.J. Dionne,Jr. &JohnJ.
Diulio, Jr. eds., 2000) (warning that when the clergy participate in political processes, they
risk being compromised by the dangerous attraction of political power); Peter Wehner, A
Screwtape Letter for the Twenty-First Century: What a Senior Devil Might Think About Religion
and Politics, in WHAT'S GOD GOT TO Do WITH THE AMERICAN EXPERIMENT?, supra, at 41, 43
(same).
193 One might argue that religious participation in democratic life makes churches too
dependent on the state. This would seem to depend on the content of the participation.
Religious lobbying for church privileges would certainly be troubling, but religious lobby-
ing on moral issues would be less worrisome.
194 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655 (1989).
195 Hall, Civic Virtue, supra note 6, at 123 (arguing that "the core insight out of which
the Establishment Clause originated" is that "government is powerless to create civic virtue
directly without risking either social unrest or corruption of the very sources of virtue it
seeks to strengthen" (footnotes omitted)).
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7. Promoting Religion
Many argue that separation of church and state has served to pro-
mote religion.1 96 Assuming this is correct, the next question would be
whether promotion is a good thing or a bad thing, or, more precisely,
whether promotion of religion is a constitutionally cognizable value.
Before deciding this issue, we must first determine if separation of
church and state has actually promoted religion.
a. Separation Positive for Religion?
Whether or not it is a good thing to promote religion, substantial
evidence suggests that the absence of established churches in the
United States has been positive for religion. 197 Most scholars, for ex-
ample, conclude that the United States citizenry is more religious
than their counterparts in European countries where established
churches persisted for centuries. 198 As Everett Ladd writes, "by just
196 See ROBERT BOOTH FOWLER & ALLEN D. HERTKEE, RELIGION AND POLITICS IN
AMERICA: FAITH, CULTURE, AND STRATEGIC CHOICES 10-11 (1995); see also Conkle, General
Theory, supra note 6, at 1180 ("[O] urjudicially enforced separation of religion and govern-
ment may well invigorate religion and work to its long-term benefit."). For a sustained
argument to this effect, see ROGER FINKE & RODNEY STARK, THE CHURCHING OF AMERICA,
1776-1990: WINNERS AND LOSERS IN OUR RELIGIOUS ECONOMY 18-21 (1992) (suggesting
that a diversity of faiths untethered from the state is necessary for religion to thrive). It is
not clear that the Framers foresaw that separation of church and state would promote
religion. See Rakove, supra note 89, at 254 (Jefferson expected religion to fade; Madison
did not). But see MOORE, supra note 68, at 17 (contending that the founders thought relig-
ion would prosper if government stopped enforcing religious orthodoxy or appearing to
care about it).
197 See FINKE & STARK, supra note 196, at 15-16.
198 One religious leader has remarked that "[i]t would not be unduly dramatic to
claim that Western Europe, at least, is suffering from a spiritual and moral crisis of im-
mense proportions." BASIL HOME, REMAKING EUROPE: THE GOSPEL IN A DIVIDED CONTINENT
59 (1994). On the other hand, North American elites are surely as secular as European
elites. PHILIP JENKINS, THE NEXT CHRISTENDOM: THE COMING OF GLOBAL CHRISTIANITY 161
(2002); see also Peter L. Berger, The Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview, in THE
DESECULARIZATION OF THE WORLD: RESURGENT RELIGION AND WORLD POLITICS 1, 10-11 (Pe-
ter L. Berger ed., 1999) (discussing a "globalized elite culture"). Indeed, Berger is quoted
as saying that, "If India is the most religious country on our planet, and Sweden is the least
religious, America is a land of Indians ruled by Swedes." HIJSTON SMITH, WHY RELIGION
MATIrERS: THE FATE OF THE HUMAN SPIRIT IN AN AGE OF DISBELIEF 103 (2001). For the
argument that religious institutions in the United States may decline in the future, see
ROBERT WITHNOW, SAVING AMERICA? FAITH-BASED SERVICES AND THE FUGURE OF CIVIL SOCI-
FTY 96-98 (2004). For the argument that European religiosity may survive the relative
abandonment of religious institutions, see Grace Davie, Europe: The Exception that Proves the
Rule, in THE DESECULARIZATION OF THE WORLD: RESURGENT RELIGION AND WORLD POLITICS,
supra, at 68-71; see generally GRACE DAVIE, RELIGION IN BRITAIN SINCE 1945: BELIEVING WITH-
OUT BELONGING (1994) (using a sociological approach to describe and explain religion in
contemporary Britain); GRACE DAVIE, RELIGION IN MODERN EUROPE (2000) [hereinafter
DAVIE, RELIGION IN MODERN EUROPE] (using the same approach to analyze European relig-
ious trends). For research suggesting that religion is more alive in Europe than is gener-
ally supposed, see ANDREW M. GREELEY, A SOCIOLOGICAL PROFILE: RELIGION IN EUROPE AT
THE END OF THE SECOND MILLENNIUM 1-20 (2003) (providing statistical evidence that belief
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about every measure that survey researchers have conceived and em-
ployed, the United States appears markedly more religious than its
peers in the family of nations, the other industrial democracies."' 99
James Madison seems to have been prescient when he argued that
state-supported churches become dependent, compliant, lazy,
bloated, and corrupt.200 They lose the vitality necessary to attract and
retain loyal committed followers. As suggested earlier, the Roman
Catholic Church in particular seemed to lose a grip on its commit-
ment to offer a moral voice in substantial parts of European society.
The Church may have done itself no favors when it sided with Franco
in God persists in Europe: "Europe is hardly godless"). Part of what Davie and Greeley are
arguing is that the glass is half full; part is to question what measures arc appropriate to
focus upon. Greeley, in particular, argues that Europe is an aggregation that hides too
much, that there are obvious transnational categories, e.g., age, gender, class, but the par-
ticular national experience is more important than the European experience in explaining
religious phenomena. See GREELEY, supra, at xi. For example, those who generalize about
Europe need to explain the religiosity of Ireland, North and South, as well as Poland. See
BRUCE, supra note 180, at 44-46 (discussing interaction of religion and politics in Poland
and Ireland). See generally Greeley, supra (providing sociological data on religious beliefs in
various European countries). They must also account for the substantial difference on
most measures between the French and those in countries such as Spain, Portugal, and
Italy. In addition, for example, Greeley finds significant attitudinal differences between
the Catholics of Northern Ireland and the Catholics of the South. See id. at 133-51.
199 Derek H. Davis, The U.S. Supreme Court as Moral Physician: Mitchell v. Helms and the
Constitutional Revolution to Reduce Restrictions on Governmental Aid to Religion, 43J. OF CHURCH
AND STATE 213, 229 (2001); cf Stephen M. Feldman, Critical Questions in Law and Religion:
An Introduction, in LAW AND RELIGION: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 1, 2 (Stephen M. Feldman
ed., 2000) ("A 1997 Gallop Poll found that 90 percent of Americans pray, 96 percent be-
lieve in God, 63 percent give grace or give thanks to God aloud, and 42 percent attended
organized religious services the previous week."). In fact, sixty percent of people believe
that one can only be a Christian if he believes in the divinity of Christ; ninety percent
believe that Christ actually lived; seventy percent believed he was truly God. Id. (re-
marking further that other studies document "consistently high levels of belief in life after
death, heaven, and Christ's presence in heaven"). Although belief and attendance rates
are generally lower in most European countries than in the United States, it would not be
appropriate to describe European countries as secular: "[Elven in the most apparently
'secular' of contemporary societies there are areas of society or of individual life where
religious influences remain important." HUGH McLEoD, RELIGION AND THE PEOPLE OF
WESTERN EUROPE: 1789-1989, at 154 (2d ed. 1997). On the European demographics, see
JENKINS, supra note 198, at 94-96 (describing the declining Christian and Catholic religious
identification in European countries). Modern day commentators might well have de-
scribed eighteenth century American society as secular. MOORE, supra note 68, at 15
("Most Americans in 1787 neither belonged to nor regularly attended any house of wor-
ship. Church membership varied from place to place but stood somewhere around 10
percent of the total population.").
200 See generally MADISON, supra note 83, at 12-13 (explaining that a "just government"
will not use clergy as auxiliaries, nor curtail the rights of a religion, nor permit one religion
to interfere with the rights of another). For the claim that monopoly churches "tend to be
lazy and will fail to mobilize high levels of commitment," see Rodney Stark & James C.
McCann, Market Forces and Catholic Commitment: Exploring the New Paradigm, 32 J. FOR THE
SCI. STUDY OF RELIGION 111, 118 (1993).
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in Spain,201 Salazar in Portugal, 20 2 the Vichy regime in France,203 the
Christian Democrats in Italy,20 4 or when it was quiescent20 5 in Hitler's
Germany.20 6 Similarly, the Anglican Church could hardly have bene-
201 See MCLEOD, supra note 199, at 16. During some of his reign, Franco nominated
half of the bishops in Spain. GEORGE HUNTSTON WILLIAMs, THE CONTOURS OF CHURCH AND
STATE IN THE THOUGHT OF JOHN PAUL 11, at 29 (1983). Late in 1953, a new concordat
lessened his control and declared Catholicism to be the only religion of the Spanish na-
tion-though citizens were to be free to practice other religions. See id. In 1978, however,
the Spanish Constitution disentangled church and state, declaring: "There shall be no state
religion. The public authorities shall take account of the religious beliefs of Spanish soci-
ety and shall accordingly maintain relations of cooperation with the Catholic Church and
other faiths." C.E. Ch.2 Div.] § 16(3), quoted in FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND BELIEF: A
WORLD REPORT 383 (Kevin Boyle &Juliet Sheen eds., 1997). For discussion of the negative
impact of the Church's embrace of Franco, see CASANOVA, supra note 191, at 75-91.
202 Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, Portugal-A Country Study, at
http://www.memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/pttoc.htrnl (last visited Sept. 6, 2004).
203 WARNER, supra note 185, at 71 (arguing that the French Church "was undeniably an
integral part of the Vichy order," that it made the mistake of condemning De Gaulle, and
that in the aftermath of the war it "would no longer be viewed as the guardian of things
eternal, and certainly not of France"). Even if the leaders of the French Church had
wished to distance the Church from the Vichy regime-clergy were in fact divided over the
desirability of the resistance-policies of several Popes had decentralized the French
Church to make it less able to offer resistance to Rome, which it was richly inclined to do.
See id. at 68-69. The byproduct of the ecclesiastical struggle was that the French Church
was unable to offer a strong voice in French politics. See id. at 68. Interestingly, the politics
of those bishops who wanted distance from Rome tended to be monarchist and conserva-
tive; those who wanted closer political ties with Rome tended to favor Republican politics.
Id. at 62-64.
204 SeeJohn G. Francis, The Evolving Regulatory Structure of European Church-State Relation-
ships, 34J. OF CHURCH & STATE 775, 786 (1992).
205 Despite courageous exceptions, the complicity of German Protestants was wide-
spread. SeeJohn S. Conway, The Political Role of German Protestantism, 1870-1990, 34J. OF
CHURCH & STATE 819, 828-29 (1992).
206 See also HANS KUNG, THE CATHOLIC CHURCH: A SHORT HISTORY 176-80 (John Bow-
den trans., 2001); WARNER, supra note 185, at 188, 190 (showing that the Church en-
couraged the Zentrum, a German Catholic political party, to sign the 1933 Enabling Act
which gave Hider dictatorial powers, turned over birth records to the Nazis facilitating the
identification ofJews, and told Catholics that they were to obey the Nazi regime); MORRIS,
supra note 185, at 242 (citingJohn Diggins's suggestion that the Catholic Church was "the
last organization in the world" that should have been relying on pragmatic arguments in
dealing with Hider given its claims to moral clarity regarding other political regimes). On
the other hand, the Church had some distance from the Nazis enabling it to achieve a
substantial amount of political damage control. See WARNER, supra note 185, at 186-92.
The Church in Italy was even more successful in the latter regard. In general, "The Pope
agreed to accept the Fascists and Mussolini agreed that the Catholic religion would be
taught in every Italian school. He also promised to pay the salaries of Catholic priests and
set up the Vatican City in Rome." BBC, Modern World History: Fascism in Italy, at http://
www.bbc.co.uk/education/modern/fascism/fascihtm.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2004). De-
spite this agreement, the Church and Mussolini had many disagreements over the years
that allowed the Church to "distance itself from Fascism without also incriminating Cathol-
icism, or appearing to reverse itself." WARNER, supra note 185, at 53. The demand that the
Church "disown certain political and social movements in exchange for limited ecclesiasti-
cal freedoms" was a frequent problem in Eastern Europe and Third World countries. ERIC
0. HANSON, THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN WORLD POLITICS 57 (1987).
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fited from its control by the English government. 20 7 Nor is it likely
that the Church of Sweden has benefited from its association with the
Swedish government. 208 In each of these countries, religiosity is now
relatively low. 2 0 9 By contrast, the Roman Catholic Church sided with
the Irish against England, the Poles against the Communists, and with
the people against many Latin American dictators.2 10 Catholicism
continues to be deeply tied with the national identity in Ireland 1 ' and
Poland 2 12 and is strong throughout Latin America. 2 13
Citing such evidence, Jose Casanova argues that the Church's de-
cision to oppose separation of church and state in many circum-
stances precipitated religious decline.2 1 4 Moreover, Roger Finke and
Rodney Stark argue that religiosity is stronger in the United States as
opposed to Europe precisely because of the separation of church and
state.2 1 5 Nonetheless, any claim that the relationship between church
207 Indeed, Roman Catholics now outnumber Anglicans in England. See Michael W.
McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I: Establishment of Religion,
44 WIM. & MARY L. REv. 2105, 2115 (2003) ("The main victim of the establishment today, if
there is one, may be the established church itself."). On the prospects for an Anglican
recovery and reconceptualization, see generally BEYOND COLONIAL ANGLICANISM: THE
ANGLICAN COMMUNION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Ian T. Douglas & Kowk Pui-Lan eds.,
2001).
208 See Eva M. Hamberg & Thorleif Pettersson, The Religious Market: Denominational
Competition and Religious Participation in Contemporary Sweden, 33 J. FOR THE SCI. STUDY OF
RELIGION 205, 206 (1994) (claiming that individuals' religious choices can be better ex-
plained by inertia).
209 At least since Vatican II, the Catholic Church has accepted religious pluralism as a
political fact, has abandoned the view that the state has the responsibility to defend and
promote religious truth, and has settled on the view that the state is obliged to embrace the
secular value of protecting religious freedom. SeeJohn Courtney Murray, S.J., The Issue of
Church and State at Vatican Council II, in THE CHURCH IN THE WORLD 35, 41-44 (Charles P.
O'Donnell ed., 1967). Pope Pius XI had stated as recently as 1933 that the separation of
church and state was "impious and absurd." MORRIS, supra note 185, at 236-37.
210 See supra notes 188-89.
211 MCLEOD, supra note 199, at 20-21.
212 CHARLES TAYLOR, VARIETIES OF RELIGION TODAY. WILLIAM JAMES REVISITED 77 (2002)
(observing that the French Canadian identity is bound up with Catholicism).
213 Fighting against imperialism can be a major source of growth in the Church. See
George Scialabba, A Faith that Shaped Today's World, BOSTON SUNDAY GLOBE, Aug. 18, 2002,
at D5 (book review) ("The faith grew astonishingly fast in the second and third centuries,
especially among the lower classes .... Roman persecution was fitful, but even at its
fiercest was unavailing. The blood of martyrs was indeed the seed of the church."). For the
claim that the Church's activities on behalf of the poor-and particularly poor non-
Church members-was also a significant factor in its growth, see ANTON WESSELS, EUROPE:
WAS IT EVER REALLY CI IRISTIAN: THE INTERACTION BETWEEN GOSPEL AND CULTURE 196 Uohn
Bowden trans., 1994). The primary thesis of Wessels's monograph is that the evangelical
success of Christianity depended upon its ability to adapt its message to the customs, hab-
its, and rituals of the different cultures it encountered. See id. passim.
214 CASANOVA, supra note 191, at 22, 29.
215 FINRE & STARK, supra note 196, at 18-21; see also Rakove, supra note 89, at 254
("[T]ojudge by the results, (the] market-oriented approach offers the best explanation for
the remarkable success of the American experiment in religious pluralism.") For a power-
ful criticism of the Finke and Stark perspective in the context of Great Britain, see Steve
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and state is invariably the decisive factor for the rise or fall of religios-
ity would be difficult to sustain. Religion has thrived during and after
many dictatorships. Consider the Constantinian dictatorship and the
many that followed. 2 16 I suspect that Nicholas Burns goes too far
when he writes that, "[w]ithout Constantine, we might not even re-
member Jesus'[s] name in the twentieth century."2 17 Although I
doubt that Burns is correct, the extent to which repression has en-
hanced some religions and diminished others may not be fully appre-
ciated in much of the religion clause literature. 2 18  Indeed,
Christianity flourishes in Central and South America 219 as well as Af-
rica 2 2 0-regions where dictatorships and support for Christianity have
often been intertwined.
Equally significant, if religions flourish when the church is sepa-
rated from the state and protections for religious freedom are in
place, one might expect that religion would now be flourishing in Eu-
rope.2 2 1 Yet Europe has emerged as the poster child for secularism.222
Clearly factors other than the relationship between church and
state play a significant role in the sociology of religion. Corruption, or
perceived corruption, in the clergy has diminished support for the
Bruce, The Truth About Religion in Britain, 34J. FOR TIlE SCI. STUDY OF RELIGION 417 (1995).
See also STEVE BRUCE, GOD is DEAD: SECULARIZATION IN THE WEST 204-28 (2002) (criticizing
the Finke and Stark perspective in the context of the United States).
216 KUNG, supra note 206, at 35-37 (describing Constantine's recognition of
Christianity).
217 Nicholas Burns, A Diplomat's Journey, in Win" I Ams STILL A CATHOLIC 66, 75 (Kevin
Ryan & Marilyn Ryan eds., 1998).
218 The Catholics' forcible conversion of the Donatists yielded unanticipated conse-
quences: "[T]he African churches, even those of Carthage and Hippo, were overwhelmed
by Islam in the seventh century without resistance and vanished without a trace into his-
tory." KONG, supra note 36, at 81.
219 SeejENKaNS, supra note 198, at 57-58.
220 See id. at 56-60, 153.
221 "In all European countries, regardless of religious complexion, the state has
sloughed off notions of partnership with the Church, the possible exception being Ire-
land .... " ATKINS & TALLEST, supra note 183, at 324. For the claim that new religions are
flourishing in Europe, see Rodney Stark, Europe's Receptivity to New Religious Movements:
Round Two, 32J. FOR THE ScI. STUDY OF RELIGION 389, 396 (1993).
222 The probable complexity of the appropriate analysis is indicated by Jose Casanova.
Krishan Kumar & Ekaterina Makarova, An Interview with Jose Casanova, 4 HEDGEHOG REV.
91, 92 (2002) (
The traditional model of secularization offers a plausible account of
European developments but not of American ones. The alternative Ameri-
can paradigm linking religious vitality to free religious markets works rela-
tively well for the United States but not for contemporary Europe. Neither
can offer a plausible account of the significant internal variations within
Europe. Most importantly, neither works very well for other world religions
and other parts of the world.
[Vol. 90:9
2004] THE PLURALISTIC FOUNDATIONS
Church 223 particularly in France;22 4 vivid reminders of the existence
of evil fuel the perception that a loving God does not exist;2 2 5 the
Church's position on birth control has troubled millions;226 attend-
ance is stronger in rural areas than in urban areas;2 2 7 women are
more likely to be religious than men 22 8 (though the Church's position
on the role of women has taken a substantial toll); 229 poor people are
more likely to be religious than the wealthy; and the Enlightenment,
223 MCGRATH, supra note 187, at ix. Support for religion in Ireland has wavered in part
because of corruption in the clergy, see id. at x, and presumably because of increased
wealth.
224 MCLEOD, supra note 199, at 15, 26-29, 57, 60-62, 72, 82-83. The split between
clerical and anti-clericals has long been central to French politics. KONG, supra note 206, at
155. Anticlericism need not signal a rejection of religion. For an interesting account of
anticlericism in Spain, see Ruth Behar, The Struggle for the Church: Popular Anticlericalism and
Religiosity in Post-Franco Spain, in RELIGIOUS ORTHODOXY AND POPULAR FAITH IN EUROPEAN
SOCIETY 76 (Ellen Badone ed., 1990).
225 According to George Shuster, other factors "could not have decimated Christen-
dom so savagely had it not been for the rise of the conviction that the problem of evil is
beyond solution. It was the powerlessness of the individual in the face of tyranny which was
so awesome and awful, so shattering and unnerving an experience." George Shuster, Chris-
tian Culture and Education, in THE CHURCH IN THE WORLD, supra note 209, at 86, 92. For
discussion of the problem of evil, see SUSAN NEIMAN, EVIL IN MODERN THOUGHT: AN ALTER-
NATIVE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY (2002).
226 The American experience in this regard presumably mirrors that of Europe. The
Catholic Church experienced a significant decline in attendance and a substantial decline
in contributions. ANDREW GREELEY, THE CATHOLIC MYrH 15-16, 23-24, 134-35 (1997).
This amounted to nothing less than a historic crisis of church authority. ANDREW GREELEY,
THE CATHOLIC REVOLUTION: NEW WINE, OLD WINESKINS, AND THE SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL
8, 55-57, 73 (2004).
227 Id. at 75-97. In some cases this phenomenon is better explained by class differ-
ence. Moreover, the hopelessness for many of urban life sometimes pushes them toward
religion. TAYLOR, supra note 212, at 38-39. Nonetheless, socioeconomic modernization
tends toward secularization. See PETER L. BERGER, THE SACRED CANOPY: ELEMENTS OF A
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF RELIGION 108-09, 130-31 (1967).
228 MCLEOD, supra note 199, at 28-35. One explanation for women's greater religios-
ity proposes that "religion stresses the 'feminine' values of kindness, empathy, and compas-
sion, and does not value the masculine characteristics of aggression and dominance."
BENJAMIN BEIT-HALLAHMI & MICHAEL ARGYLE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS BEHAVIOUR,
BELIEF AND EXPERIENCE 65 (1997). Women tend to see God as supporting, loving, and
forgiving; men tend to see God as a planner, supreme power, and controller. Id. at 140. It
is ironic that the Catholic Church would insist on limiting important ministerial functions
to males although some steps have been taken to loosen the historic restrictions. See
HOME, supra note 198, at 54. On the political impact of femnale religiosity, see MORRIS,
supra note 185, at 46. See also id. ("Avoiding undue clerical influence in public affairs was
advanced in the French Parliament as an important reason for denying women suffrage.").
229 See MORRIS, supra note 185, at 409-11, 423, 430. For a critique of the Church's
position, see HANS KONG, CHRISTIANITY: ESSENCE, HISTORY, AND FUTURE 79-83, 53-62,
604-14, 752-61 (2003). For a political defense, see JENKINS, supra note 198, at 196,
198-200, 209.
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with its emphasis on reason and science, 230 has rocked the faith of
many.23 1
It is not clear, however, that these factors vary significantly be-
tween European countries and the United States. One factor that
might be significant in the United States is that it was founded by re-
ligious dissenters who were intense in their religiosity and prone to
form new sects rather than compromise 232 their individualistic integ-
rity.2 3 3 The existence of freedom of religion and believers' concomi-
tant ability to form many different churches might have had a
particularly strong impact in the United States given the religious
demographics of the population. Despite the multiplicity of factors
relevant to the sociology of religion, then, there is support for the view
that the prohibition of tight connections between church and state
has served to promote religion in the United States.
b. The Value of Religion
The question remains whether promoting religion is a good
thing, and whether the religion clauses of the Constitution should be
2-0 On the limits of a naturalistic view, see Alan Donagan, Can Anybody in a Post-Chris-
tian Culture Rationally Believe the Nicene Creed?, in CHRISTIAN PHIL. 92 (Thomas P. Flint ed.,
1990). For a brilliant discussion of the relationship between scientism, religion, and ro-
manticism, see PETER L. THORSLEV, JR., ROMANTIC CONTRARIES: FREEDOM VERSUS DESTINY
(1984). See also REINHOLD NIEBUHR, DOES CIVILIZATION NFFD RELIGION?: A STUDY IN THE
SOCIAL RESOURCES AND LIMITATIONS OF RELIGION IN MODERN LIFE 5 (1928) ("The sciences
have greatly complicated the problem of maintaining the plausibility of the personalization
of the universe by which religion guarantees the worth of human personality; and science
applied to the world's work has created a type of society in which human personality is
easily debased."). On the limits of science, see HUSTON SMITH, supra note 198 passim. For
the methodological atheism of Habermas, see JtJRGEN HABERMAS, RELIGION AND RATIONAL-
ITY. ESSAYS ON REASON, GOD, AND MODERNITY 78-91 (Eduardo Mendieta ed., 2002). See also
MARGARET M. CAMPBELL, CRTrICAL THEORY AND LIBERATION THEOLOGY. A COMPARISON OF
THE INITIAL WORK OFJtGRGEN HABERMAS AND GUSTAviO GUTIERREZ (1999) (exploring and
analyzing the work of Jirgen Habermas); MARC P. LALONDE, CRITICAL THEOLOGY AND THE
CHALLENGE OFJRJEGFN HABERMAS 33-37 (1999) (same).
231 On the other hand, to the extent that an emphasis on reason and science "under-
mines all the old certainties; uncertainty is a condition that many people find very hard to
bear; therefore, any movement (not only a religious one) that promises to provide or to
renew certainty has a ready market." Berger, supra note 198, at 7.
232 Finke and Stark argue that the uncompromising character of religious institutions
is a strong factor in maintaining their power to attract and maintain membership. Thus
they argue that the liberalization of Vatican II in the Catholic Church caused its lay mem-
bership and the number of priests to decline. FINKE & STARK, supra note 196, at 255-75.
233 In countries where Gatholicism dominates, the potential for schism seems less in
this post-reformation era. Catholics who can no longer live with the church frequently
leave organized religion altogether. Perhaps because Protestant denominations emphasize
the lack of a central authority, the potential for multiple schisms has been greater. See
Timothy P. Schilling, When Bishops Disagree: Rome, Hunthausen & the Current Church Cisis,
COMMONWEALTH, Sept. 12, 2003, at 15, 21 (contrasting the propensities of Catholics and
Protestant to engage in schism); cf FOWLER & HERTZER, supra note 196, at 33 ("In Europe,
if you have become alienated from the established church you likely drift away; in America
you are as likely to form orjoin a new church.").
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interpreted to favor religion over nonreligion. The debate over the
utility of religion, of course, is longstanding. In his Farewell Address,
George Washington maintained, "[o]f all the dispositions and habits
which lead to political prosperity, religion and morality are indispen-
sable supports."23 4 By contrast, John Stuart Mill conceded the impor-
tance of morality, but denied the utility of religion.2 35 Mill
maintained that a belief in the supernatural served useful purposes in
the early stages of human development, but was now dispensable.
2 16
He suggested that religion continued to be significant because of au-
thority, education, and public opinion,23 7 and that a supernatural
foundation was no longer needed for moral beliefs. Indeed, he ar-
gued that a supernatural foundation was positively harmful in that be-
lief in religion discouraged criticism of some flawed beliefs. 2 8 Mill
admitted that religion would be attractive so long as
human life is sufficient to satisfy human aspirations, so long there
will be a craving for higher things .... So long as earthly life is full
of sufferings, so long there will be need of consolations, which the
hope of heaven affords to the selfish, the love of God to the tender
and grateful.2 39
Nonetheless, Mill thought an alternative to what he believed to be
"baseless fancies" existed.2 40 Just as human beings have been willing
to sacrifice all for their countries, Mill believed that they could be en-
ticed to play their part in the destiny of the human race, a role in
which they need not sacrifice themselves to the whole, but would ac-
commodate freedom and duty.24' He believed that they would be
consoled by living the kind of life that would be admired by family or
friends, dead or living.242
234 George Washington, Farewell Address (Sept. 17, 1796), in A COMPILATION OF THE
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF TH4E PRESIDENSr 1789-1897, at 213, 220 (James D. Richardson ed.,
1898); cf. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 293 (George Lawrence trans.,
J.P. Mayer ed., 1966) (
I do not know if all Americans have faith in their religion-for who can
read the secrets of the heart?-but I am sure that they think it necessary to
the maintenance of republican institutions. That is not the view of one
class or party among the citizens, but of the whole nation; it is found in all
ranks.
MOORE, supra note 68, at 15 ("We ... know that, whether lthe framers] were Deist or
Congregational or Episcopalian, or not much of anything, they shared an important as-
sumption: Religion was the foundation of virtue.").
235 John Stuart Mill, Utility of Religion, in NATURE AND UTILITv OF RELICION 50-51
(George Nakhnikian ed., 1958).
236 Id. at 63-65.
237 Id. at 51-59.
239 Id. at 46-47, 65.
239 Id. at 68.
240 Id.
241 Id. at 71.
242 Id. at 70-71.
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Many have been moved by humanistic ideals like Mill's. Moreo-
ver, it is hard to deny the force of public opinion. If religion were
authoritatively regarded as superstition in a society, socialization
against religion would be powerful, and it might be possible to organ-
ize a society around the humanistic appeals of Mill. 243 Indeed, those
humanistic appeals are present in any religion worthy of the name. As
Reinhold Niebuhr puts it, "morality is as much the root as the fruit of
religion."244
But we do not write on a clean slate. For millions of citizens,
religion fills a need that humanism does not fill. For those citizens,
the dominant religions in the United States provide an explanation of
the mysteries of the universe, 245 a ground for the importance of per-
sonality in an impersonal world, 246 a sense of obligation and mission
not provided by humanism, 247 and a "guaranteed security against the
forces of nature."2 48
Moreover, religious institutions regularly maintain rituals and
other events that create opportunities for moral reflection and en-
courage believers to come together. This makes religiously based
moral practice less lonely than humanism and provides more social
support for its burdens. Such community-centered events are not in-
compatible with secular humanism, but they are relatively rare, partic-
243 For the argument that many east Asian countries have been organized-with con-
siderable success-through the aggressive promotion of a form of secular humanism, see
T.R. REID, CONFUCIUS LIVES NEXT DOOR: WHAT LIVING IN THE EAST TEACHES Us ABOUT
LIVING IN THE WEST 227-28, 246 (1999).
244 NIEBUHR, supra note 230, at 14.
245 For reflections on living without an explanation, see TllOMAS NAGEL, WHAT DOES IT
ALL MEAN: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 95-101 (1987).
246 NIEBUHR, supra note 230, at 4.
247 See generally HANS KONG, WHY I AM STILL A CHRISTIAN 57-65 (David Smith trans.,
1987) (1985) (stressing the idea of being a disciple).
248 NIEnUHR, supra note 230, at 5; see also MICHAELJ. PERRY, LoVE AND POWER: THE ROLE
OF RELIGION AND MO ALIT' IN AMERICAN POLITICS 69-70 (1991) ("One polar response to
the problem of meaning is to conclude that life is, finally and radically meaningless ....
The other polar response .... is 'religious': the trust that life is ultimately meaningful,
meaningful in a way hospitable to our deepest yearnings."); JONATHAN SACKS, THE DIGNITY
OF DIFFERENCE 82 (2002) (remarking that religions are "a significant spacc outside of and
in counterpoint to a late-modern Western culture that tends systematically to dissolve the
values and virtues that give meaning to a life"); Marshall, spra note 138, at 387 ("Religion
addresses the most important questions at the core of human existence-the existential
questions of meaning, morality, and the nature of Truth. It provides many with a sus-
taining meaning for life-and an explanation for death."). Marshall, however, argues that
the psychological need to hold on to these explanations leads to intolerance particularly
when everlasting life is thought to be at stake. Id. at 388-90. On the latter point, see
William P. Marshall, The Other Side of Religion 44 HAs'TINGS L.J. 843, 858 (1993) (suggesting
religious believers may view forces that assault their religious structure "as threatening evils
that must be eliminated"); cf Berg, supra note 179, at 1589-90, 1596-97 (suggesting that
believer's recognition that only one God exists can induce humility, but can also lead to
false absolutes and arrogance).
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ularly outside educational settings. By comparison, then, secular
humanist moral agency is rather isolated.2 49
Whether religiosity is desirable from a political perspective, how-
ever, is open to question. Measuring the extent to which religion pro-
motes altruism is tricky business. 250 To the extent there is a case for
religion in this regard, it lies among the group that is religiously active
in significant ways. Nonetheless, the overall impact of religion on al-
truistic behavior is arguably suspect. For example, as Mary Ann Glen-
don observes, "[c]rossnational studies repeatedly show that the
proportion of children in poverty in the United States is greater than
in other countries with which we frequently compare ourselves." 25' If
altruism were connected with religion, one might have expected the
"religious" United States to take better care of its poor children than
secular Europe. On the other hand, Europeans remain influenced in
their values by a prior religious history2-5 2 and they are more comforta-
ble with a strong government welfare role. Nevertheless, some soci-
ologists wonder whether, as Europe continues to secularize, its
commitment to humane values will wane. 25 3 In any event, whatever
the comparative dimensions with Europe, it is hard to ignore the sub-
stantial role played by religious associations in directly assisting the
poor.
2 5 4
Even if religion does not promote altruism, there are grounds to
believe that religious associations promote civic participation 255 and
provide moral and political criticism uncontaminated by the profit
249 Thanks to Seana Shiffrin for the points made in this paragraph.
250 The evidence regarding actual congregant behavior is mixed. See BEIT-HALLAHMI &
ARGYLE, supra note 228, at 200-03. But churches surely work to promote altruism and
oppose the notion of"every man for himself." HuME, supra note 198, at 14; see also id. at 48
(arguing that "it is important for the churches to stress the moral imperative to help those
in need").
251 GLENDON, supra note 55, at 107.
252 HANS KONG, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN 28-31 (1978).
253 For extensive discussion relevant to this issue, see DAVIE, RELIGION IN MODERN Eu-
ROPE, supra note 198, at 38-194.
254 Peter Dobkin Hall, The Histoy of Religious Philanthropy in America, in ROBERT
WUTHNOW ET AL., FAITH AND PHILANTHROPY IN AMERICA: EXPLORING THE ROLE OF RELIGION
IN AMERICA'S VOLUNTARY SECTOR 38, 38-39 (1990) (churches and denominationally tied
institutions account for close to two thirds of philanthropic contributions); Robert
Wuthnow & Virginia A. Hodginson, in WIJTHNOW & HoDGWINSON ET AL., supra, at xiii ("Mil-
lions of Americans regularly attend religious services, and a large proportion give of their
time and money to charitable causes and voluntary organizations.").
255 FOWLER AND HERTZVKE, supra note 196, at 32 ("On the social and civic level, religious
people are more likely to give to charity, vote, and be influenced in community activities
than the nonreligious."). Obviously other associations promote civic virtue, but the contri-
bution of religion to civic virtue can in combination with other factors serve to justify spe-
cial constitutional protection. See, e.g., Hall, Civic Virtue, supra note 6, at 112-17 (arguing
that religious liberties should be protected on several grounds, including that religion
serves a distinctive role in value inculcation and the production of civic virtue).
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motive. 25 6 For example, there are strong grounds to credit religious
groups with positive efforts for social change in American history. Re-
ligious leaders and groups have played important roles in movements
to abolish slavery, acquire rights for workers in a wide variety of con-
texts, grant women suffrage, obtain civil rights for African Americans
and other minority groups, and a number of other progressive
causes.25 7 Moreover, religious groups have been an important force
in lobbying for the poor 2 58 as well as providing direct services.
2 59
From a political perspective, I believe that religion has on balance
been a positive political force in the United States 260 and a negative
force in Europe.2 6 1
Even if those who follow religious precepts are more altruistic
than their nonreligious peers, and even if religious associations pro-
mote civic values, it has to be admitted that deep religious commit-
ments have led to intolerance, discrimination, and violent civil and
international wars. 262 But there is more. Perhaps the dominant strain
of Protestantism in the United States has stressed the importance of
faith as opposed to good works, concern about a good life in the next
world at the neglect of this one,2 63 and the virtue of accepting busi-
256 See CARTER, supra note 74, at 112.
257 See Shiffrin, supra note 100, at 1648-50.
258 On the contributions of religious groups to grassroots progressive movements, see
Richard Parker, Progressive Politics and Visions and, Uh, Well... God, in WHAT'S GOD GOT TO
Do WITH THE AMERICAN EXPERIMENT?, supra note 192, at 56.
259 Amy L. Sherman, Faith in Communities: A Solid Investment, 40 Soc'v 19 (Jan./Feb.
2003).
260 Shiffrin, supra note 100, at 1646-52.
261 Particularly important in this connection is the extensive period in which the
Church opposed democracy and religious liberty.
262 KONG, supra note 206, at 137-38 ("Christianity had shown itself incapable of
peace," contributing to modern secularization.). The prospect of religious wars in the
third world is quite real. SeeJENKINS, supra note 198, at 13. On the other hand, I wonder
how much of the violence apparently attributable to religion might have occurred in any
event with some other method of creating the Other who needed to be slain. Hitler and
Stalin, for example, did not need religion to support mass murder. See JOHN GRAY, ArL
QAFDA AND WHAT IT MEANS TO BE MODERN 2 (2003); see also O'MALLEY, supra note 187, at
136 ("Surely the war in Northern Ireland today has nothing whatever to do with whether
the pope is the vicar of Christ."); SACKS, supra note 248, at 5-6 (arguing the causes of
conflicts in which sides are divided along religious lines are frequently political or eco-
nomic). Having said that, I do not mean to deny that one of the disadvantages of religion
is that it has played a substantial role in creating violence. One of the explanations for this
is that the human need to feel a sense of certainty about religious matters-as opposed to
feelings of insignificance and chaos-breeds intolerance about those who have reached
different conclusions. For powerful development of this position, see Marshall, supra note
248, at 854-59. Marshall is careful to observe that the tendency toward intolerance is not a
property of all religions. See id, at 853.
263 For many decades in the twentieth century, the American Catholic Church's em-
phasis on loyalty and patriotism, rocking the boat only in areas of special interest for relig-
ious freedom, may have had political effects similar to the dominant strain of Protestantism
(though Catholicism was socially segregated from the modern culture). For an excellent
description of Catholic culture in the first six decades of the twentieth century and the
[Vol. 90:9
THE PLURALISTIC FOUNDATIONS
ness and governmental institutions as they are, thus encouraging a
predominantly secular economy where business is business, and en-
trenching predominantly secular political institutions where naked
self-interest dwarfs ethical considerations. 26 4  These emphases on
faith, the next life, and acceptance of one's lot in the current life are
hardly likely to yield an active, engaged citizenry.
Even if religion generally produces an engaged citizenry, certain
aspects of many religions unquestionably run counter to the public
good-at least from a progressive perspective. Consider the teaching
of conservative religions about the role of women in the family and
society, 265 about birth control, and homosexuality. 266 Consider the
impact of conservative religious teachings on tolerating others.267
And, then, there is the issue of hell. It is questionable whether the
traditional doctrine of hell is psychologically productive for anyone, 26 8
let alone children. 269  In the absence of religion, a family that
threatened its children with eternal torture2 70 for sexual indiscretions
would presumably be guilty of child abuse.
factors which caused it to change, see MoRIs, supra note 185, at 113-281. For one view of
the various Muslim perspectives, see L. CARL BROWN, RELIGION AND STATE: THE MUSLIM
APPROACH TO POLITICS 175-80 (2000) (cautioning against an assumption that Muslims
share uniform beliefs about engagement with political processes).
264 See NIEBUHR, supra note 230, at 11-18. On the relationship between Protestantism
and economic attitudes, Niebuhr seems to follow Max Weber and R.H. Tawney. See MAX
WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (Stephen Kelberg trans.,
2001) (1904-05); R.H. TAwNEY, RELIGION AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM: A HISTORICAL STUDY
227-53, 277-87 (Harcourt, Brace, & World 1962) (1926).
265 For a brilliant Catholic feminist critique and reconstruction of traditional Catholic
teachings about Mary, see ELIZABETH A. JOHNSON, TRULY OUR SISTER: A THEOLOGY OF MARY
IN THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS (2003).
266 For a critique of the historically negative stance taken by Christianity on sexuality,
see JAMES B. NELSON, BETWEEN Two GARDENS: REFLECTIONS ON SEXUALITY AND RELIGIOUS
EXPERIENCE 14-15, 85-95 (1983).
267 For the claim that the Puritan doctrine separating the elect from the immoral
others has played a dominant role in American history, see MORONE, supra note 35, at
39-41.
268 It is easy to see how the doctrine can lead to intolerance. See Marshall, supra note
248, at 854-59.
269 HANS KONG, ETERNAL LIFE? 131 (Edward Quinn trans., 1984) (1982) ("The prob-
lem of hell may not be dismissed in silence if only because the fear of hel/-which has
become a proverbial expression-has done immense harm over the course of centuries.").
270 There are alternatives to the literal interpretation. Indeed, as Ellen Badone ob-
serves, "since the 1950's Catholic teachings on Hell and Purgatory have changed dramati-
cally." Ellen Badone, Introduction, in RELIGIOUS ORTHODOXY AND POPULAR FAITH IN
EUROPEAN SOCIETY 7 (Ellen Badone ed., 1990); see RICHARD P. McBRJEN, CATHOLICISM
1176-77 (1994) (suggesting that it is not clear that persons actually go to hell and conceiv-
ing hell as separation and isolation or as nonbeing). For a subtle discussion about the
possibility of eternal damnation, see KARL RAHNER, THE CONTENT OF FAITH: THE BEST OF
KARL RAHNER'S THEOLOGICAL WRITINGS 634-37 (Karl Lehmann & Albert Raffelt eds., Har-
vey D. Egan, S.J. trans., 1994).
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c. The Constitutional Value of Religion
Conceding that there are arguments on both sides on the civic
value vel non of religion, the question remains whether it is reasonable
to interpret the religion clauses to favor religion.27 1 Of course, part of
the motivation for the Establishment Clause was unconcerned with
the value of religion. The Establishment Clause was designed to en-
sure, among other things, that the federal government did not inter-
fere with the then-reigning state establishments of religion.2 72 This
does not mean that the Framers favored tight connections between
church and state, however. Far more likely, the Framers respected the
autonomy of states to conduct their own affairs. They plainly did not
believe that tight connections between church and state at the federal
level would be good for religious liberty.273
Beyond federalism, a substantial theme of the Framers favoring
separation of church and state sounded in religious reasons. The no-
tion was that some things belonged to God and others to the state. 274
Moreover, the Framers seemed generally to value religious commit-
ments over nonreligious commitments, with many like George Wash-
ington believing that the nurturing of religion was necessary for the
271 For arguments that it should be so interpreted, see GARVEY, supra note 63, at 49-57,
which argues that religious freedom is protected because the law views religion as a good
thing. Cf Smith, supra note 97, at 157 (contending that a religious justification for relig-
ious freedom had substantial force in the founding period). For arguments against, see
Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 86, at 1248, which maintains that religious practices should
be protected not because of their value, but because they are susceptible to discrimination.
The Framers certainly had no interest in promoting false religions. This was one of the
reasons for the notion that persons should not be forced to support religions to which they
were opposed. TRIBE, supra note 6, at 1160-61. Moreover, the early American church
histories were written to allay the worry that disestablishment would promote quack reli-
gions and undermine the morality of the nation. MOORE, supra note 90, at 5-13.
272 See Conkle, supra note 6, at 1132-35. But cf STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAIL-
URE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 18-19 (1995)
(arguing that the exclusive purpose of the Establishment Clause was to assign jurisdiction
over religious issues to the states); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100
YALE L.J. 1131, 1157-60 (1991) (applying the Establishment Clause against states elimi-
nates the states' rights to establish religion-a right the clause itself explicitly confirms);
Akhil Reed Amar, Some Notes on the Establishment Clause, 2 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 1, 3
(1996) (accord).
273 CONKLE, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY, supra note 6, at 1134 ("The national govern-
ment was conceived as a government of limited and enumerated powers, and these powers
did not extend to matters of religion."); see supra note 174.
274 John Locke was influential in this regard. LOCKE, supra note 2, at 26-30; see also
MADISON, supra note 83, at 9-10 ("[I]n matters of religion, no man's right is abridged by
the institution of Civil Society, and .. .Religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance.");
Michael McConnell, "God is Dead and We Have Killed Him!": Freedom of Religion in the Post-
modern Age, 1993 BYU L. REv. 163, 167-70 [hereinafter McConnell, God is Dead] (discussing
the lack of government power over the soul); Michael W. McConnell, Why is Religious Lib-
erty the "First Freedom"?, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1243, 1245-50 (2000) (exploring the relation-
ship of two-kingdoms theology to the First Amendment). This argument has also been
used to oppose democracy. See KRAYNAK, supra note 185, at 45-106.
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promotion of civic virtue. 275 On the other hand, Thomas Jefferson
did not favor promoting institutional religion.2 76 He believed, among
other things, that it was unnecessary. From Jefferson's perspective,
God had already supplied us all with a moral sense. 277 Indeed, Jeffer-
son hoped that traditional religion would fade away. 278 The presence
of the Enlightenment theme in the foundation of the republic cannot
be ignored.279
Moreover, there are serious grounds to question whether it is rea-
sonable to interpret the religion clauses as proceeding from a relig-
ious foundation in the more pluralistic and skeptical age in which we
live.280 One approach to this might be to say that an overlapping con-
sensus of the religious (more precisely, most of the religious) and
nonreligious support freedom of religion,8 1 and that the clauses
should not be interpreted to favor one side over the other. From this
perspective, if the separation of church and state promoted religion,
the Constitution would be indifferent. The promotion of religion
275 See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
276 EUGENE R. SHERIDAN, JEFFERSON AND RELIGION 67-68 (1998) (describing Jefferson
as revering Jesus as a moral reformer, but rejecting the Bible as divine revelation and re-
jecting Christianity's theological, metaphysical, and ecclesiological doctrines as corruptions
of Jesus's message).
277 Id. at 19. For intellectual history relevant to this view of conscience, see LINDA
HOGAN, CONFRONTING THE TRUTH: CONSCIENCE IN THE CATHOLIC TRADIrION 1-99 (2000).
278 See MOORE, supra note 68, at 15 (explaining that Jefferson and other Deists found
evidence of God in the "machine-like perfection of the natural order"); Rakove, supra note
89, at 254 (noting that Jefferson hoped religious discussion would produce "rational de-
ists"). Although Jefferson opposed doctrines associating Jesus Christ with the divine, he
ultimately came to favor Christian moral teachings. See SHERIDAN, supra note 276, at 68 ("If
the acceptance of orthodox Christian doctrines produced virtuous lives, he welcomed the
result without approving the cause.").
279 William Lee Miller argues that religion cannot be viewed as the sole and necessary
foundation of American institutions. See William Lee Miller, The Moral Project of the Ameri-
can Founders, in ARTICLES OF FAITH, ARTICLES OF PEACE: THE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY CLAUSES AND
THE AMERICAN PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY, supra note 99, at 17, 35 (
The Enlightenment, with its edge of skepticism, was too much present in
the Revolution, in the new nation's institutions, in key founders, in the
mind of significant segments of the people-and, in effect, in the great
silences and protections and negations of the Constitution itself-for that
to be persuasive.
). Instead, he maintains that the distinctive feature "of the American beginning was
neither the religious underpinnings nor the emancipation from them but the combina-
tion." Id. at 37. Nonetheless, the Enlightenment theme in the United States was not as
hostile to religion as it was in Europe. See id. In part, this was because those who sup-
ported religion also supported republicanism, contrary to the pattern in Europe. See id.
280 Although the original intent of the Framers is relevant to constitutional adjudica-
tion, multiple sources should guide constitutional interpretation. Shiffrin, supra note 53,
at 1197-98. But see McConnell, God is Dead, supra note 274, at 168-72 (placing stress on
original intent).
281 Cf Berg, supra note 179, at 1581-82 (suggesting there was an overlapping consen-
sus about the purposes of the religion clauses at the founding, but arguing that the rise of
the welfare state tears the consensus apart). Of course, in the concrete, no consensus
exists as to how to define religious freedom in specific contexts.
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might be a fact; it might be valued by many; but it would not be a
constitutional value.2 82
Although there is much to commend in the overlapping consen-
sus approach as an ideal, it seems clear that government has favored
religion, at least to a limited extent, throughout our constitutional his-
tory, and that this favoritism has not been regarded as unconstitu-
tional. As I will discuss below, the presence of "In God We Trust" on
coins, for example, is a non-trivial indication that government can
favor religion in some contexts without violating the Constitution.
One way to look at this is that the Constitution favors religion over
nonreligion, but that there are limits to which the government can
promote religion both out of respect for non-believers and for reasons
that appeal to many religious believers. Alternatively, one could posit
that the Constitution is indifferent about the fate of religion, but com-
promises supporting religion have been made along the way. As I will
suggest in connection with discussion of the Pledge of Allegiance and
"In God We Trust," I think the latter perspective is at odds with our
constitutional history. It seems reasonable to interpret the religion
clauses as favoring religion,2 8 3 but with significant limitations on how
that favoritism may be expressed. Such a position does not undercut
the protection of free exercise for non-believers. If there is one pro-
position unanimously favored in religion law, it is that the decision to
accept or reject religion should be a voluntary matter.284 Moreover,
the Free Speech Clause, Article VI, clause 3, prohibiting religious test
oaths for public office, 285 and the Equal Protection Clause, also make
clear that our Constitution does not tolerate governmental discrimina-
tion against the nonreligious.
282 The same could not be said from this perspective of the Roger Williams's concern
that the wilderness of the state would compromise the garden of religion. See supra notes
168-95 and accompanying text. From a religious perspective, protecting religions from
the corrosive effects of state interference is of religious importance. From the perspective
of the nonreligious, compromising the garden of religion might or might not serve civic
purposes.
283 Certainly an attempt to justify the religion clauses from anti-religious premises
would be a non-starter. As I will ultimately suggest, given the plurality of positions, there is
no neutral ground to stand upon.
284 Indeed, Thomas Berg argues that "the reliance on religious voluntarist beliefs to
ground religious freedom is not the sort of reliance that amounts to real favoritism or
preference for religion or a particular faith." Berg, supra note 32, at 734. Instead, the
voluntarist principle is intended to "give equal liberty to all beliefs." Id. Although the
government may rely upon oue specific belief to ground the general principle, this fact
"does not in itself create any favoritism in how government actually treats its citizens-and
again, it is how government actually treats citizens, not the grounds on which it relies, that
is most important to neutrality." Id.
289 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 ("[N]o religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualifica-
tion to any Office or Public Trust under the United States."). On the significance of this
provision, see KRAMNICK & MOORE, supra note 168, at 26-45.
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Nor does such a position do much to endorse general govern-
mental involvement in the religious sphere to promote religion.
Favoring religion ordinarily counsels against government action de-
signed to favor religion. Distrust of politicians is not only a mark of
our system of checks and balances; it is a fundamental ingredient of
the religion clauses. 286 Nonetheless, the Establishment Clause cannot
fairly be read to preclude all actions by politicians that favor religion
any more than the Free Exercise Clause precludes all state actions
with a negative impact on religion. Although there are easy cases, ap-
plying the Establishment Clause frequently calls for nuanced practical
judgments that cannot be reduced to simplistic formulas.
C. Applying the Establishment Clause
Applying the Establishment Clause is a more complicated enter-
prise than applying the Free Exercise Clause. When government im-
pacts religious liberty directly, all the values underlying the Free
Exercise Clause are potentially in play, and they all point in the same
direction. Unlike the Free Exercise Clause, Establishment Clause val-
ues frequently come into conflict with each other. This complexity
forces a more extended discussion of applications than was necessary
with the Free Exercise Clause. But in many ways the question of Es-
tablishment Clause applications is more interesting than Free Exercise
applications, partly because of the greater richness produced by con-
flicts between values, partly because they force deeper inspection of
the relationship between religion and government, and partly because
so many of the cases arise out of controversies affecting our children
in the schools.
Perhaps there is a natural human tendency to transform the com-
plex into the simple, and the Allegheny County case is a model case for
those who would reduce the Establishment Clause to a simple equality
model. The county's action favors Christianity. This it may not do.
End of case. If equality were the sole value underlying the Establish-
ment Clause, one would expect that governmental deviations from re-
ligious equality would invariably be unconstitutional and that
government conformity with equality would invariably be constitu-
tional. But neither of these propositions are correct. Government de-
viations from equality are frequently constitutional. For example,
governmentally sponsored monotheistic prayers are ordinarily consti-
tutional, at least outside the context of public schools; 28 7 government
frequently takes positions that contradict religious doctrine without
286 See Berg, supra note 179, at 1630-31.
287 Compare, for example, the treatment of government prayers such as "God save this
honorable Court" with cases such as Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000),
striking down school sponsored prayer at football games, Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577
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violating the Establishment Clause; 288 and government ordinarily may
remove obstacles from religious practice in ways that discriminate
against or burden nonreligious actors.28 9 Similarly, conforming with
equality does not immunize government from Establishment Clause
liability. For example, government may not permit religious teachers
in public school classrooms even if it does so on an equal basis. Equal-
ity's explanatory power is thwarted precisely because of the pluralistic
foundations of the Establishment Clause.
1. Acceptable Deviations from Equality
a. Monotheistic Prayer
Justice Kennedy's claim that those who oppose the action of Alle-
gheny County are hostile to religion 290 is widely shared. Many worry
that the absence of religious symbols from public life would create the
impression that religion is unimportant, not part of the lives of the
American people, and not something that should be part of the lives
of children. They worry about the consequences of a political culture
devoid of religious symbolism. They worry about the consequences of
maintaining a "naked public square."2 91
In response to such worries, much public ceremony contains ref-
erence to or prayers to God designed to counter the impression that
the United States is a Godless government. The formulation and use
of the Pledge of Allegiance is one of many governmental actions that
pay homage to God. Some such efforts have been declared unconsti-
tutional. For example, the Court struck down prayer 29 2 and Bible
readings293 in public school classrooms some four decades ago.
Nonetheless, Supreme Court Justices have routinely suggested that
the Pledge of Allegiance was not constitutionally problematic. These
statements have now been challenged.
Shortly before the fourth of July, 2002, Judge Goodwin of the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals wrote an opinion declaring that the
words "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance violate the Establish-
ment Clause.2 94 It was not a hard argument to make. Far from being
(1992), striking down school sponsored prayer at graduation, and Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421 (1962), striking down state sponsored prayer in classrooms.
288 See supra Part II.C. 1b.
289 See supra Part II.C.l.c.
290 See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
291 See generally RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND DE-
MOCRACY IN AMERICA (1984) (arguing that the idea of America as a secular society is "de-
monstrably false" and "exceedingly dangerous").
292 Engel, 370 U.S. at 436.
293 Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223-27 (1963).
294 Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002) (judgment stayed on June
27, 2002, pending en banc review). The opinion was ultimately withdrawn in favor of an
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a lasting tradition reaching to the beginning of the Republic, the
words had been added to the Pledge by Congress in the 1950s. 295 The
Supreme Court had clearly stated that it was unconstitutional for the
state to promote religion.2 96 But, as Goodwin pointedly observed, the
"under God" amendment not only endorsed religion over nonreli-
gion, it endorsed monotheism over polytheism. 29 7 Indeed, its unmis-
takable purpose was to endorse and promote religion. President
Eisenhower, during the Act's signing ceremony, stated: "From this day
forward, the millions of our school children will daily proclaim in
every city and town, every village and rural schoolhouse, the dedica-
tion of our Nation and our people to the Almighty."
298
Persons from very different traditions could support the Goodwin
opinion. Obviously, strong followers of the Enlightenment tradition
would find the opinion congenial. If you think that belief in God is
just superstition, believed because of fear or ignorance, then the idea
that children should be encouraged to pledge allegiance to a flag
"under God" is difficult to swallow.2 99 But traditional religious believ-
ers can support the opinion on the ground that, among other things,
the mixture of politics and religion works to the detriment of religion.
Whether viewed from a nonreligious perspective or a religious
perspective, then, the Goodwin opinion had much to recommend it.
Nonetheless, one need not have been a constitutional lawyer to pre-
dict that the Court would find a way to overturn the Ninth Circuit,
and in Elk Grove United School District v. Newdow, reverse it did.3°° Six
opinion declaring unconstitutional a school district policy requiring the recitation of the
Pledge of Allegiance daily by willing students in each elementary school class, but not inval-
idating the Congressional act adding the words under God to the Pledge. Newdow v. U.S.
Congress, 328 F.3d 466, 483, 490 (9th Cir. 2003), cert denied, 124 S. Ct. 383 (2003), and cert.
granted sub nom, Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 384 (2003).
295i Newdow, 292 F.3d at 600.
296 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S 1, 15-16 (1947).
297 Newdow, 292 F.3d at 607-08; cf Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982) ("The
clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot
be officially preferred over another.").
298 Newdow, 292 F.3d at 609 (quoting 100 CONG. REc. 8618 (1954)).
299 Of course, many nonreligious products of the Enlightenment would argue that
there is a moral order and that the U.S. Constitution is best understood as requiring that
the government create and comply with that order. While the writers of the Declaration of
Independence looked to God as the source of that order, nonreligious moralists find that
the order is grounded in nature alone, or in some concept of civilization, or
even in supposedly unchallengeable a priori principles, often inspired by
Kant. So that some Americans want to rescue the Constitution from God,
whereas others, with deeper historical roots, see this desire as doing vio-
lence to it. Hence the contemporary American Kulturkampf.
TAYLOR, supra note 212, at 70. For an argument that the existence of a moral order shows
the existence of God, see C.S. LEwIs, MERE CHRISTIANITy 3-32 (rev. ed. 1953). For addi-
tional discussion of that issue, see ALAN RYAN, JOHN DEWEY AND THE HIGH TIDE OF AM4ERI-
CAN LIBERALIsM 360-62 (1995).
300 542 U.S. -_, 124 S. Ct. 2301, 2312 (2004).
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Justices reversed on a procedural ground, arguing that Newdow did
not have standing to bring the action.30 1 Three Justices, however,
namely, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Thomas
disagreed with Judge Goodwin on the merits.
Analyzing Judge Goodwin's opinion requires separation of two
issues: First, is the Pledge a religious exercise, and, second, can a gov-
ernment actor constitutionally require that the Pledge be part of the
official public school day? Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
O'Connor both denied that the Pledge was a religious exercise s0 2 and,
therefore, concluded that it could be a part of the official public
school day. Justice Thomas conceded that the Pledge was religious, 303
but, for reasons I will not explore here,30 4 argued it was constitutional
nonetheless.30 5 I will argue that the Pledge is religious and that it is
constitutional for Congress to encourage its use, but that it should not
be considered constitutionally permissible to use the Pledge in public
school classrooms.
How does one argue that the Pledge with its "under God" lan-
guage is not religious? Chief Justice Rehnquist argues that the Pledge
is a patriotic exercise, not a religious exercise. 30 6 On one reading of
the opinion, the Chief Justice is suggesting that "under God" simply
refers to what he regards as a historical truth, namely that "our Nation
was founded on a fundamental belief in God."3
0 7
Elsewhere in the opinion, however, he states that "under God"
"might mean several different things: that God has guided the destiny
of the United States, for example, or that the United States exists
under God's authority. '30 8 These are quite obviously theological
301 Id.
302 Id. at 2319-20 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); id. at 2327 (O'Connor, ].,
concurring).
Io3 Id. at 2329-30 (Thomas, J., concurring).
304 1 make some remarks on the incorporation of the Establishment Clause issue in
Steven H. Shiffrin, Liberalism and the Establishment Clause, 78 CHI.-KETr L. Rsv. 717 passim
(2003).
305 Elk Grove, 124 S. Ct. at 2330 (Thomas,J., concurring). Justice Thomas argued that
the Establishment Clause did not apply to the states and, if it did, it would only prevent
coercion by force of law or penalty which the pledge policy did not do. Id. (Thomas, J.,
concurring). As Justice Thomas understands, his rendition of the Establishment Clause
would "probably cover little more than the Free Exercise Clause." Id. at 2328 (Thomas, J.,
concurring). From the perspective detailed in this article, this approach would ignore
important Establishment Clause values while embracing a shriveled conception of the Free
Exercise Clause.
306 Id. at 2319-20; see also Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 328 F.3d 466, 471, 477-79 (9th
Cir. 2003) (O'Scainnlain,J., dissenting from denial of hearing en banc) (making a similar
argument that the pledge is patriotic and not religious), revd sub nom. Elk Grove Unified
Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004).
307 Elk Grove, 124 S. Ct. at 2319 (Rehnquist, C.J, concurring) (quoting HR. REP. No.
83-1693 (1954)).
308 Id. at 2317 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
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claims. Why it would violate the Establishment Clause to encourage
prayer, but would not violate the Establishment Clause to encourage a
pledge embracing a theological perspective is not on display in the
Rehnquist opinion. Nor does he offer any reason to support the view
that the law contains two fixed categories that cannot overlap: the pa-
triotic and the religious. On his own analysis, the Pledge seems to be
both a patriotic and a religious exercise fused together.
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion is more elaborate on the
claim that religion is not present, but is equally unpersuasive. Her
main line of argument focuses on whether the "reasonable observer"
would think that the Pledge was religious.30 9 This reasonable observer
is "deemed aware of the history of the conduct in question and must
understand its place in our Nation's cultural landscape."3 10  Of
course, children, including the children of atheists, agnostics, and
Buddhists to name a few, are quite unlikely to be aware of this history
or the Pledge's "place." Assuming their views match their parents,
they are overwhelmingly likely to think that they are "outsiders, not
full members of the political community,""' I and they would regretta-
bly be right to think so. But, on Justice O'Connor's rendition of the
Establishment Clause these children's reasonable reactions are of no
moment. In other words, she has formulated a test that can achieve
equality for a group of elite insiders, not for American parents and
children. This, she maintains, is prompted by the "dizzying religious
heterogeneity of our Nation."3 1 2 The alternative she suggests is an-
archistic subjectivity threatening nearly every government action.3 13
In support of this claim, one might conjure up the fundamentalist
who maintains that the public school curriculum establishes a religion
because it does not mention God. As I argue infra, there is a solution
to that problem, and it does not require imaginary people with insider
information. 314
Let us suppose, however, that we are stuck with the O'Connor
test. Does it follow that the Pledge is not religious? Justice O'Connor
says yes because the Pledge is used for secular purposes,31 5 has not
engendered significant national controversy, - 16 does not involve wor-
ship or prayer,31 7 and is a minimal part of the Pledge.3 18 The notion
309 Id. at 2321-22 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
310 Id. at 2322 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
311 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
312 Elk Grove, 124 S. Ct. at 2321 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
313 Id.
314 See infra notes 359-66 and accompanying text.
315 Elk Grove, 124 S. Ct. at 2323, 2325 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
316 Id. at 2323-24 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
317 Id. at 2324-25 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
318 Id. at 2326 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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of using religious language for secular purposes ought itself to raise
constitutional eyebrows. Religion is already damaged by using it for
secular purposes; the damage is compounded by denying that religion
is not involved. And it is a non sequitor to say that reasonable observ-
ers would think that they were not outsiders because a religion they
oppose was only used to consolidate secular objectives. On the other
hand, even from a secular perspective, one might imagine the honor-
ing of the Puritan contribution of democratic thought or of Martin
Luther King and the role religion played in his life as a part of recog-
nizing the role of religion in American life. Such honoring would be
quite different than the use of God in the Pledge of Allegiance unless
one indulges the fiction that it exists only to recall a historical "fact"
about the founding of the Republic.
Justice O'Connor argues that the absence of litigation over the
last half century and the absence of public controversy shows that the
reasonable observer would recognize that the Pledge is secular.31 9 I
would think it shows the contrary. I would think it shows that atheists,
agnostics, and Buddhists knew they were outsiders and knew they had
no chance of winning a lawsuit. It is hard to imagine that atheists,
agnostics, and Buddhists have been happy to send their children to
schools that sport the Pledge. That they have not set themselves up as
targets for reprisals and have instead quietly accepted a public insult
does not infuse the Pledge with a secular character.
Justice O'Connor also finds it significant that the Pledge is not a
prayer. 320 To prove this, she would have the reasonable observer con-
sult the California Education Code to determine that the Pledge is
characterized as a patriotic exercise 321 and also notice that the Pledge
is led by a teacher rather than a religious leader.322 Fair enough. But
then she walks into outer darkness.
She insists that the constant repetition of the Pledge in a patriotic
context has removed religion from the Pledge: "[A]ny religious
freight the words may have been meant to carry originally has long
since been lost."32 3 Similarly, Justice Brennan once wrote that the
phrase "In God We Trust" on coins had lost religious meaning.32 4 I
have always thought that such an argument was ironic. When govern-
319 Id. at 2323-24 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
320 Id. at 2324-25 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
321 Id. at 2325 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
'322 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
323 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
324 This argument is even less persuasive when used to support the governmentally
sponsored ceremonies featuring prayer in the wake of the September 11th tragedy. For
the argument that governmentally sponsored prayers should be immune from constitu-
tional objection in exceptional circumstances-such as a national crisis combined with
public mourning-so long as the government response occurs within a limited time period
from the date of the tragedy, see William P. Marshall, The Limits of Secularism: Public Relig-
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ment puts a prayer on a coin, it cheapens the prayer. When govern-
ment makes Christmas a commercial holiday by cooperating with
merchants in putting Christmas lights all over town, it cheapens
Christmas. And when I hear the phrase "under God" in the Pledge of
Allegiance, I think of cynical and sanctimonious politicians currying
favor with their constituents.
PerhapsJustice O'Connor means to suggest that the Pledge does
not instill religious values. If that is what she means to say, I am in-
clined to agree. There are grounds to wonder whether significant
numbers of children have become religious or stayed religious longer
because they mouthed the magic words on school day mornings. It
seems unlikely that brief ceremonies of that character have any signifi-
cant religious influence, 32 5 Indeed, in the nineteenth century relig-
ious promotion was far more conspicuous in the public schools than it
is today. 32 6 Yet many argued that the effort was ineffective. Indeed
my colleague R. Laurence Moore strongly argues that the "importance
of religion to intellectual development in the nineteenth century had
almost nothing to do with what happened in public school
classrooms."
327
But neither this, nor the fact that the Pledge fails to induce spiri-
tual attitudes,328 nor the fact that the reference to God is circum-
scribed, 329 or that it is only two of the Pledge's 31 words330 in any way
makes the "under God" phrase nonreligious. Citizens may have for-
gotten that the City of Los Angeles has a religious meaning, but any
English speaker knows that "under God" and "In God We Trust" carry
theological meaning. Indeed, Justice O'Connor states that the phrase
is "merely descriptive; it purports only to identify the United States as
a Nation subject to divine authority. That cannot be seen as a serious
invocation of God or as an expression of individual submission to di-
vine authority." 3 1 I am not sure why individuals are not subject to
ious Expression in Moments of National Crisis and Tragedy, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 11, 31-33
(2002).
325 Despite ceremonial deists' claims to the contrary, the brevity of the ceremonies and
their likely ineffectiveness do not rob them of their religious character.
326 Harold J. Berman, Religious Freedom and the Challenge of the Modern State, in ARTICLES
OF FAITH, ARTICLES OF PEACE: THE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY CLAUSES AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC
PHILosoPHn, supra note 99, at 40, 45 ("[Tihe great apostle of the public school, Horace
Mann, . . .continually emphasized that only through public education could a Christian
social consciousness and a Christian morality be inculcated in the population as a whole.").
327 R. Laurence Moore, Bible Reading and Nonsectarian Schooling The Failure of Religious
Instruction in Nineteenth-Century Public Education, 861. OF AM. HIsT. 1581, 1598 (2000). For
arguments that the Pledge may have more importance in inculcating religious values than
I recognize, see Seana Shiffrin, supra note 94.
328 Elk Grove, 124 S. Ct. at 2324-25 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
'329 Id. at 2327 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
330 Id. at 2326 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
'3I Id. at 2325 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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divine authority if the United States is, but I am sure that a pledge
identifying the United States as subject to divine authority is asserting
the existence and authority of the divine.
Justice O'Connor may be suggesting that even if there is some
minimal religious content, it is basically non-controversial, and, there-
fore, not an endorsement. But Justice O'Connor knows this to be
false. It is not clear why atheists and agnostics do not matter in her
analysis, but she does respond to the contention that Buddhism is not
based on belief in a separate Supreme Being: "[O]ne would be hard
pressed to imagine a brief solemnizing reference to religion that
would adequately encompass every religious belief expressed by any
citizen of this Nation. ' 332 True, but it is no more satisfying to be told
that the Pledge is not an endorsement than it is to be told that it is not
religious.
Nor does it work to suppose that the God amendment represents
a trivial conflict with Establishment Clause values. As I have just dis-
cussed, one cannot persuasively claim that it is bereft of religious
meaning. Rehnquist and O'Connor aside, the history leading to the
adoption of "under God" makes its religious purpose clear.333 Moreo-
ver, the firestorm following the Ninth Circuit's opinion itself demon-
strated the religious character of the message and the tenacity with
which it is held.334 To claim that it is just a patriotic ceremony is to
blink that the ceremony was converted into a patriotic/religious cere-
mony by the God amendment. To claim that the God amendment is
de minimis tells those who are marked as outsiders to pretend that
they are not marked as outsiders. In contrast, the ideal of those who
oppose the insertion of under God in the Pledge of Allegiance is one
of equal citizenship. Their constitutional vision sees a nation in which
one's religion or lack of religion has no bearing on one's identity as
an American citizen.
But, unfortunately, they see a nation that does not exist. It never
has, and it never will. Certainly, government has been deeply involved
in promoting religion over nonreligion over the course of American
history, and, for the greater part of that history, it has supported Prot-
estantism over other forms of religion.33 5 The public schools were
332 Id. at 2326 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
333 Steven G. Gey, "Under Cod, " The Pledge of Allegiance, and Other Constitutional Tivia,
81 N.C. L. Rev. 1865, 1873-80 (2003).
334 See id. at 1914-16. Similar considerations lead me to conclude that "In God We
Trust" on coins is not de minimis.
335 James Davison Hunter, Religious Freedom and the Challenge of Modern Pluralism, in
ARICLES OF FAITH, ARTICLES OF PEACE: THE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY CLAUSES AND THE AMERICAN
PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY, supra note 99, at 54, 55 ("While no one Protestant denomination en-
joyed the patronage of the state, the cause of a 'pan-Protestantism' had a substantial, if
unofficial, governmental endorsement. The consequence was the restriction of the full
civil liberties of other, non-Protestant communities of belief."); see also Berg, supra note
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formed in large part to support Protestant values. 336 Indeed, for most
of our history, reading from the Bible in the public schools was con-
sidered constitutional33 7 at the same time that financial aid to private
schools was considered unconstitutional. 338 Perhaps some fine mind
can reconcile these two positions on the basis of some neutral princi-
ple, but the fact is that the reading was from a Protestant Bible unac-
companied by commentary, 33 9 and the private schools were largely
Catholic. Supporting the Protestants was considered neutral, com-
mon sense promotion of morals; supporting the Catholics was estab-
lishing a religion. 340
Although the Court, in the landmark case of Everson v. Board of
Education, said that "[n]either a state nor the Federal Govern-
ment .... can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or
prefer one religion over another,"341 it is hard to take this language
seriously. This is a country in which "In God We Trust" appears on
the currency, the Supreme Court begins its sessions with "God save
the United States and this Honorable Court," and Congress has or-
dained a National Day of Prayer. In theory, of course, these and other
practices could be rolled back.342 In practice, it is inconceivable that
they will.3 43 Moreover, pretending they are not religious is simply
insulting.
179, at 1612 (discussing the American authorities preferences for "generic Protestantism"
even after disestablishment); cf TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 234, at 293 (
For the Americans the ideas of Christianity and liberty are so completely
mingled that it is almost impossible to get them to conceive of the one
without the other; it is not a question with them of sterile beliefs be-
queathed by the past and vegetating rather than living in the depths of the
soul.
336 FiNE & STARK, supra note 195, at 139-40; Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the
Establishment Clause: The Rise of the Nonestablishment Principle, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1085, 1120-22
(1995); McConnell, supra note 78, at 121.
-37 See Michael deHaven Newsom, Common School Religion: Judicial Narratives in a Protes-
tant Empire, 11 S. CAL. LRTEDISC. L.J. 219, 223-37 (2002).
338 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 967 (Walter
Carrington ed., 8th ed. 1927); see Steven K. Green, Private School Vouchers and the Confusion
over "Direct" Aid, 10 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTS. L.J. 47, 50-51 (2000) (describing how, from
the second half of the Nineteenth Century into the Twentieth, state courts consistently
invalidated financial aid to religious schools).
339 Reading without commentary suggested that it was up to the individual to interpret
the scripture, but the Catholic Church taught that its hierarchy was necessary for guidance
in the interpretation. See MACEDO, supra note 165, at 54-59, 64-76 (2000).
340 HAMBURGER, supra note 172, at 364-65. For the contention, somewhat exaggerated
to my mind, that anti-Catholic prejudice remains common, see PHILIP JENKINS, THE NEw
ANTI-CATHOLICISM: THE LAST ACCEPTABLE PREJUDICE (2003).
341 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
342 For criticism of the Court's expansion of such practices by resort to analogy, see
Van Alstyne, supra note 127, at 782-87.
343 For arguments that they should be eliminated, see Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the
Constitutionality of Ceremonial Deism, 96 COLUM. L. Rv. 2083, 2173-74 (1996); Douglas Lay-
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What does this hard reality mean for Establishment Clause inter-
pretation? It seems inescapable that the Establishment Clause should
be interpreted in light of precedent along with the values of the Amer-
ican people, that the high wall between church and state perspective
should be respected as a regulatory ideal, and that when these clash
the Justices should come as close to the ideal as our evolving traditions
permit. From that perspective, it seems clear that generalized govern-
mental endorsements of monotheism are consistent with the Estab-
lishment Clause. It seems clear that, despite all the lip service to
equality, the United States Constitution is best interpreted to be con-
sistent with monotheistic ceremonial prayers that do not involve coer-
cion. Indeed, Justice Douglas was on to something when he said that
our institutions presuppose a divine being.344 Now, of course, it need
not be that way. Indeed, given the pluralistic character of our people,
it seems to me that we would have a better Constitution if we did not
have what amounts to a monotheistic established religion, and it
should be noted a monotheism of a specific type-one that, among
other things, 345 puts "in God we trust" on the coins, not "in Allah we
trust."
3 4 6
Of course, we need not be bound by the dead hand of the past.
Of course, we should remember that it is a Constitution we are inter-
preting, one designed for ages to come and to be adapted to varying
cock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence: The Equal Status of Religious Speech by Private Speakers,
81 Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 8 (1986); Arnold H. Loewy, Rethinking Government Neutrality Towards
Religion Under the Establishment Clause: The Untapped Potential ofJustice O'Connor's Insight, 64
N.C. L. REv. 1049, 1054-60 (1986).
344 For defense of the notion that America has a civil religion that includes God, see
Robert N. Bellah, Civil Religion in America, in RELIGION IN AMEICA 3, 5 (William G. Mc-
Loughlin & Robert N. Bellah eds., 1966): "[T]he separation of church and state has not
denied the political realm a religious dimension." More generally, the Bill of Rights might
be understood to presuppose a Supreme Being. For an argument that the notion of equal-
ity among human beings cannot be supported without resort to such a conception, see
JEREMY WALDRON, GOD, LoCKE, AND EQUALITY: CHRISTIAN FOUNDATIONS OF JOHN LocKE's
POLITICAL THOUGHT (2002). Although there is a strong case for the proposition that relig-
ion has on balance been a progressive force in American politics, see Shiffrin, supra note
100, at 1648-52, 1 do not believe it follows that religion has been a progressive force when
employed by American politicians. Particularly problematic has been the theme that God
has a "special concern for America." Bellah, supra, at 9. The notion that God has sanc-
tioned our colonizing efforts in the name of democracy, let alone in the name of God, is
plainly distasteful.
345 Michael Perry suggests that America follows a moderate version of the nonestab-
lishment norm that includes a loving, judging God and that we are all sacred because God
created us and loves us. Perry, supra note 86, at 309-10. He states that government may
affirm these views, but may not impose them on others. Id.
346 1 do not mean to suggest that Muslims suppose that Allah is a different God than
that worshiped by Jews and Christians. Even if the equivalence were generally understood,
however, the cultural importance of saying "In God We Trust" instead of "In Allah We
Trust" would remain formidable.
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conditions.34 7 We, however, have also been counseled to recognize
that it is this Constitution we are interpreting, 3 48 and this Constitution
cannot plausibly be understood to foreclose the engraving of "In God
We Trust" on coins and the like.3"49 At least, not yet; and probably, not
ever.
How does this apply to the issues put forward by the Pledge? On
this analysis, Congress could legitimately put forth a model as to how
citizens might honor the flag if they wished.3 511 On the other hand,
the use of the Pledge in public school classrooms should not be de-
fended. If the Court could strike down prayer and Bible readings in
public school classrooms, it is a short step for it to recognize that en-
couraging public recitations of the existence of God by children in
public school classrooms is not consistent with the Establishment
Clause. 35 1 If the Court could hold that prayers in graduation ceremo-
nies were coercive in that members of the audience might feel com-
pelled to stand, as it did in Lee v. Weisman,3 5 2 how much more coercive
is the daily recitation of the Pledge in public school classrooms? 353
There is plenty of room under this Constitution to hold that the coer-
cive atmosphere of peer groups in public school classrooms cannot
constitutionally function to induce recitals of belief in God.
There is a strong case for an alternative path to the conclusion I
have set out, but I do not believe it is ultimately persuasive. This alter-
native path strives to be pragmatic. It would suggest that Justices
should make decisions on the basis of what would best protect relig-
ious liberty overall. To declare unconstitutional the engraving of "In
347 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 408 (1819) ("[W]e must never forget, that it is
a constitution we are expounding.").
348 WILLIAM W. VAN AL-STYNE, INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FIRsT AMENDMENT 6"-7 (1984).
349 Similarly, the weight of history suggests the already-established cities of Los Angeles
and St. Paul do not violate the Establishment Clause, though these names should not act as
precedent for new names of governmental entities.
350 Judge Goodwin's revised opinion in Newdow does not maintain that the Congres-
sional amendment is unconstitutional, but it does invalidate the school district's policy of
having the pledge recited in the classroom. Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 328 F.3d 466,
489-90 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd sub nom., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. V. Newdow, 124 S. Ct.
2301 (2004).
351 In truth, the worst aspect of the Pledge's content is not the under God phrase-
though it is an outrage. The worst aspect is that we place pressure on small children to
repeat words saying that we live in a country with liberty and justice for all. This lie is not
cured by the assertion that the Pledge really means that we have an ideal of liberty and
justice for all. Does anybody believe that little third graders make this distinction?
Finally, there is a strong First Amendment case for the proposition that forcing school
children to make a pledge is an unconstitutional method of instilling values. See Seana
Shiffrin, supra note 94.
352 505 U.S. 577, 598-99 (1992).
353 Cf. Gey, supra note 333, at 1893-97 (suggesting even more coercion in the Pledge
atmosphere than at a football game or graduation, because the student who opts out will
be tainted not only as unreligious, but also unpatriotic).
2004]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
God We Trust" on coins under this approach would be thought futile
because it would trigger a quick constitutional amendment to the con-
trary. 354 Moreover, it would be dangerous. Aside from the symbolic
damage created by amending the Bill of Rights, there is no assurance
that a new amendment would be narrowly crafted or that it would be
narrowly interpreted.
Certainly, one argument for a pragmatic path would be that it has
more integrity than pretending that monotheistic ceremonies do not
violate equality, or are not really religious, or that the public affirma-
tions of and prayer to a deity are trivial.355 On the other hand, one
might object to this approach on the ground that it sacrifices minority
rights on the altar of the intense majority, and so it does, but only
when thought to be necessary. One might also object that the Court
sacrifices its reputation as a court of law when it resorts to pragmatism.
But this would not be the first time that the Court's constitutional
decisions have been influenced by pragmatic assessments of its own
power. Indeed, if concern about the Court's reputation as a legal ac-
tor were primary, a decision finding "under God" constitutional would
be mandatory given the swift condemnation that greeted the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals when it invalidated the Pledge.
But some might argue that this, too, misses the point. The point
is not the Court's reputation, but the fact that the Court is supposed
to be a legal institution immune from political pressure. The Consti-
tution, on this understanding, requires that the Court interpret the
Establishment Clause according to the high wall understanding even
if the reading is contrary to our history, even if the reading would
swiftly be circumvented by a constitutional amendment that might
make matters even worse, and even if the reading would do great
damage to the Court as an institution. To that high-minded objec-
tion, I plead guilty. I do not believe that vague slogans or deep analy-
sis of the "rule of law" yield the result that Justices are required to
render decisions that threaten to undermine critical constitutional
values and institutions.3 5 6
354 Cf RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 54 (2001)
Justices otherwise most committed to strict separation of church and state
apprehend that judicial rejection of those entrenched practices [such as 'In
God We Trust' on coins and 'Under God' in the Pledge] would engender
widespread anger and resentment-and perhaps not unreasonably so
(even if not rightly) in light of historical understandings of what the Estab-
lishment Clause permits.
355 See Steven D. Smith, Believing Persons, Personal Belieuings: The Neglected Center of the
First Amendment, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1233, 1317 (arguing that nonreligious explanations
are disingenuous and offensive).
356 For the claim that it would be wrong to deny a constitutional right in order to
protect the Court, but that the "under God" practice and the "In God We Trust" practice
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My concern about the pragmatic approach is pragmatic. I fear
that if such an approach were legitimized in defining rights (as op-
posed to implementation of the "passive virtues"), the Court would
not be as aggressive as it should be. It is not clear that a Court armed
with pragmatic concerns would have had the nerve to desegregate
schools, outlaw prayer in schools, or recognize the burning of flags to
be protected freedom of speech. Despite exceptional appointments,
the process of appointing Justices is not calculated to produce those
who are vigilant in supporting civil liberties. Offering a pragmatic ex-
cuse to enforce civil liberties strikes me as a political mistake.
It could, for example, lead to upholding the Pledge in class-
rooms. To be sure, the prospect of a constitutional amendment in
this situation is not as sure as it would be if the Court invalidated "In
God We Trust" on coins. After all, Governor Jesse Ventura vetoed a
bill that would have required the Pledge to be used in all Minnesota
public school classrooms,3 57 and only half the states have any such
requirement. One could argue that the American people may have
no patience for removing "In God We Trust" from coins and the like,
but doubt that there is enough of a consensus to underwrite a consti-
tutional amendment requiring the Pledge in American classrooms.
On this analysis, protecting the religious liberty of third graders might
fall victim to political demagogues, but it is a stronger cause than flail-
ing against inequalities like engraving "In God We Trust" on coins.
Nonetheless, the political risks are substantial. Obviously, govern-
ment could function quite effectively without parading religious sym-
bols in a ceremonial way. The intense desire to use these symbols may
just show that Americans are a religious people who believe that
prayer or the recognition of religion is an important part of public
life. There is a lot of that involved. But I am sure there is something
else, too, and it is revealed by the intensity of the outrage responding
to the suggestion that the Pledge of Allegiance presents a problem.
There is a desire on the part of many to marginalize those who do not
agree, to show who the insiders are, and to send a loud, clear message
as to who the outsiders are.358 And thus a pledge purportedly de-
can be defended as a part of the historical understanding, see Fallon, supra note 354, at 55.
See generally DWORKIN, supra note 47 (opposing strategic conceptions of rights).
357 "My position is that it isn't government's job to mandate patriotism. To me man-
dating a pledge of allegiance to a government is something Saddam Hussein would do."
David Wallis, Questions for Jesse Ventura: Still Wrestling With it, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Aug. 18,
2002, at 11. On the other hand, Michael Dukakis's decision to veto a similar bill in Massa-
chusetts certainly did not help his Presidential campaign. Gey, supra note 333, at 1868.
358 See Berg, supra note 179, at 1612 ("[S]ome Americans repeat the pattern of ignor-
ing or underestimating the harm done to dissenters from explicit government advance-
ment of particular religious truths. For example, it is fair to say, as does Professor Douglas
Laycock, that many of those who advocate government-initiated displays and rituals, when
they could use nongovernmental outlets for such expression, simply 'place little or no
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signed to unite a People divides a People into the "good guys" and the
"bad guys." The risk that politicians would pander to these currents
might be too much for a pragmatist to swallow. 3 -5 9
If the use of the pragmatic consideration would enhance civil lib-
erties, I would not hesitate to endorse it, but judges are already too
cautious. In the case of the Pledge, it could cause judges to consign
our children to religious coercion in the classrooms even if they be-
lieved it was unconstitutional. That is too much of a price to pay.
b. Contradicting Religious Doctrine
Government frequently speaks and acts in ways that contradict
religious doctrine, and these communications and actions have not
been thought to violate the Establishment Clause. Indeed, the Consti-
tution allows governments to contradict doctrines of the Quakers, the
Roman Catholics, the Christian Fundamentalists, the Muslims, and
the Jews. The military is not unconstitutional despite the Quakers;
capital punishment is not unconstitutional despite the Roman
Catholics; state teaching about gender roles and homosexuality in
ways that contradict the teachings of Muslims, Christian fundamental-
ists, and other religions is not unconstitutional; state support of medi-
cal care is not unconstitutional despite the Christian Scientists; and
public high school Friday night football games do not violate the Con-
stitution despite the Jews.
One could attack parts of this list. The Friday football game ex-
ample to me shows the unthinking hegemony of Christianity, but at-
tempting to change it would trigger enormous anti-Semitism. In
many circumstances, it should be permissible to excuse children from
objectionable instruction though this is very different from aban-
doning the instruction altogether. Capital punishment should proba-
bly be unconstitutional on other grounds.3 60
Nonetheless, such government policies raise troubling theoretical
issues. Christian fundamentalists faced with a secular school system
ask why they are not the kind of outsiders who should be protected
value on the costs to religious minorities.'"); Berg, supra note 3, at 190 ("The separationist
approach .. relied implicitly on the existence of a general religious and moral consensus
that made specific references to God seem less necessary; as that moral consensus has
broken down, more citizens feel the need to reassert the religious foundations of morality
explicitly .. "); cf Van Alstyne, supra note 127, at 787 (stating that the use by government
of religious symbols such as the criche "are disappointing reminders that religious ethno-
centrism, as well as religious insensitivity, are still with us. I do not know whether Mr.
Jefferson would have been surprised, but I believe he would have been disappointed").
.159 See Berg, supra note 3, at 190.
360 Numerous Justices have lodged constitutional objections, but they have never been
able to deliver a knockout blow. JssE H. CHOPER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 511-37 (9th
ed. 2001).
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under the Establishment Clause.3 6 1 When Fundamentalists believe
that God created the world in seven days, why isn't the teaching of
evolution an establishment of religion? Surely Fundamentalists
rightly believe that the majority is treating them as outsiders.
One response to the Fundamentalists is that government could
not effectively function if it were forced to avoid contradicting relig-
ious doctrine in its communications and actions. Indeed, in a pluralis-
tic society it may often be impossible to act without contradicting one
religious doctrine or another. For religions divide upon how govern-
ments should be organized and how the church should relate to the
state; any organizing action will contradict some religion. Nonethe-
less, it is not clear this shows that in every case government must be
permitted to contradict religious doctrine. Perhaps permitting relig-
ious claims on this basis would overwhelm government and the courts,
but the empirical foundation for that claim depends upon the process
for adjudicating the claims and the degree of scrutiny applied.
A more fundamental response to the Fundamentalists is that the
Establishment Clause prohibits the establishment of religion and the
teaching of evolution is not the teaching of religion. A central mes-
sage of the Establishment Clause is that government has no jurisdic-
tion to determine what God has to say about any subject 3 62 or to
361 The question I am posing might be presented by a taxpayer in a school district,
even if the objector had no children in the school. The issue raised by the taxpayer would
be whether public education in its present form violates the Establishment Clause. If a
child were present in the school and she were exposed to instruction that contradicted her
religion, then a free exercise issue would also be presented. Ordinarily, in my view, the
free exercise claim should prevail. But I see no room for compromise if parents insist on
separating their child from other children on grounds of intolerance or depriving their
child of vital information or critical thinking skills-skills necessary for democratic citizen-
ship and for adaptability in a changing marketplace. Discussion of the general free exer-
cise issue primarily focuses on the Mozert litigation culminating in Mozert v. Hawkins County
Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987). For analysis of Mozert, see STEPHEN BATES,
BATTLEGROUND: ONE MOTHER'S CRUSADE, THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR
CONTROL OF OUR CLASSROOMS 233-302 (1993) and Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, "He Drew a
Circle That Shut Me Out": Assimilation, Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal Education,
106 HARV. L. REv. 581 (1993).
362 OWEN, supra note 85, at 129, 168; cf Sullivan, supra note 104, at 198-99 (arguing
that the Establishment Clause creates secular governance of public affairs). I think Sulli-
van leaves too little room for religious speech in democratic life, but whatever secular
governance may mean, it must exclude governmental determinations of what God has to
say. Consider Laycock, supra note 343, at 7-8 (
"Agnostic" is the label that comes closest to describing the attitude required
of the government, but that label is misleading in an important way. An
agnostic has no opinion on whether God exists, and neither should the
government. But an agnostic also believes that humans are incapable of
knowing whether God exists. If the government believed that, it would pre-
fer agnostics over theists and atheists .... Agnostics have no opinion for
epistemological reasons; the government must have no opinion because it
is not the government's role to have an opinion.
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"measure religious truth."363 The teaching of evolution does not vio-
late this precept. Indeed, a teacher of evolution in the public schools
might believe that the best scientific evidence pointed to the truth of
evolution, that the Bible pointed in the other direction, and that the
Bible was right. The teacher also might think that it is her job to
teach science, not religion. From this perspective, the teacher or the
school has taken no position on the interpretation of the Bible or the
weight to be given to it.
Imagine how different it would be if the science teacher taught
the science of evolution and proceeded to say, "And this shows that
the Fundamentalists are wrong." Clearly she would have left the
realm of science and entered the realm of religion. Despite the exam-
ple of monotheistic prayers, in the overwhelming majority of cases,
when government speaks or acts it does so for civic reasons, not be-
cause God has something to say about the subject. Such actions do
not deny the existence of God or suggest that God has nothing to say
about evolution or any other subject. Despite the fact that Fundamen-
talists reasonably experience the teaching of evolution as a contradic-
tion of their religious views, such teaching is not religious within the
meaning of the Establishment Clause. 3
64
These arguments are hardly satisfying to Fundamentalists. But
what is the alternative? Should public school teachers teach what God
has to say about evolution and other subjects? Should school board
meetings resolve the question of God's word or whether there is a
God? There may be a compromise to some of these questions. I see
no reason why public school teachers should be disabled from teach-
ing that various religions question the views that are being expressed
in the classroom-whether those views involve evolution, the legiti-
macy of war, capital punishment, abortion, or what-have-you. Nothing
in the Constitution has been interpreted to prevent teachers from
talking about religion. Students need not be deprived of information
about strongly held views. Indeed, I would argue that fairness de-
mands that students be provided with this information. Without sug-
gesting that judges should police this aspect of education, I would
maintain that this dimension of fairness could ground a constitutional
obligation to include such material in the curriculum. Public school
authorities, who take oaths to defend the Constitution, may take on
constitutional obligations that are rightly regarded as judicially
unenforceable.
363 TRiBE, supra note 6, at 1232. As I have suggested, monotheistic affirmations such as
those appearing on the coins are limited exceptions to this principle.
364 Shiffrin, supra note 304, at 726-27. But cf. Steven D. Smith, Barnette's Big Blunder,
78 CHi.-KEu-r L. REv. 625 (2003) (arguing that there is no meaningful way to draw such
distinctions).
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The ultimate Fundamentalist position ranges far beyond exam-
ples like evolution. From their perspective, the failure to teach relig-
ion in the public schools violates the religious rights of many religious
believers because they believe that religion should permeate the edu-
cational process. From their perspective, the failure to advocate relig-
ious beliefs is itself a religious position.3 65 The difficulty with this
argument is apparent. Religion permeating education in the public
schools would clearly violate the Establishment Clause. To close down
the public schools in order to accommodate the religious beliefs of
some would also violate the religious beliefs of others. However
church-state relations might be structured, the religious beliefs of
many millions of Americans will be contradicted. 366
c. Removing Obstacles from Religious Practice
Government frequently removes obstacles from religious prac-
tice. For example, many states make exemptions to their drug laws to
permit Native Americans to ingest peyote at religious services. The
Smith Court stated that legislative exemptions of this sort were not
constitutionally required, but were constitutionally permitted. 367 This
obviously favors religious peyote users over nonreligious users. But,
for reasons I have canvassed earlier, preferences of this type seem
reasonable. 368
More complicated in terms of analysis are provisions like the fed-
eral draft law that exempted those who were conscientiously opposed
to all wars "by reason of religious training and belief."' '36 9 This, too,
favored religious objectors over nonreligious objectors and raises no
new issues in that respect, but it favored some religious objectors over
other religious objectors, and that should rarely be countenanced.
365 Cf Richard A. Baer, Jr., The Epicycles of the Church-State Debate, CORNELL DAILY SUN,
Apr. 12, 2004, at 5, col. 4 (maintaining, as "Orthodox Christian, that whenever it addresses
the "Big Questions," such as who we are, how we should live, and the meaning of life, "the
secular must itself be considered a form of religion"), , available at http://www.cornellsun.
com/vnews/display.v/ART/2004/o4/1 2/407a0c0f898f3?inarchive=l.
366 Mark V. Tushnet, Disaggregating "Church" and "Culture," 42 DEPAUL L. REv. 235, 239
(1992) ("In a religiously pluralist society, any particular pattern will constitute an endorse-
ment of the normative stance of some churches and a rejection of the stance of others.
Therefore, the only way to devise proper First Amendment jurisprudence is to determine
which pattern is normatively desirable.").
367 For strong arguments in favor of legislative accommodation, see Berg, supra note 1,
at 476-83 which examines textual, structural, and normative arguments, as well as views of
original understanding and case law precedent, that support accommodating religious
conscience), and Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Re-
sponse to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 685 (1992).
368 One might argue that if Smith was rightly decided, Establishment Clause problems
are nmore formidable because religious actors are favored over nonreligious actors in cir-
cumstances that are not required under the Free Exercise clause.
369 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (2000).
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The Court maintained that determining the sincerity of those who
object to all wars would generally be easier than determining the relig-
ious sincerity of those who object only to particular wars.3 70 True
enough. But when serious liberty values (forcing someone to kill
when their religion commands otherwise) and fundamental equality
values (favoring one group of religions over others) combine in the
same case, more serious justification needs to be offered. It has also
been suggested that permitting such general conscientious objection
opportunities would compromise the government's ability to raise the
kind of fighting force it needs. 37 1 If one takes a democratic perspec-
tive, the desire of elites to fight a war lacking strong democratic sup-
port should undercut the importance of the governmental interest. If
the interest is sufficiently grave, a democratic perspective would sug-
gest a less restrictive alternative: justify the war effort to the people.
A final objection to permitting conscientious objection is that it
does not just remove obstacles to religious practice; it offers powerful
incentives for people to join a religion. 372 I do not doubt the psychol-
ogy that lies behind this argument. I believe that many persons joined
the Quakers in an effort to avoid the Vietnam War. These side effects,
however unintended, are offensive to the values of the religion
clauses. But violating liberty and equality values in such a severe way
by not allowing conscientious objection seems even more
problematic. 37 3
Commentators such as Ira Lupu have powerfully argued that per-
mitting discretionary accommodation risks discrimination against mi-
nority religions. 374 But one intriguing feature about the conscientious
objector example is that the statute favored minority religions like the
Quakers over more powerful religious constituencies such as the
Catholics and mainline Protestants. A partial answer to Lupu's wor-
ries is that courts should extend the benefits of legislation intended to
protect religion to minority religious groups.
370 See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 460 (1970).
371 See id.
372 See Jesse H. Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Con-
flict, 41 U. PiTT. L. REv. 673, 698-700 (1980); cf Berg, supra note 1, at 463 (arguing that the
real issue with regard to religion-specific accommodations is whether "its greater effect [is]
to permit religious practice to continue freely, or to induce people to switch to the accom-
modated religion"). Permitting the use of peyote for religious purposes is not a problem-
atic accommodation. See supra notes 107-08, 367 and accompanying text.
373 My contention, therefore, is that religious exemptions in this context should be
constitutionally required. For the suggestion that such exemptions should be permitted,
but not required, see McConnell, supra note 367, at 702.
374 Lupu, supra note 5, at 586.
[Vol. 90:9
THE PLURALISTIC FOUNDATIONS
Another concern frequently raised about such accommodation
provisions is that they impose burdens upon others.37 5 For example,
Estate of Thornton v. Caldo9 76 invalidated a Connecticut statute guaran-
teeing workers an absolute right not to work on the day they observed
as the Sabbath._77 The Court was especially concerned about the
sweeping character of the statute, and that it did not permit excep-
tions when honoring the Sabbath would cause a substantial economic
burden on the employer or the imposition of significant burdens on
other employees. Too be sure, some burdens in some circumstances
could be undue (though it is not clear this was one of them).3 7 8
Significantly, the Thornton Court did not object to the state's con-
cern with the interference with free exercise by private actors.3 79 If it
had, the religious aspect of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Right Act would
have been endangered. 380 To be sure, the Constitution does not pro-
tect free exercise against private interference. As Michael McConnell
375 For consideration of a wide range of circumstances, both religious and nonreli-
gious, in which burdens are imposed upon others because of autonomous choices together
with a strong argument for the virtue of supporting such choices, see Seana Valentine
Shiffrin, Egalitarianism, Choice-Sensitivity, and Accommodation, in RE-ASONS AND VALUES 270
(Philip Pettit et al. eds., 2004).
376 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
377 Id. at 707-08.
378 Regrettably, the Supreme Court has interpreted Title VII's "reasonable accommo-
dation" of religion requirement to require very little of employers. See Ansonia Bd. of
Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60 (1986) (rejecting the proposition that an employer must
accept the employee's proposed accommodation unless it would result in undue hard-
ship); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977) (holding that an em-
ployer need not accommodate an employee whose religious beliefs prevented Saturday
work if doing so would cause it to bear more than a de minimis cost).
379 Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Marshall, thought that permitting persons to
take off work on the Sabbath constituted an endorsement of the Sabbath. See Estate of
Thornton, 472 U.S. at 711 (O'Connor, J., concurring). I do not see why this law endorses
religion any more than laws exempting believers from controlled substance laws if they
ingest peyote in a religious ceremony. Presumably, the law was passed primarily to support
minority religions since the majority of believers would typically have Sunday off. Even if
the law helped majority believers exercise their religious liberty, however, the removal of
an obstacle to religious practice should not, without more, be considered an endorsement.
380 Mark Tushnet does an admirable job of showing that there can be many hard cases
under the accommodation principle, but this demonstration itself does not imperil the
project of protecting religious liberty against the actions of private actors altogether. Mark
Tushnet, The Emerging Principle of Accommodation of Religion (Dubitante), 76 GEO. L.J. 1691,
1704-08 (1988). Tushnet also argues that accommodation does not easily follow from a
republican or pluralist conception of government. ld. at 1695-1701. The accommodation
strand of religion law seems most closely tied to the liberty value. This presents no prob-
lem for actions at the state and local level where officials enjoy general police powers. It
could, however, present problems at the federal level since the religion clauses confer no
power upon the federal government (except through section five of the Fourteenth
Amendment). This could lead to questions of whether Congress can pass legislation under
the Commerce Clause for non-commercial reasons. Assuming sufficient commercial rea-
sons were not presented and only a tie to commerce were present, one might wonder why
Congress could protect morals under the Mann Act, but not religious practice under acts
such as Title VII.
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observes, "[t]he legislature should have as much latitude to protect
the exercise of religion that it has to protect other important values in
life." 38 ' The state has a substantial interest in protecting its citizens'
free exercise of religion just as it has an interest in protecting them in
a wide variety of other spheres.
2. Unacceptable Conformity with Equality: Equality in the Public
School Classroom
If the complexity of the Establishment Clause means that some
deviations from formal equality are permissible, it should not be sur-
prising that complying with formal equality is not sufficient in other
circumstances. Although conservatives have argued that exceptions
should be permitted in favor of religion in particular legislative
schemes, they have pressed the view that compliance with formal
equality should otherwise be sufficient to meet Establishment Clause
standards. Conservatives, for example, have been arguing for many
years that school voucher programs should be deemed constitutional
under the Establishment Clause so long as the standards for their dis-
tribution do not discriminate against religious or nonreligious
schools. 3 2 Thus, the equality theme loomed large when the Court
decided the landmark case of Zelman v. Simmons-Harris."8 The case
381 Estate of Thornton, 472 U.S. at 703. Smith also seems to make it clear that the re-
moval of burdens on religious activity ordinarily does not violate the Establishment Clause
even if the burdens do not violate the Free Exercise Clause. See Employment Div. v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990); see also Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 453 (1971) ("Quite
apart from the question whether the Free Exercise Clause might require some sort of ex-
emption, it is hardly impermissible for Congress to attempt to accommodate free exercise
values, in line with 'our happy tradition' of 'avoiding unnecessary clashes with the dictates
of conscience.'" (quoting United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633 (1931) (Hughes,
C.J., dissenting))). One might argue that permitting the discretionary removal of burdens
on free exercise places churches in a position of dependence that could have a chilling
effect on their criticism of government. This, for example, has been a historic problem in
Mexico. CHAND, supra note 186, at 196-203. In Mexico, however, the government denied
basic freedoms to those who wished to practice their religion, see id. at 156-59, chilling
religion more than if the government removed burdens preventing free exercise. But see
id. at 196 (explaining that the Salinas government removed anticlerical articles from the
Mexican constitution in an attempt to contain the growing activism of the Mexican clergy).
This makes it all the more important that Free Exercise doctrine err on the side of protect-
ing religious freedom to minimize the chilling effects associated with governmental
discretion.
382 See, e.g., Mark E. Chopko, Vouchers Can Be Constitutional, 31 CoNN. L. Rav. 945, 948
(1999) (arguing that broadly based neutral voucher programs meet constitutional require-
ments); Eugene Volokh, Equal Treatment Is Not Establishment, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL'v 341, 366-68 (1999) (arguing that non-discrimination is required).
383 536 U.S. 639 (2002). For criticism of Zelman, see GaryJ. Simson, School Vouchers and
the Constitution-Permissible, Impermissible, or Required?, 11 COR 4ELUJ. oF L. & PUB. POL'Y553,
564-76 (2002); Note, They Drew a Circle That Shut Me In: The Free Exercise Implications of
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 117 HARv. L. REv. 919 (2004) (claiming that the Cleveland
system severely impaired free exercise values). But see Thomas C. Berg, Vouchers and Relig-
ious Schools: The New Constitutional Questions, 72 U. CIN. L. REv. 151, 220 (2004) (arguing
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forced the Court to consider the constitutionality of Ohio's system of
providing funds primarily to poor children to attend private schools.
The overwhelming majority of recipient families used the funds to
send their children to religious schools. 384 The system presented the
Court with a hard choice: either accept substantial intrusions on seri-
ous Establishment Clause interests or invalidate an important effort to
help poor children enmeshed in a failing urban public school system.
For the Court led by Chief Justice Rehnquist, however, it made
no difference that the recipients of Cleveland's largesse were poor,
nor did it matter that the public schools were in sorry condition.
3 8 5
For the Chief Justice, it was enough that the program was formally
neutral with respect to religion38 6 and that the choice of which school
to attend was a private and independent parental choice, not a deci-
sion of the state.38 7 As a result of the private choice element, Rehn-
quist determined that no reasonable observer could believe that
religious schools were endorsed by the state.3 8 Similarly, Rehnquist
found no purpose to advance religion.38 9
Since the Ohio program, at least on its face, was not designed to
advance religion over nonreligion or to favor one religion over an-
other, the Court maintained that the program met Establishment
Clause standards. As the dissenting Justices observed, this form of
analysis is too fast; indeed, it is utterly impoverished. The difficulty is
that other Establishment Clause values are in play. Vouchers in Cleve-
land forced many taxpayers to support religious ideologies that they
opposed,390 had unequal impact, favored one religion in a substantial
way,3 91 and ignored "the risk that religion can be neutralized, homog-
that "once vouchers are made available for use at private schools, they must be made availa-
ble for use at religious schools as well").
384 In fact, 96% of the voucher recipients used vouchers in religious schools. Zelman,
536 U.S. at 647.
385 These facts were mentioned in the opinion, id. at 644, 657, but they were not rele-
vant to the outcome except to show that Ohio could not reasonably be understood to have
the purpose of advancing religion, id. at 649-54, or to be endorsing religion, id. at 654-55.
"386 Id. at 653; see also Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. -_, 124 S. Ct. 1307 (2004). In Locke, the
Court ruled that formal neutrality in post-secondary school aid was not required when the
state funded scholarships, but refused to fund studies in devotional theology. The Court
observed that the state's interest was not based on hostility toward religion, but rather was
to avoid compromising values relating to establishment of religion. See id. at 1312-14.
387 Id. at 652-53.
388 Id. at 654-55.
389 Id. at 649-54.
390 Forcing individuals to advance religious views they reject is the "primary vice of
government support for private religious schools." Conkle, General Theory, supra note 6, at
1175.
391 96% of the voucher students attended Catholic schools.
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enized, and secularized when it participates in governmental pro-
grams .... "392
The risks of church-state interaction seem particularly acute in
this context. Consider that about half of the children who attend pri-
vate schools are in Catholic schools, 39 3 and that those schools exist
primarily to maintain or to increase the membership of the
Church.3 94 If vouchers are constitutional, the Church has an interest
in using its political power in lobbying to acquire financial aid in the
form of vouchers, to maintain their continued existence, and to shape
the voucher program in ways that might benefit the Church. Simi-
larly, politicians have an interest in extracting benefits from the
Church in return for advocacy with respect to the same issues. This
just can't be the kind of relationship between church and state that is
appropriate under the Establishment Clause.
Of course, churches have lobbied politicians on issues like pov-
erty, civil rights, the environment, and abortion. The state will inevita-
bly be involved in issues upon which churches take a stand.3 95 But
church-state negotiations about the money that will go to help
churches propagate theological doctrines in their schools seem quite
different. 396 Negotiating about state money for proselytizing purposes
392 Conkle, supra note 1, at 22. Berg forcefully argues that churches-not a court-
should make the decision whether to compromise and accept government regulation as
the cost of getting government funding. Berg, supra note 179, at 1635-36. My view is that
this argument assumes the churches will make good decisions in this area where the his-
tory indicates that Roger Williams and James Madison were on to something, ignores the
civic values associated with the checking function of religion and the goal of nurturing
civic virtue, and reads an important goal of the Establishment Clause out of the
Constitution.
393 The percentage has declined substantially over the years. Catholics peaked at 87%
of private school enrollment in 1966 and dropped to 64% in 1982. JosEPH P. VITERITrI,
CHOOSING EQUALITY: SCHOOL CHOICE, TIlE CONSTITUTION, AND CIVIL SOCIETY 81 (1999).
394 MORRiS, supra note 185, at 110-11 (parochial schools established to encourage re-
ception of the sacraments and to prevent mixed marriages).
1195 For an expression of concern about the power of religious lobbies from a Madis-
onian perspective, see Hamilton, Power, supra note 164, at 816-21 ("[Religion] continues
to deserve the mantle of distrust Madison placed upon it."). Though the power of relig-
ious lobbies is regrettable in many contexts, I believe that religious lobbying in the U.S. has
historically benefited progressive politics. Shiffrin, supra note 100, at 1646-52.
396 Cf Daniel 0. Conkle, Does the United States Need an Establishment Clause?: God Loveth
Adverbs, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 339, 345-46 (1992) (distinguishing between worldly and spiri-
tual matters in terms of the political role of religions); Douglas Laycock, The Benefits of the
Establishment Clause, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 373, 381 (1992) (maintaining that religion will
always be part of politics, but theology, worship, and ritual are beyond the scope of
government).
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involves substantial state intrusion into the domain of religion 39 7 and
improper use of the state for religious ends.39
8
I do not mean to argue that these considerations should necessa-
rily be decisive. 99 Professors Berg and McConnell argue with some
force that the rise of the welfare state puts religious institutions in a
less powerful position than they enjoyed at the founding and that
funding is necessary to assure the conditions of religious freedom.40 0
I only mean to suggest here that the Establishment Clause analysis
would have been more rich and rigorous if the full range of values
had been considered and if the conflicts between Establishment
Clause values had been exposed and discussed. 40' What I would like
to discuss more fully is what might happen if a school board embold-
ened by Zelman proposed to bring religion into the public schools in a
formally non-discriminatory way.
Suppose, for example, that a school board thinks it inappropriate
to provide nonreligious education without providing religious educa-
tion. Imagine that it sets a couple of hours per week to permit priests,
ministers, rabbis, other religious teachers, 40 2 and nonreligious hu-
manists40 3 to enter the public schools to give religious or nonreligious
ethical instruction, that students (with parental permission at earlier
ages) are free to enroll in the class of their choice, and that nonreli-
gious electives are available at the same hour.
397 Although Michael Perry supports the constitutionality of financial aid to religious
schools and charities along with nonreligious schools and charities, see PERY, supra note
167, at 3-19, he has also observed that "[o]ne way for government to corrupt religion-to
co-opt it, to drain it of its prophetic potential-is to seduce religion to get in bed with
government; an important way to protect religion, therefore, is to forbid government to
get in bed with religion." Michael J. Perry, Religion, Politics, and the Constitution, 7 J. CON-
TEMP. LEGA-L ISSUES 407, 420 (1996).
398 See Hamilton, Pragmatic Balance, supra note 164; Hamilton, Power, supra note 164.
399 In fact, the majority also underestimates the religious freedom arguments in favor
of vouchers. That the government grants a free secular education to students puts relig-
ious education at a disadvantage. Some argue that this permits or mandates the existence
of vouchers. See, e.g., Berg, supra note 32, at 706 ("Excluding religious agencies from pub-
lic programs . . .produces a regime that favors the secular rather than one that leaves
choices up to citizens.").
400 See Berg, supra note 32, at 714; McConnell, supra note 78, at 137, 161, 183-94.
401 Elsewhere I argue that the constitutionality of vouchers should depend on the con-
text. Steven H. Shiffrin, The First Amendment and the Socialization of Children: Compulsory
Public Education and Vouchers, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PuB. PoL'v 503, 550 (2002).
402 1 leave to the side the potentially difficult question of how to determine who can
qualify as a religious teacher. For example, "70% of the imams in France are self-pro-
claimed." Special Report: Muslims in Western Europe: Dim Drums Throbbing in the Hills Half
Heard, EcoNoMIsT, Aug. 10, 2002, at 21, 23.
403 For a case striking down a school district's program permitting clergy to enter the
schools for group counseling about civic values-among other things, on the ground that
it favored religion over nonreligion, see Doe v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 173 F.3d 274,
287-89, 291-92 (5th Cir. 1999).
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A similar arrangement was declared unconstitutional by the Su-
preme Court in McCollum v. Board of Education40 4 in 1948, but it might
be argued today that the school board was merely rectifying inequal-
ity. Notice precisely what would be at stake. It is already permissible
to teach about religion in the public school curriculum. 40 5 The Consti-
tution does not require that students be uninformed about the relig-
ious diversity of the American people. Schools are free to inform
future citizens about the religious values and positions that inform
many of the most controverted policy issues in the Republic. Such
instruction allows students "to think other people's thoughts instead of ig-
noring them and fearing them (which does not mean thinking as
others do)." 406 Moreover, there are clear circumstances in which relig-
ious proselytizing can take place in the public schools. For example,
suppose a public school allows private organizations in the community
to use its classrooms in the afternoons after school or other times
when school is not in session. If the school is generally open to orga-
nizations, religious organizations may not be excluded even if they are
engaged in proselytizing.40 7 When a limited public forum has been
opened, content discrimination is rarely permitted. In such a circum-
stance, the public school honors freedom of speech; it does not en-
dorse religion.
On the other hand, if a school board in a predominantly Catholic
community approves a course in Catholicism taught by a practicing
404 333 U.S. 203 (1948). The program was applied in grades four through nine with
weekly classes of thirty minutes in the lower grades and forty-five minutes in the higher
grades. Id. at 207-08. The instructors were employed by an interfaith council and were
approved and supervised by the superintendent of schools. Id. at 208. Only Catholics,
Protestants, andJews participated in the program. Id. at 207. In some years there were no
Judaism classes. Id. at 209.
405 See generally Jay D. Wexler, Preparing for the Clothed Public Square: Teaching About Relig-
ion, Civic Education, and the Constitution, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1159 (2002) (arguing
among other things, that schools should teach about religion to prepare students to be
citizens of a religious world and nation). The school board might argue that arguments
are best evaluated by hearing their presentation by true advocates. Cf JOHN STUART MILL,
ON LIBERTY 45 (David Spitz ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 1975) (1859) .
406 kTIENNE BALIBAR, WE THE PEOPLE OF EUROPE: REFLECTIONS ON TRANSNATIONAL CITI-
ZENSHIp 202 (James Swenson trans., 2004). Thomas Berg maintains that instruction in pub-
lic schools would inevitably slight some religions at the expense of others. Berg, supra note
32, at 745. My view would be that the disadvantage of the deviation from equality is out-
weighed by the educational interests at stake.
407 See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 120 (2001) (holding that a
school district was required to permit Christian prayer group to use elementary school
facilities when the facilities had been open to nonreligious groups); Lamb's Chapel v.
Cent. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 395-97 (1993) (holding that a school
district was required to permit a church to use school facilities to show a religious film
series when facilities had been open to nonreligious groups). For criticism of permitting
religious exercises in the public schools, see Ruti Teitel, When Separate is Equal: Why Organ-
ized Religious Exercises, Unlike Chess, Do Not Belong in the Public Schools, 81 Nw. U. L. REv. 174,
187-89 (1986).
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Catholic whose goal is to make Catholicism appealing, the arrange-
ment would clearly exceed constitutional bounds. It is not the busi-
ness of the public schools to endorse Catholicism. The example we
are considering involves none of this. It does not endorse a particular
religion as in Allegheny County and it does not endorse religion over
nonreligion. The school board would argue that itjust gives religion a
fair place at the table.
If formal equality is the sole Establishment Clause value, the
Board has a strong case. After all, the arrangement need not favor
one religion over another,40 8 and it does not favor religion over
nonreligion. Moreover, the size or existence of particular religious
classes would depend not upon the decision of the state, but the deci-
sions of numerous private actors. On Zelman's logic, no one could
reasonably suppose that the state had endorsed any particular relig-
ion. Given that alternative nonreligious classes are available, it would
be unfair, according to the Zelman analysis, to accuse the state of being
motivated by a religious purpose.
If Zelman's analysis is correct, the result in McCullom is open to
question. And perhaps it should be. Public schools in England,
Northern Ireland, 40 9 Spain,4 10 Portugal, 411 Italy,4 12 Germany, 4 1-" and
408 There would invariably be non-neutrality of effect, but, at least in theory, the pro-
gram could be open to those who wish to teach regardless of religious persuasion. Zelman
produced inequality of effect, but the Court did not find this to be fatal. See supra notes
384, 391.
409 FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND BELIEF: A WORLD REORI", supra note 201, at 328-29. In
Northern Ireland, the religious curriculum must be taught in those private schools that
receive public funds. Catholic schools, the main class in this category, use the mandated
religious curriculum, but add to it. Id. The state run Protestant schools simply follow the
curriculum without systematic additions. Id. The Republic of Ireland has no state oper-
ated schools at the primary level, but it funds and regulates private schools, the overwhelm-
ing majority of which are Catholic schools. Id. at 348. A contentious issue in those state
funded schools is not whether religion should be taught, but whether religion can be inter-
woven in the curriculum. Id. The concern is that an integrated religious curriculum dis-
criminates against religious objectors who have a right to be excused from religious
instruction. Id.
410 Id. at 384.
411 U.S. Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report 2002, available
al http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2002/13956.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2004).
412 U.S. Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report 2002, available
at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2002/13941(last visited Sept. 20, 2004).
413 FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND BELIEF: A WORLD REPORT, supra note 201, at 309.
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Poland 41 4 typically teach religion.4t 5 Indeed, in Germany, children
have a constitutional right to receive a religious education in the pub-
lic schools. 416 Perhaps these countries have come to a better reasoned
conclusion about the place of religion in the educational process.
4 17
Perhaps, but there are substantial grounds for believing other-
wise. First, formal equality in this circumstance promises to lead to
substantial substantive inequality. Suppose the system is adopted in
school districts in Mississippi, Utah, and Minnesota. Classes will be
overwhelmingly Southern Baptist in some districts in Mississippi, Mor-
mon in some districts in Utah, and Lutheran in some districts in Min-
nesota. This inequality in itself is problematic. 418 But suppose such a
proposal is enacted in a more heterogeneous district. It might be sup-
posed that such a system could arguably serve an important multicul-
414 According to the United States State Department:
Although the Constitution gives parents the right to bring up their children
in compliance with their own religious and philosophical beliefs, religious
education classes continue to be taught in the public schools at public ex-
pense. While children are supposed to have the choice between religious
instruction and ethics, the Ombudsman's office states that in most schools
ethics courses are not offered due to financial constraints. Although Catho-
lic Church representatives teach the vast majority of religious classes in the
schools, parents can request religious classes in any of the religions legally
registered, including Protestant, Orthodox, and Jewish religious instruc-
tion. Such non-Catholic religious instruction exists in practice, although it
is not common, and the Ministry of Education pays the instructors. Priests
and other instructors receive salaries from the State for teaching religion in
public schools, and Catholic Church representatives are included on a com-
mission that determines whether books qualify for school use.
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, Poland: Inter-
national Religious Freedom Report, at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rs/irf/2001/5727.htm
(last visited Sept. 9, 2004).
415 France is a conspicuous exception to this pattern. Religion is absent from the pub-
lic schools and the French constitution forbids giving state money to religions for any pur-
pose (though tax benefits are provided to "long-established Christian churches and their
Jewish counterparts"). Special Report: Muslims in Europe, supra note 402, at 23. For many
years, the Christian religion was taught in the Ontario public schools, but the Ontario
Court of Appeal struck down the practice on the ground that it violated § 2(a) of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, guaranteeing freedom of conscience and relig-
ion. Corp. of the Can. Civil Liberties Ass'n v. Ontario [1990], 71 O.R. 2d 341. The court
argued that the purpose and effect of the practice was to indoctrinate in the Christian faith
and this was not saved by a provision exempting those who did not wish to participate. Id.
416 For discussion of the nature and limits of this right, see Ingrid Brunk Wuerth,
Private Religious Choice in German and American Constitutional Law: Government Funding and
Government Religious Speech, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1127, 1143-58 (1998).
417 See Charles Fried, Five to Four: Reflections on the School Voucher Case, 116 HARV. L. Rv.
163 (2002). Fried maintains that the widespread support in foreign countries of private
religious schools should be an embarrassment to those who oppose vouchers. Id. at
183-84. But, aside from the differences in culture, whether a foreign government's sup-
port for religion in public schools or for private religious schools should be considered
embarrassing to those who oppose vouchers depends entirely on how well these other
countries' arrangements work in practice. The existence of an arrangement is not a dem-
onstration of its sagacity.
418 TRIBE, supra note 6, at 1174.
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tural purpose. A hallmark of public education is its commitment to
educate children of all classes, races, and religions together.41 9 This
commitment to integrated education fosters autonomy, empathy, cre-
ativity and imagination, equality, respect and tolerance, social skills,
justice, and democratic education. 420 Having children attend relig-
ious classes in the public schools makes it more difficult to paper over
difference, and arguably might foster genuine reflection and dialogue
about the character of those differences and the extent to which there
is unity in those differences. Students who attend to those differences
on this line of thought need not abandon their faith tradition, but by
empathic engagement with those of other traditions, may learn more
about themselves and the traditions of which they are a part.42'
Nonetheless, there is good reason to worry that segregated relig-
ious education in the schools would promote separatism, marginaliza-
tion, and intolerance. Multicultural goals might better be achieved in
the context of teaching about religions generally. In those contexts
students are not formally marked out as separate, and dialogue can
arise out the experience of subject matter taught to all. The presence
of segregated religious education in the schools functions to empha-
size difference in a visible way that would seem to lead students away
from the recognition of unity in difference. This kind of state involve-
ment is contrary to the goals of public schools and seems contrary to
the toleration values embedded in the religion clauses of the First
Amendment.
Moreover, the burden of these disadvantages could fall with par-
ticular weight on the children whose religions are small minorities in
the district. In addition, as previously discussed, there are good rea-
sons to believe that some of the religious teaching in the schools
would be contrary to public goals. That is, such teaching might be
racist, sexist, homophobic, and more generally intolerant; e.g., we are
saved and they are not. The potential for stigmatization and denial of
liberty are not inconsiderable.
These concerns are not rescued by substantial state interests. The
strongest argument for access of religious leaders sounds in equal-
ity.4 2 2 It is sometimes argued that the public schools teach a religion,
419 This was one of the main goals of the common school movement. MACEDO, supra
note 165, at 52-54.
420 Shiffrin, supra note 401, at 513-23.
421 For reflections about this process, see DAVID T.AicY, THE ANALOGICAL IMAGINATION:
CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY AND THE CULTURE OF PLURALISM 405-55 (2002).
422 In the absence of a specific showing, there is no general right of access to the
public school curriculum. To be sure, religious leaders may be permitted in the schools in
some circumstances. If a public high school permits community groups to use its class-
room in the late afternoon, free speech doctrine requires that groups be admitted to this
public forum on a content-neutral basis. Lambs Chapel v. Cent. Moriches Union Free Sch.
Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). Thus, religious groups
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namely secular or ethical humanism. If this were true, the argument
might continue, equal access for other religions should be re-
quired.423 The difficulty with the argument structured in this fashion
is that the premise is simply wrong. The doctrine of secular or ethical
humanism, according to this argument, holds that no God exists.
God, from this account of the secular humanist, is simply supersti-
tion.424 So understood, it seems clear that no public school in
America teaches any such thing. Moreover, the public school bureau-
cracy, including masses of school teachers, is filled with a substantial
portion of religious believers. 425 Indeed, if any school did teach ag-
nosticism or atheism, the Establishment Clause would clearly be vio-
lated. The remedy would be an injunction against the teaching, not a
requirement of access for those with other views.
A better way of making this argument would be to stress that fail-
ing to mention God in the public schools communicates a message of
secular humanism 42 6 and discourages religion.427 One might argue
that the public schools contributed to religious life for most of our
history, but the Supreme Court ended all this by excluding prayer
from the schools. In support of the view that the public schools dis-
courage religion, one might point to the slow, but steady rise of
nonbelievers in the United States. 42 s On the other side, the failure to
mention God in the public schools can also be seen for what it is: an
acceptance of the separation of church and state. Moreover, outside
the public school curriculum, religious clubs flourish; moments of si-
lence exist at the outset of classroom days; prayer groups frequendy
meet before the beginning of school. At the same time God is absent
from the public school curriculum, sociologists marvel at the religious
must be admitted along with nonreligious groups even if the public school maintains that
their admission violates the Establishment Clause. Id. On the other hand, permitting re-
ligious leaders into the schools during class time would be unconstitutional because any
such program would not be opened to public groups at large.
423 This argument is ordinarily employed to justify state funding of vouchers to relig-
ious schools.
424 Some secular humanists might be agnostic or even might believe that God exists,
but would argue that a belief in God is not important for the conduct of life. The public
schools also do not advocate these variations of secular humanism.
425 See Smith, supra note 85, at 174.
426 Fundamentalist Christians in particular think that this is unfair to them. And this is
correct in the sense that the system cannot be justified in terss that any reasonable person
would be bound to accept. See Fish, supra note 36, at 2256, 2257 n.4. On the other hand, if
Christian fundamentalists achieved what they want, the system would be unfair to others in
exactly the same sense. As Fish states, "[t]he only real question is whether the unfairness is
the one we want." Cf id. at 2256. Our choice is to determine which unfair system is better.
427 Hunter, supra note 335, at 68-73.
428 As I have already suggested, it is hard to believe that the absence of school prayer
could account for this rise. See supra note 327 and accompanying text.
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character of the American people.42 9 There are also grounds to
doubt the extent to which the public schools have played a significant
role in religious socialization. It is hard to believe, for example, that
the existence of a ritualized prayer at the outset of a school day had
any substantial spiritual effect.
Indeed, assuming that it is worthwhile for the state to promote
religion, one could reasonably wonder how much would be accom-
plished by the small amount of classroom time involved in such pro-
grams. The European experience would suggest not much. Of
course, it is all a matter of perspective. Perhaps in Spain religious
participation would be even lower if religion were not taught in the
public schools; perhaps religiosity in the United States would be even
higher if religion were taught in the public schools.
Perspective matters on how many personal conversions count as a
success. From the perspective of many religions, every soul counts.
Forty conversions might be a success. From the perspective of govern-
ment, we are supposing that religiosity of the people as a whole mat-
ters in a democratic society. From a civic perspective, affecting the
views of only forty students would not be worth pursuing. But govern-
ment has to adopt a civic perspective, not a religious perspective, and
from the perspective of public goals, evidence that religion in the
schools has substantial effects is hard to come by.4 30 There does not
seem to be evidence that would outweigh the Establishment Clause
concerns.
Perhaps even more to the point, in the end, the issue is not
whether children get religious instruction; the issue is whether they
get it in the schools. If children do not get religious instruction in the
public schools, they can get religious education in their churches,
mosques, or temples. Indeed, the Court in Zorach v. Clason43 1 up-
held released time programs that could, if properly structured, miti-
429 The thesis that religions will disappear as a society develops is shattered by the
American religious demographics. See supra note 198-99 and accompanying text. The
U.S. experience forces sociologists to recognize that the phenomenon is more
complicated.
430 Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi and Michael Argyle's reading of the literature suggests
that "[t]he effects of religious education seem to be quite weak, when other variables are
taken into account." BEUT-HALLAMI & ARGYLE, supra note 228, at 109. They report greater
effects in Catholic schools. Id. at 109-11 ("[It has been found consistently that going to a
Catholic school does have a definite effect on religious beliefs, attitudes, and later church
attendance . . . ."). Others argue that the most important religious education occurs in
early childhood, and that adopting modem educational assumptions about when instruc-
tion should begin causes these religious groups to "neglect the most formative time in
children's lives. In a religious community, five or six years of age is rather late for learning
the important attitudes and rituals of a religious life." Gabriel Moran, Religious Education
After Vatican 1, in OPEN CATHOLICIsM: THE TRADITION AT ITS BEST: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF
GERARD S. SLOvAN 151, 154 (David Efroymson &John Raines, eds., 1997).
431 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
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gate, but not liquidate, the Establishment Clause concerns.
Regrettably, the program upheld in Zorach was doubly defective. First,
the program in essence suspended the duration of the school day by
not holding classes for those who were not released and requiring
them to stay in study hall. 432 Justice Jackson characterized this as a
"temporary jail for a pupil who will not go to church." 43 3 Hyperbolic
as this may be, the failure to provide elective classes seems to take the
program beyond accommodation into using the compulsory machin-
ery of the state to encourage religion.414 Similarly, the Zorach pro-
gram provided that teachers were to receive written reports from
churches to confirm attendance. 43- This, too, seems to cross the line.
Excusing students on religious grounds is one thing; using state ma-
chinery to enforce religious attendance is quite another. 43 6 Nonethe-
less, released time programs not containing the objectionable features
of Zorach strike me as a reasonable compromise. Although concerns
about secular or ethical humanism have been overstated, the underly-
ing equality concern is legitimate. The state is paying students to be
educated in a nonreligious way. Accommodation of the equality con-
cern in this manner allows parents to use time for their children for
religious education in a religious atmosphere. To be sure, the accom-
modation may cause some stigmatization, but stigmatization would
likely be more serious if the children removed themselves to segre-
gated classrooms on public school premises. Of course, the released
time solution is not perfect, but no solution can be perfect when the
values of the religion clauses conflict with each other.
432 Id. at 309.
433 Id. at 324 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
434 For commentary, see Lupu, Trouble, supra note 104, at 743-45.
435 343 U.S. at 308.
436 On the other hand, the Court stated that there was no "indication that the public
schools enforce attendance at religious schools by punishing absentees from the released
time programs for truancy." Id. at 311 n.6. It is not clear what the Court thought the
attendance reports were to be used for or what effect they had. Justice Jackson opined
that, "[tlhe greater effectiveness of this system over voluntary attendance after school
hours is due to the truant officer who, if the youngster fails to go to the Church school,
dogs him back to the public schoolroom." Id. at 324 (Jackson, J., dissenting). The Court
did conclude that the teacher could appropriately make efforts to confirm that the student
was not a tnant. Id. at 313. Justice Black dissenting maintained that the
sole question is whether New York can use its compulsory education laws to
help religious sects get attendants presumably too unenthusiastic to go un-
less moved to do so by the pressure of this state machinery. That this is the
plan, purpose, design and consequence of the New York program cannot
be denied. The state thus makes religious sects beneficiaries of its power to
compel children to attend secular schools. Any use of such coercive power
by the state to help or hinder some religious sects or to prefer all religious
sects over nonbelievers or vice versa is just what I think the First Amend-
ment forbids.
Id. at 317 (Black, J., dissenting).
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CONCLUSION
The attempt to explain the religion clauses by reducing their sup-
port to a small set of values-most commonly equal liberty-is too
narrow. The Free Exercise Clause is supported by seven values: (1) it
protects liberty and autonomy; 4 7 (2) it avoids the cruelty of forcing
an individual to do what he or she is conscientiously obliged not to do
or to penalize an individual for responding to an obligation of con-
science; 438 (3) it preserves respect for law and minimizes violence trig-
gered by religious conflict; 439  (4) it combats religious
discrimination; 440 (5) it protects associational values; 44' (6) it pro-
motes political community;442 and (7) it protects the personal and so-
cial importance of religion. 44 The failure to appreciate this is not
only of theoretical importance, but also of pragmatic importance. If
free exercise is too be given its full weight in a constitutional balance,
the full range of values needs to be considered.
The attempt to reduce the religion clauses to equal liberty is even
less convincing with respect to the Establishment Clause. The Estab-
lishment Clause is supported by seven values: (1) it protects religious
liberty and autonomy including the protection of taxpayers from be-
ing forced to support religious ideologies to which they are op-
posed;4 4 4 (2) it stands for equal citizenship without regard to
religion; 445 (3) it protects against the destabilizing influence of having
the polity divided along religious lines;4 4 6 (4) it promotes political
community;447 (5) it protects the autonomy of the state to protect the
public interest;448 (6) it protects churches from the corrupting influ-
ences of the state;449 and (7) it promotes religion in the private
sphere. 450
The attempt to reduce the Establishment Clause to equal liberty
works well in a case in which the government appropriates religious
symbols to celebrate Christmas as it did in County of Allegheny. Moreo-
ver, the liberty value explains why government sponsored prayer does
not belong in the schools, and it can explain why government can
437 See supra Part I.D.1.
438 See supra Part I.D.2.
439 See supra Part I.D.3.
440 See supra Part I.D.4.
441 See supra Part I.D.5.
442 See supra Part I.D.6.
443 See supra Part I.D.7.
444 See supra Part II.B. 1.
445 See supra Part II.B.2.
446 See supra Part II.B.3.
447 See supra Part II.B.4.
448 See supra Part II.B.5.
449 See supra Part II.B.6.
450 See supra Part II.B.7.
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prevent impingement of free exercise by private employers. But the
values of equality and liberty do not help in explaining why it is per-
missible to put "In God We Trust" on coins. They do not explain why
government can engage in action that contradicts the doctrines of
specific religion such as the teaching of evolution in the schools. Nor
can they explain the complexity of the question of whether govern-
ment can provide aid to private religious schools or permit religion in
the schools on a formally equal basis. Such aid or permission ad-
vances religious liberty and treats religions equally. But it forces tax-
payers to support religions to which they are conscientiously opposed;
in many regions it will support a dominant religion; and it ignores
that the provision of aid creates a dependency of church on the state
that can dull its moral witness and weaken or modify its religious
commitments.
The reasons for the attempt to simplify religion clause analysis
are undoubtedly complex. Of course, a part of the simplification pro-
ject is result-oriented. If one favors vouchers, for example, it makes
things more difficult if the values of the clauses range beyond equal
liberty or if the conceptions of liberty or equality are problematized.
But the drive to simplify the analysis often goes beyond the likely con-
sequences. There is an aesthetic appeal to analysis45 1 that proceeds as
if it were a form of legal geometry.452 Moreover, there is a psychologi-
cal appeal to security in having firm foundations. 4 53 And there is an
appeal to the rule of law in avoiding the kind of messiness and discre-
tion that follows when values come into conflict. There is a sense of
rationality, objectivity, and integrity accompanying a method that min-
imizes subjectivity.454 And there is the appeal to fairness that pulls
toward an ideal of formal equality.
In the end, however, the simplification project can not be en-
dorsed. It asks too much of theory in a context in which theory can
have little resolving power. The pluralistic values underlying the relig-
ion clauses conflict with multiple governmental interests in a culture
with a strong, diverse, and conflicting religious presence. The compli-
cations of these interactions are enormous. Theory can help to reveal
451 See CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 113 (2001)
(criticizing the aesthetic fallacy).
452 Cf JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY oFJusTIcE 105 (rev. ed. 1999) ("We should strive for a
kind of moral geometry with all the rigor that this name connotes."). Of course, the drive
toward proofs satisfying the ideals of geometry is not just aesthetic), see Thomas C. Grey,
Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. Rav. 1, 16-20 (1983), but the aesthetic aspect is not
trivial. See SHIFFRIN, supra note 31, at 121.
453 As Noonan writes, "[t]here is a praiseworthy desire to maintain intellectual consis-
tency. There is a longing in the human mind for repose, for fixed points of reference, for
absolute certainty. There is alarm about the future . . . ." Noonan, supra note 36, at 300.
454 See SHIFFRIN, supra note 31, at 120-28 (discussing the appeal of the Kantian
approach).
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the factors that should be relied upon to resolve problems in concrete
contexts, and theory can help explain why particular problems are
difficult. But the power of theory to dictate results in concrete con-
texts often runs out. Then we must rely on prudential judgment to
make decisions and on practical experience to revise those decisions
when they fail to work on the ground. 45 5 It makes for a messier world,
but it is the world in which we live.
455 Cf ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 288 (1975).
2004]
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